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Abstract 
 
 
Based on Ullman’s (2004) hypothesis that declarative memory impairment will contribute to 
language impairment, this thesis presents two experiments that test familiarity and 
recollection in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Intellectual Disability 
(ID).  Four experimental groups comprised children and adolescents with ASD with language 
impairment (ALI); ASD without language impairment (ALN), intellectually disabled children 
without ASD (ID) and typically developing children (TD).  Children were tested on two 
forced choice recognition tests of familiarity and recollection and a shape recognition and 
cued action-recall test. The relation between familiarity and conceptual semantic knowledge 
was investigated whilst controlling for visuo-perceptual abilities and fluid intelligence. 
Findings confirmed an association between familiarity and conceptual semantic knowledge in 
the ASD population as well as the use of visuo-perceptual skills to enhance familiarity. The 
broader role of declarative memory in language is addressed in ASD. Implications for future 
methods of testing in ASD populations are considered, as are implications of declarative 
memory anomalies in both ASD and ID populations in educational settings. 
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Chapter One 
An Introduction   
 
 
The Autism Spectrum 
 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neuro-developmental disorder that is present from early 
childhood. It has been more recently defined by the American Psychiatric Association's 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, APA, 2013) as a single 
‘spectrum’ disorder that includes disorders that were previously considered separate — 
autism, Asperger's syndrome, childhood disintegrative disorder and pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS).  
 
For a current diagnosis, as stated in the DSM-5 (2013), there needs to be evidence of both 
impairments in social communication and interaction (SCI) as well as restricted and repetitive 
behaviours (RRB’s). Within the SCI domain, deficits must exist across all three sub-
categories pertaining to social-emotional reciprocity; non-verbal communication behaviours 
and in developing and maintaining relationships. Within the domain of restricted, repetitive 
behaviours, two out of four sub-categories must be met. These include: stereotyped or 
repetitive speech, motor movements or use of objects; excessive adherence to routines, 
ritualised patterns of verbal or non-verbal behaviour or excessive resistance to change; highly 
restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus; and hyper or hypo-
reactivity and/or unusual interest to sensory input.  Other determining diagnostic factors must 
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include the presence of these symptoms from early childhood as well as everyday functioning 
being limited and/or impaired by the symptoms. 
 
In addition to the diagnostic determinants, the DSM-5 introduces two ‘dimensional’ features, 
which are ‘severity levels’ and the presence or absence of  ‘specifiers’. Severity levels must 
be established from three levels ranging from “requiring support” to “requiring very 
substantial support” for each of the SCI and RRB criteria. The specifiers then require 
identification as to whether the criteria are accompanied by intellectual and/or language 
impairment; as well as any known medical or genetic condition or environmental factor, and 
catatonia. 
 
The first major change from the DSM-IV to DSM-5 is the ‘new’ term Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD).  This change reflects a scientific consensus that the four previously 
identified  categories: Asperger’s disorder, autistic disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder 
and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified, are not clearly discriminable, 
and are more appropriately considered to constitute a single condition (Grzadzinski, Huerta & 
Lord, 2013; Wing, Gould & Gillberg, 2011). This establishes ASD as more of a dimensional, 
spectrum disorder rather than defining it in terms of subtypes. The second major change is 
within the diagnostic criteria where the original ‘triad’ of core impairments has been 
collapsed into two (SCI and RRB’s) by combining the two domains of impaired social 
interaction and impaired communication.  If no RRB’s are present, a new classification 
defined as ‘Social Communication Disorder’ can now be diagnosed. 
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The Causes of ASD: Cognitive Theories of ASD 
 
Causes of ASD largely remain unknown although it is well established that they are anchored 
in abnormal neurobiology. Many genes and brain structures have been implicated in the 
etiology of ASD but as yet, no biological marker for the disorder has been identified. In the 
absence of such markers, psychological explanations of the disorder have proven useful for 
guiding interventions and treatment. 
 
There are several challenges when trying to look at what might ‘cause’ ASD.  First there is 
the more generic problem of establishing what actually constitutes a ‘cause’ at both 
theoretical and empirical levels and then how ‘unidirectional’ a cause may be. For instance, it 
is difficult at times to establish whether a certain cognitive ‘style’ (as opposed to a deficit or 
relative skill), such as enhanced field independence (the ability to separate details from the 
surrounding context), is a cause or an effect (Happé, 1999). It is also possible that a factor 
like enhanced field independence has a cyclical effect on other cognitive skills, which further 
complicates the possibility of trying to single out and separate causes from effects. In 
addition, the fact that ASD is a developmental disorder and causes and effects are likely to 
change and develop over time makes it much harder to identify a clear-cut cause.  
 
Second, given the nature of ASD’s heterogeneity, research has attempted to look for 
individual causal factors to explain this heterogeneity. However, by looking for a single 
cause, or even multiple causes in ASD (which is more likely) the focus of the researcher is 
redirected towards looking for unifying factors at either (neuro)biological and/or cognitive 
levels, not forgetting environmental possibilities too.  As ASD is defined by such 
heterogeneity it is difficult to establish unifying theories that withstand further research and it 
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is questionable how useful a unifying theory can be if it cannot accurately and convincingly 
explain ASD. However, there are four main cognitive theories that continue to be accepted, 
cited and studied. 
 
The first theory states that ASD is the result of an impaired ability to understand that other 
people have their own beliefs and thoughts, which is called ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). This impairment has been latterly rendered untenable by 
multiple studies that have demonstrated that many individuals with ASD do have the ability 
to imagine the minds of other people (Waterhouse, 2013). Rather it has been shown that 
performance on ToM tests depend more on cognitive and language abilities than on ToM 
(van Buijsen, van Buijsen, Hendriks, Ketelaars & Verhoeven, 2011).  This theory, to a point, 
can explain some of the social and communicative difficulties present in ASD. If a child is 
not able to understand what others are thinking, feeling and believing, it is likely that children 
(and adults) with ASD will behave in ways that may be perceived by others as divergent from 
social norms. This is because to behave ‘appropriately’ in a social context requires a certain 
level of understanding of others including social cues, facial expressions, and nuances in 
spoken language, body language and many more. These types of behaviour are often the most 
striking to a ‘non-expert’ in ASD but cognitive behaviour in ASD is characterised by many 
more anomalies in attention, memory and language which may not be immediately obvious to 
the ‘non-expert’ observer. There are also some specific limitations to the ToM theory of ASD 
if measured by tests of false belief. The most obvious limitation is that there are some 
children, normally those with good verbal skills, who are able to pass tests of false belief..  
These children appear to use a different set of skills to solve ToM tasks and ‘hack out’ 
solutions rather than utilise any form of mentalising ability (Happé, 1994).  Therefore, it is 
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difficult to operationalize ToM into specific components that can be reliably tested between 
TD and ASD populations. 
 
In contrast to the ToM hypothesis there is an alternative theory that relates to social 
motivational ability. Hobson (1993) argues that the primary deficit in ASD is not a difficulty 
in understanding that other people have their own minds but rather that it is a basic 
impairment in the biological capacity to engage in social interaction. He suggested that if 
children with ASD struggle with interaction with others from very early on they would then 
have fewer opportunities to develop an understanding that other people have minds. 
 
However, one salient factor that the two theories above do not address is that children with 
ASD find it difficult to draw together different pieces of information to create a meaningful 
construction of what is perceived (like field dependence mentioned above). This has been re-
conceptualised as ‘weak central coherence’ (WCC) and constitutes another main theory of a 
cognitive cause of ASD (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006). Weak central coherence 
manifests as an attention to parts or details of, for example a picture, rather than the whole. It 
may follow that if children with ASD have a fragmented experience of the world, then their 
behaviour is likely to be fairly meaningless in terms of it containing unintegrated actions that 
may seem more random or impulsive. In addition, if their actions are responses to fragmented 
and discrete perceptions then their behaviour may result in being repetitive and restricted.  
 
Children with ASD often have very good visuo-spatial skills and are skilled at finding 
embedded shapes within a whole picture. During such a task as the Children’s Embedded 
Features Test (Karp & Konstadt, 1963) the embedded shapes do not represent a particular 
object. Weak central coherence means that children with ASD do not attend to the overall 
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picture but rather they are drawn to the individual lines and shapes that make up the picture. 
This results in an ability to locate embedded shapes. The point of this theory is that these 
abilities are not just confined to looking at pictures but rather that they influence the whole 
cognitive system. For example, memories from a birthday tea party may be of the pattern on a 
tea cup rather than an overall memory of whose birthday party it was and whether it was 
enjoyable or not. Also, at the attentional and perceptual levels, how stimuli are processed 
may have much do to with weak central coherence.  Whether or not this particular aspect of 
their cognitive behaviour is conceptualised as a strength or a weakness is interesting. Mottron 
and Burack (2001) have conceptualised this particular cognitive style as an ‘enhanced 
perceptual functioning’ ability whilst Plaisted (2001) contends that this ‘style’ is more to do 
with enhanced discriminability and reduced generalisation simultaneously. 
 
Another explanation stems from a more generalised deficit of executive function which has 
been considered as a major cause of ASD (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991). Executive 
functioning enables us to plan how to achieve a particular goal and relies mainly on the 
prefrontal cortex. The process of planning (and decision making) requires that immediate 
attention to a task is put on hold and replaced by another task that has been decided to be 
more important. If a child with ASD lacks executive control, then their attention may be 
easily captured by other objects or actions and they may be unable to shift from this. The 
executive dysfunction theory as an explanation of ASD is a useful one because it manages to 
account for the broad array of anomalies and difficulties in ASD including both SCI and 
RRB’s.  If s child is ‘locked’ into a basic activity or focused on a particular part of an object 
then they may find it difficult to plan a way of moving onto something else and shifting their 
attention. Therefore the behaviour is repeated over and over again. 
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However, the executive dysfunction account has one major disadvantage and that is that it is 
not confined to ASD.  Deficits in executive functioning can also be found in children who 
have damage to their frontal lobes (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) and although some 
behavioural similarities will exist these children do not have ASD. Therefore a deficit in 
executive functioning cannot alone explain the nature of ASD.  
 
A more recent paper came from Pellicano and Burr (2012) who suggested that autistic 
perception can be explained via Bayesian modelling. Bayesian decision theory states that our 
perceptions are influenced by a combination of incoming sensory information and prior 
knowledge about the world. In ASD, this functions in a way that prior beliefs, which generate 
top-down predictions are compromised which leads to an over reliance on bottom-up sensory 
evidence. In ASD, the authors propose that these Bayesian priors are attenuated and therefore 
result in the anomalistic perceptual experience evident in ASD, which in turn will influence 
their whole learning experience.  If individuals with ASD are less biased by their prior 
experiences, then the authors infer that they may see the world more accurately – “as it really 
is” (Pellicano & Burr, 2012).  
 
This is an interesting account, however, it has been suggested by other researchers that the 
lack of central coherence typical in ASD could also be attributable to attenuated ‘hyperpriors’ 
(which refer to the parameters of estimation by prior beliefs) which is not a failure of 
‘prediction’, but rather an inability to process top-down predictions during the perceptual 
synthesis (Friston, Lawson & Frith, 2013). This would mean that there is a failure of beliefs 
(relating to precision estimation) about beliefs (relating to predictions), which stem from a 
failure of metacognition which is a complex form of higher order thinking involving 
awareness of one’s own thinking. 
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The Role of Language in ASD 
 
The defining features of ASD have always included impaired communication (APA, 2000; 
WHO, 1992). The role of language impairments in this context, however, has evolved. More 
specifically structural language impairment was deemed central to autism as defined in the 
DSM-III (APA, 1987) . However, since Wing’s influential writings on Asperger’s syndrome 
(Wing, 1979; 1981a; 1981b) the presence of language abnormalities in autism have not 
always been considered requisite. She described children clearly who had problems with 
social interaction and communication as well as behavioural inflexibility, but who did not 
have significant language impairments. In addition they did not possess relatively lower IQ’s, 
indeed some were above average as well as having precociously large vocabularies. Wing 
suggested that these individuals should be described as having ‘Asperger’s syndrome’, after 
the German paediatrician who first described individuals with autistic features but no 
language or intellectual impairments (Asperger, 1944). Asperger Syndrome was ultimately 
recognised in the DSM-IV (1994) but in the interim, the DSM-III ® (APA, 1987) reflected 
these cases by acknowledging that autism can also affect individuals who have no language 
or learning difficulties.  But, at this time, instead of recognising Asperger’s syndrome as a 
form of autism, the emphasis on structural language impairment as a diagnostic criterion 
reduced whilst the focus on impaired communication increased. Now, however, the DSM-5 
recognises langauge impairment by appointing it as a ‘specifier’ thus whilst the emphasis on 
structural langauge impairment as a diagnostic criterion has reduced over time, the focus has 
remained on wider social communication impairments including aspects of language 
pragmatics but primarily also non-verbal behaviours. 
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Interestingly there is a huge amount of research into impaired social communication in 
autism, mainly focussing on individuals with normal language at the higher functioning end 
of the spectrum –referred to in this thesis as the ‘Autistic Language Normal’ (ALN) group. 
By contrast, there is relatively little recent research into the structural language impairments 
that most commonly occur in individuals at the lower-functioning end of the spectrum 
referred to here as the ‘Autistic Language Impaired’ (ALI) group. In addition to the lack of 
emphasis in research on structural language impairments (LI) in autism, intellectual disability 
(ID) is also relatively under researched. Yet in around 55% of cases, autism co-occurs with 
intellectual disability (Charman, Pickles, Simonoff, Chandler, Loucas & Baird, 2010; 
Elsabbagh, Divan, Koh, Kim, Kauchali, Marcin, Montiel-Nava, Patel, Paula, Wang, Yasamy 
& Fombonne, 2012).  Moreover, LI and ID most often occur together in ALI. There are many 
more individuals with ALI than ALN with most ALI’s enduring a challenging ‘trio of 
difficulties’ comprising autistic features, intellectual disability and language impairments 
(Loucas, Charman, Pickles, Simonoff, Chandler, Meldrum, Baird, 2008; Boucher, 2012; 
Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001) . This ‘trio’ causes severe lifelong difficulties for 
individuals with ALI themselves and additionally for their families, carers and educators 
resulting in substantial governmental costs (Järbrink & Knapp, 2001).   
 
Currently, the outlook for support for adults with ASD, especially those with ALI, is gloomy. 
A report from the National Autistic Society (Redman, Downie, Rennison & Batten, 2012) 
asked 323 adults with autism what their experiences of employments and benefits was like 
using a quantitative questionnaire both online and by post. 71% of these individuals had 
Aspergers or high functioning autism and the percentage of male and female participants was 
74% and 26% respectively.  Findings showed that in England nearly two-thirds did not have 
enough support to meet their needs with at least one in three experiencing severe mental 
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health difficulties. 51% of adults with autism in the UK have spent time with neither a job, 
nor access to benefits, 10% of those having been in this position for a decade or more. 61% of 
those out of work say they want to work and 79% of those on Incapacity Benefit say they 
want to work (Redman, Downie, Rennison, & Batten, 2009; Rosenblatt, 2008; Wilkins, 
2012). There is therefore a strong need for research into LI in ALI such as would contribute 
to improvements in intervention which would, in turn, positively impact on the futures for 
individuals themselves, their families, and associated costs. The principal aim of this research 
is therefore to investigate causes of structural language impairments in ALI. The most 
common characteristics of structural language in people with ALI will be described in the 
next chapter. Theories as to the causes of LI in ALI will also be presented and discussed.  
 
 
The Aims of this Thesis 
 
Following Boucher et al. (2008a), the work reported in this thesis will test the hypothesis that 
possible causes of LI in ALI are a combination of impaired declarative memory and impaired 
mindreading ability, whilst fully accepting that other factors such as hearing impairment, 
comorbid SLI and low nonverbal intelligence may also contribute in individual cases. The 
first part of the hypothesis is based on Ullman’s (2004) argument that declarative memory is 
necessary for the acquisition of words and word meanings (semantics), whereas procedural 
memory is necessary for the acquisition of the rules of phonology and grammar.  Declarative 
memory is thought to depend on two distinct but mutually supportive processes, namely 
recollection and familiarity (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002; Aggleton & Brown, 2006). 
Recollection is particularly important for episodic memory i.e. memory for personally 
experienced events, whereas familiarity is particularly important for semantic memory i.e. 
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memory factual information including words and their meanings. The typical language 
profile that emerges from group studies of individuals with ALI, as described in the next 
chapter, is consistent with a declarative memory deficit according to Ullman’s theory.  
Moreover, evidence on memory in ALI indicates a combined impairment of recollection and 
familiarity. Evidence for this claim will be provided in Chapter Three. Briefly, impaired free 
recall of events demonstrates impaired recollection and episodic memory (Boucher, 1981; 
Boucher & Lewis, 1989; Millward et al., 2000) and impaired recognition of numerous kinds 
of materials including words and pictures (Boucher & Warrington, 1976; Summers & Craik, 
1994; Barth et al., 1995; Boucher et al., 2008b) demonstrates impaired familiarity such is 
essential for semantic memory and for language acquisition. Notably, studies of memory in 
individuals with ALN reveal milder impairments in declarative memory but with difficulties 
pertaining selectively to recollection and episodic memory whilst familiarity is spared. 
Performance on recognition tests is unimpaired indicating intact familiarity and semantic 
memory (Bowler & Gaigg, 2008), consistent with normal language ability.  A preliminary 
test of the declarative memory explanation of LI in ALI showed that, as predicted, 
recognition was impaired in ALI (relative to ability-matched typically developing children), 
and correlated with conceptual knowledge and vocabulary (Boucher et al., 2008b). Although, 
recognition was also impaired in participants with intellectual disability without autism (ID), 
there was no correlation with language ability.  
 
The second part of the above hypothesis is based on the argument that ‘theory of mind’ (the 
ability to attribute mental states to others) and social engagement are important for early 
language acquisition (Bloom, 2000; Ahktar & Tomasello, 2000).  It also raises the question 
of what causes LI in individuals with ID. The secondary aim of this research is, therefore, to 
assess causes of LI in idiopathic ID, looking in particular at the possible effects of low 
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nonverbal ability. It is recognised that auditory processing impairments, comorbid SLI and 
sensory or neuromuscular impairments may all contribute to language impairments 
(Robinson, 1991). These additional factors will form part of the exclusion criteria for 
participants in attempts to isolate the other factors of interest (memory, theory of mind and 
non-verbal ability).  Language impairment in individuals with idiopathic ID is, like LI in 
ALI, of practical importance but little researched.  Yet recent government reports show that 
children with intellectual disabilities without autism have profound impairments in language 
(Dockrell et al., 2012a; Dockrell et al., 2012b).  These two reports state that in comparison to 
children with autism they are relatively more impaired in structural language and whilst 
phonological skills remain intact there is evidence that their expressive and receptive 
language skills are further compromised compared to children with ASD’s. 
 
There is evidence that non-verbal ability plays a significant role in lexical semantic 
impairments and this will be investigated in this research. This is the case in both individuals 
with ALI and ID (Rapin, 1996) but how specific components of NVIQ interact and affect 
language is still uncertain as well as to what extent. Furthermore, these interactions may be 
different in ALI and ID.  This research should thus contribute to an understanding of the 
problems these ID children face and to improved therapy and education in their case, as well 
as contributing both theoretically and practically to an understanding of ALI.  
 
 
Structure of this Thesis 
 
Chapter Two will review past and present evidence for structural language anomolies in ALN 
and ALI. It will then attempt to outline some of the possible causes of language impairments 
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in ASD. As this is the focus of this thesis, Chapter Three is dedicated to memory in ASD. 
First, memory systems and processes will be outlined followed by a review of declarative 
memory literature in ASD.  General methods comprising all the baseline tests used in this 
research will be described in Chapters Four and Five and Chapters Six and Seven will include 
the methods and results of Experiment 1 (Forced Choice Recognition study) and Experiment 
2 (Shape Recognition – Action Recall study) respectively. Chapter Eight will then discuss 
these results along with the implications at theoretical, empirical and educational levels. 
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Chapter 2 
Structural Language in ASD 
 
Introduction 
 
Early research up until the 1980’s showed that 50-75% of individuals with a diagnosis of 
‘early childhood autism’ never acquired functional verbal language skills (Bryson, Clark & 
Smith, 1988; Rapin, 1991).  Today, that percentage is lower for two reasons. First, as noted in 
the previous chapter, diagnosis up to this point specified that there had to be a clinically 
significant language impairment. The classification of autism later expanded to include those 
with Asperger’s syndrome (AS) or those with higher functioning forms of autism where 
language was not significantly affected. This expansion of the classification of ASD to 
include those with higher functioning forms of autism means that the proportion of those with 
little or no language is smaller today. Second, as ASD is often diagnosed from an early age, 
sometimes as young as two years old, early interventions have led an increasing number of 
children to acquire and develop some verbal skills (Koegel, 2000; Prizant, 1983). However, 
the actual number of these individuals with a language impairment (LI) has not reduced or 
changed.  The majority of non-verbal individuals with ASD have severe or profound 
intellectual disability but there is also a small minority who have superior skills that are in 
advance of their language abilities (Boucher, 2011). It is difficult to estimate the percentage 
of non-verbal individuals because although 25%-30% is a broad estimate, a number of these 
will go on to develop minimal language if they have the relevant education or intervention 
(Wodky, Mathy and Kalb, 2013). 
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Socio-communicative and pragmatic language impairments, which in part define autism 
(APA, 2000) have been extensively researched and a review of this literature is beyond the 
scope of this thesis (for a recent review see Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009). The focus of this 
thesis is on the large proportion of individuals who have additional structural language 
difficulties at a clinically significant level. For this reason, only structural language will be 
investigated in this research, to address the current lack of research here particularly at the 
lower end of the spectrum. 
 
 
Definitions within structural language 
 
Structural language refers to the system of items and rules stored in the brain comprising 
grammar, phonology and semantics. ‘Semantics’ refers to the ‘meaning’ in language (Crystal, 
1987), not only vocabulary but also the analysis of sentence meaning which includes many 
aspects such as prosodic meaning (the way a sentence is said); pragmatic meaning, social and 
grammatical meaning. It also comprises the study of lexemes, which form the basis of 
semantic analysis. ‘Grammar’, comprising syntax and morphology, refers to the structure of 
words, phrases, clauses and sentences and ‘phonology’ is the systematic organisation of 
speech sounds (phonemes) into speech (phonotactics).   
 
The boundary between semantics and grammar can sometimes become blurred particularly in 
morphology where connectives such as ‘if’ and ‘but’ belong under the category of grammar 
‘grammar’ and alongside ‘semantics’ whereas other morphemes such as pronouns, irregular 
noun-plural and verb forms fit better under the category ‘semantics’. Also, with sentences 
that are used in a habitual manner such as “come to think of it” and “think nothing of it” it is 
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argued that people memorise these types of expressions as part of the process of building up 
fluent and connected speech. However, these ‘lexicalised sentence stems’ are not necessarily 
as ‘fixed’ in their structure as conventional idioms and their meaning can be predicted quite 
accurately from their constituent lexemes (unlike “it’s raining cats and dogs”).  This results in 
an area of usage that is midway between grammar (productive sentence types) and semantics 
(properties of particular lexical items) (Crystal, 1987). This is particularly relevant, in this 
instance, to those with ASD, who in spite of possessing a range of semantic impairments are 
able to use their rote memory skills to remember certain phrases regardless of their meaning. 
It may then appear that their semantic skills are more highly developed than they actually are. 
 
 
Features of structural language in ASD 
 
Structural language in ASD is a complex area and there are many factors to address 
simultaneously and this is difficult. First, it is important to consider the broad scope of 
impairment across the spectrum: why do some individuals not display any degree of 
impairment, in fact some show superior skills in specific domains such as rote learning, 
whilst others at the opposite end might never manage any spoken language? And mid-
spectrum there is huge diversity where it is not obvious if language is simply delayed or more 
complexly deviant (Boucher, 2012).   
 
Second, this extreme diversity continues between individuals where there does not appear to 
be any particular ‘pattern’ or ‘consistency’ of specific language skills or impairments that 
cluster together at any point along the spectrum. Therefore two individuals, for example, with 
either a similar IQ and/or similar autistic symptomology may display a widely different 
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profile of language abilities. Nevertheless there is an overall ‘typical’ language profile that 
does emerge when large groups with ASD are assessed but only beyond pre-school age and 
into adulthood (Boucher, 2012). There is still heterogeneity between individuals but this 
simultaneous profile demonstrating an overall developmental trajectory consists of impaired 
comprehension and semantics; whilst phonology and syntax are less affected. This will be 
discussed below. 
 
 
Etiological factors of structural language in ASD 
 
For research and interventions into LI in ASD to be effective it is important to understand the 
possible causes that underpin the diversity of impairments. It is understood that there is no 
single genetic cause of overall autistic symptomology (Happé , 2006) and this would likely 
follow for language impairments more specifically. ASD, by definition, requires a broad 
subset of behaviours to occur together however there is no likely mechanism that would be 
able to cause this co-occurrence (Happé , 2006; Boucher, 2011; Holt & Monoco, 2011; 
Szatmari, 2011). Most theories that unify ASD as having a single cause fail at being 
sufficiently autism-specific because the unifying feature is never only unique to ASD but is 
also present in cases such as intellectual disability, Alzheimer’s disorder or other disorders 
(Waterhouse, 2013).   
 
There are already many proposed and understood causes of structural language impairment in 
ASD and the most ‘unambiguous’ is hearing loss (Rosenhall, Nordin, Sandstrom & Ahlsen, 
1999). There is a significant amount of research that demonstrates how an impairment of 
theory of mind is associated with poor early language skills (Astington & Baird, 2005). There 
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is also evidence suggesting that the language impairment in autism could be due to co-morbid 
SLI (Tager-Flusberg, 2006; Churchill, 1972). Therefore, if the language impairment is not 
‘inherent’ to autism, what exactly is it and how does research account for this? In addition, it 
is necessary to investigate the relationship between nonverbal IQ and structural language 
impairment as well as addressing existing theories of visuo-spatial abilities  as a possible 
contributing factor also. These are all possible causes that will be addressed later in this 
chapter. 
 
 
Features of the literature on structural language in ASD 
 
There are several theoretical and empirical factors that need attention when reviewing 
literature on ASD and language in particular.  First, it is important for the purposes of this 
current research to establish terminology that is helpful, rather than restrictive or absolute, in 
defining the differing abilities along the spectrum.  The studies that are reviewed in this 
section will either be categorised within ASD as including participants who are ‘language 
impaired’ (ALI) or ‘language normal’ (ALN). It must be stated that language abilities lie on a 
continuum in ASD and this boundary is artificial. However, one of the main objectives of this 
research is to investigate the apparent differing characteristics and explanations of both 
higher and lower language abilities. More specifically, in this chapter, mean language and 
verbal abilities in ALI groups refer to standard verbal test scores below 75 and ALN groups 
above 85. This will extend more strictly into the empirical work within this current research 
and will be discussed at greater length below. It must also be noted that scores across studies 
using different measures are not going to equate precisely but it does allow for broader 
comparisons between ALN and ALI. 
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Second, a significant proportion of recent studies include mixed ability groups, which is 
where verbal ability is not differentiated.  It is therefore difficult to identify any similarities or 
differences of structural language anomalies between those with good or poorer verbal 
ability.  However, prior to the late 1980’s, all studies of autism would have been with 
‘language-impaired’ (LI) individuals due to the diagnostic criteria at that time so this, in some 
respects, is more helpful. These early studies provide an invaluable window to structural 
language in lower functioning autism and are not complicated by mixed ability groups 
(although ASD symptom severity and IQ may still be diverse). There is unfortunately little 
research that defines or separates groups with language impairment versus mixed and 
unselected groups with autism. This is regrettable as language profiles may be different and 
consequently the needs of these individuals with LI may be different as well as likely greater; 
and knowledge of this is vital if research is to effectively influence more targeted 
interventions. Since the diagnostic criteria changed to include individuals with more normal 
language it has been difficult to identify studies that are solely dedicated to ALI. There has 
also been much more of a research focus on ALN as well as a large body of studies that 
include mixed ability groups. At the lower end of the spectrum the needs of individuals are 
more complex due to their broader and more severe impairments of structural language. This 
needs to be singled out and investigated. 
 
It is also important to note that from 6.0 – 7.0 years of age some key language impairments 
pertaining to phonology and syntax begin to resolve in individuals with ASD. So at pre-
school age, children with ASD will have a broader range of language impairments than at 
school age and beyond and at times it is therefore necessary to separate out research at these 
age boundaries because the overall profile will be different.  
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As early studies only include participants with ALI, they are dealt with under the ALI 
heading. They will also be followed by later studies that single out groups with ASD with 
language impairment (ALI) as opposed to unselected or mixed ability groups. 
 
 
Language Characteristics: Review of Research 
 
ALI – studies that use participants with ASD who have language impairment  
Early studies and more recent ALI specific  
 
This section comprises research from the early phase prior to diagnosis including HFA/AS – 
thus all studies were ALI by definition; and later studies that state explicitly that their groups 
are ALI or similar.  
 
Phonology and syntax in ALI 
Most early studies of school-age children with ALI show that in phonology and syntax, 
language development is more narrow and delayed rather than deviant and they are grouped 
together here under the same heading for that reason.  When tested on mean length of 
utterance (MLU) Volden and Lord (1991) found that children with ALI had a significantly 
shorter MLU than a TD group of younger children matched on receptive vocabulary, whilst 
the higher functioning groups did not differ.  An earlier study that compared language-
matched children with developmental delay (DD) without autism to an ALI group found that 
articulation was superior in the children with ALI (Boucher, 1976).  However, in a different 
study, when ALI’s were matched for non-verbal mental age (NVMA) with DD children their 
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performances were then broadly equated (Bartolucci, Pierce, Streiner & Eppel, 1976).  This 
may indicate that ALI’s generally have a disproportionately higher non-verbal ability (akin to 
fluid intelligence) as compared to their verbal ability (Lord & Paul, 1997; Siegel, Minshew 
&Goldstein, 1996). This has important implications for matching in experiments because 
their performance will appear relatively higher when matched on NVMA to a DD group. 
Matching strategies are absolutely crucial in the study of ASD and some researchers 
emphasise the need to consider empirial work within a ‘mosaic’ framework containing 
smaller but more precise findings rather than that of a ‘melting pot’ where there may be more 
grander, broader interpretations of findings that may be less precise (Burack, Iarocci, 
Flanagan & Bowler (2004). In research that investigates group differences it is therefore 
important to address the specific context of the comparison groups, the experimental task, the 
developmental level and the matching measures of the individual study rather than 
extrapolate this information to a more general understanding. Therefore, in this case, it is 
important to understand that relative performance on measures such as MLU may be partially 
determined by the matching measure. 
 
Bartolucci et al., (1976) also reported a delay in phoneme acquisition in both ‘verbal autistic’ 
and ‘mentally retarded’ groups. However, there was a significant correlation between the 
frequency of phonological errors and overall language development in the ‘verbal autistic’ 
group which the authors interpret to be an indication of a global delay in language 
development, rather than deviant or delayed in certain areas. In addition, Pierce and 
Bartolucci (1977) found that compared to NVMA-matched in another study, DD children and 
young typically developing (TD) children, ALI’s used a similar rule-governed grammatical 
system which suggests that syntactic development may be more delayed rather than deviant. 
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In a sentence comprehension study, ALI’s performed similarly to TD’s in preferring a word 
order strategy to a ‘probable event’ strategy (Tager-Flusberg, 1981) which suggests that 
syntactic abilities here are MA-appropriate (Boucher, 2012).  They also displayed similar 
preferences in their strategies employed on the task. Also, in another study, despite the fact 
that ALI’s were impaired relative to TD and DD children in comprehension of transitive and 
intransitive phrases, their response patterns resembled controls (Prior & Hall, 1979). Both of 
these studies point towards delayed development rather than deviant development in 
phonology and syntax because of the similarity of strategies and responses used by ALI’s to 
control groups, even if relatively impaired in the latter study (Prior & Hall, 1979). 
 
Morphology in ALI 
In morphology, early research points to both deviance and delay amongst ALI’s in 
comprehension and use of personal pronouns, errors of verb tense marking, use of articles 
and conjunctions and use of closed class words, especially in the early stages of language 
acquisition (Bartolucci, Pierce & Streiner, 1980; Howlin, 1994; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1990; 
Waterhouse & Fein, 1982). There are few studies on morphological development in ALI but 
findings point to early acquired morphological rules being learnt as efficiently in ALI as in 
controls (Waterhouse & Fein, 1982).  It has also been shown that children with ALI (n = 10) 
are more likely to omit obligatory morphemes than TD and DD controls matched on mental 
age (MA), which the researchers suggest may reflect a specific delay in morpheme 
production rather than a more general language delay (Bartolucci, Pierce & Streiner, 1980).  
In a study of ALI children (mean chronological age (CA) = 9 years) compared to a dysphasic 
(in today’s terms Dysphasia is more akin to Specific Language Impairment, SLI) control 
group, Cantwell, Baker & Rutter (1978) found similar performance in the use of morphemes 
in spontaneous speech. The only differences were that the ALI group displayed more 
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echolalic and abnormal speech. These mixed results may be due to the types of control 
groups used and the variables on which they were matched.  In the Waterhouse & Fein study 
(1982) a mixed group of developmentally disabled children formed the experimental group 
and were matched to three different control groups of TD children; one was matched for 
chronological age, one for MLU and one for performance on a perceptual test.  Contrastingly, 
the Bartolucci et al., study (1980) matched groups of TD and DD children to an ALI 
experimental group on MA; and the Cantwell et al., study (1978) only used a control group 
with dysphasia/SLI.  These apparently diverse results underscore the relevance of different 
types of control groups that can be used in developmental research (Eigsti et al., 2011).  For 
instance, when ALI participants are compared to a group matched overall on MA, it may 
appear that the ALI children have delayed syntactic skills but these may not be apparent 
when compared to a language impaired DD group matched on IQ. In terms of understanding 
whether development is deviant or delayed, the role of control groups here is pivotal. 
 
Semantics in ALI 
In contrast to findings of delayed rather than deviant phonological and syntactic 
development, as early as Kanner (1946) semantic development was consistently found to be 
deviant. The use of idiosyncratic and stereotyped language featured highly amongst ALI’s 
and arguably was a defining difference between children with autism and those with SLI 
(Bartak, Rutter & Cox, 1995). ALI’s tend to use an excess of echolalic, stereotypic and 
bizarre language and the majority of these utterances relate to a meaning or context that was 
at the origin of their initial learning (Fay & Schuler, 1980; Prizant & Duchan, 1981). In the 
case of the ‘initial learning phase’, Fay and Schuler (1980) state that individuals with autism 
are severely limited in their understanding of word meanings because they are so bound by 
this initial learning situation. What occurs in here is that a word or phrase will be learnt with 
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a single referent rather than a rich, generalisable network of meanings and associations that 
also adapt and update over time with repeated occurrences (Fay & Schuler, 1980). Thus 
language will be ‘stalled’ in terms of its depth and maturity at a young age because first 
associations are the only associations that are grappled and processed. This therefore sets up a 
very narrow and inflexible foundation for the building and use of context in language for an 
individual with ALI and it will likely become more and more narrow as they get older.  
 
The processing of meanings has also been shown to be anomalous amongst ALI’s as shown 
in studies that test sentence recall or recall of semantically related word lists. With TD and 
DD children, recall on semantically related words is higher than in non-related conditions 
because they can use meaning to aid recall. However in ALI this is not the case and their 
performance is not enhanced by semantic relations of to-be-remembered material (Fyffe & 
Prior, 1978; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1967).  Moreover, ALI’s are less able to use or rely on 
lexical or sentential meaning to facilitate verbal recall. What causes this particular 
impairment was argued to be a fundamental difficulty in the acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge (Fay & Schuler, 1980; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1970). However, Tager-Flusberg 
(1991) showed that ALI’s can indeed use semantic cues to aid verbal recall but they do not 
use similar semantic clustering strategies in a spontaneous way as age and verbal IQ-matched 
developmentally delayed children . This finding was shown in a task that replicated Boucher 
and Warrington’s (1976) study where children were presented with semantically related word 
sequences in which the words came from a number of categories and random semantically 
unrelated word strings.  
 
Later studies looking at adolescents have found additional impairments in ALI with spoken 
word recognition using the gating paradigm (Loucas, Riches, Baird, Pickles, Simonoff, 
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Chandler & Charman, 2013). A gating task presents listeners with increasingly long 
fragments of a word (gate) and asks them to identify the word after each gate (Grosjean, 
1980).  In a study investigating both ALI and SLI, with all groups including TD matched on 
non-verbal IQ, adolescents with ALI needed additional speech input to identify low-
frequency words which have low competitor density, i.e. fewer already formed lexical 
representations. The authors speculate that these differences could be due to less well-
specified word form representations, which may affect spoken word recognition. 
 
Contrastingly, an earlier study by some of the same authors testing for interpretation of 
compound nouns in adolescents found that both SLI and ALI groups performed similarly in 
that their difficulties extended to processes of word formation which may reflect difficulties 
in making analogies with stored lexical items (Riches, Loucas, Baird, Charman & Simonoff, 
2012). The authors conclude that these results support the hypothesis of a phenotypic overlap 
between SLI and ALI and this will be discussed briefly in the section relating to causes of LI 
in ALI. But first, studies with mixed ability groups will be reviewed that do not differentiate 
between ALI and ALN. 
 
 
ALI and mixed ability 
 
Preschool age 
 
With the advent of advances in early diagnosis, research started to show that the notion of a 
language delay in ALI was an oversimplification and that indeed language patterns in 
children with autism were different to both TD and DD children.  According to Rapin & 
 36 
Dunn (2003) 63% of pre-school children with autism with language impairment (ALI) have 
impaired phonology and grammar whilst only 37% have problems with ‘semantic meaning’ 
(defined in this study by a diagnosis of a higher processing order involving receptive and 
expressive semantics). Wolk and Giesen (2000) confirm deviant and delayed phonological 
impairments in pre-school children as shown in their case studies of four siblings. Impaired 
grammar has also been found by Eigsti, Bennetto & Dadlani (2007) in a comprehensive study 
that investigated three key areas of structural language. These areas were measured using the 
Inventory of Productive Syntax (IPSyn; Scarborough, 1990); Mean Length of Utterance 
(MLU) as measured in morphemes; and Number of Different Word Roots (NDWR) to assess 
lexical-semantic knowledge. On the IPSyn, children with ASD were not only significantly 
impaired compared to age, language and non verbal IQ matched TD and DD children; but 
they also showed a different pattern of scores which again shows a deviant as well as delayed 
type of development. Children with ASD also had shorter MLU than both the TD and DD 
groups but by contrast they produced a similar number of word roots as the TD group and 
significantly more than the DD group. In addition they produced significantly more jargon 
than both control groups. 
 
In a large-scale study, Charman, Drew, Baird & Baird (2003) found that pre-school children 
with ASD had delayed language onset and a slowed rate of development. More specifically, 
phrasal understanding achieved by TD children at age 1 year and 4 months was not reached 
(as a group) until age 4:0, and a non-verbal mental age of 3 years 6 months in ASD children. 
This same study as well as another large scale study by Luyster, Lopez & Lord (2007) also 
found that children with ASD understood more words and phrases than they used 
spontaneously, following the normal pattern.  However, what was interesting in both of these 
studies is that the divergence between comprehension and production was much smaller in 
 37 
the ASD group than in the TD group (Hudry et al., 2010). This may be due to children with 
ASD using words and phrases without accessing their full meaning (Charman et al., 2003). 
 
It is interesting to note that up until the age of 6 years there is clear evidence that children 
with ASD have significantly delayed language development in the areas of phonology and 
grammar. This finding is contrary to the results of earlier studies carried out with the school-
age children with ALI where phonology and grammar improve dramatically but semantic 
difficulties are retained.  Rapin & Dunn (2003) suggest that this is due to a change in the 
profile of language impairments with age; which highlights the non-linear nature of the 
developmental language trajectory in ALI. They also speculate that the children in the groups 
previously mentioned may have had a higher non-verbal IQ than the children in their study 
but this was challenged with findings from Eigsti et al., (2007).  
 
In a follow up study with the same children Rapin, Dunn, Allen, Stevens & Fein (2009) 
reassessed the pre-schoolers when they were 7 and then 9 years old. 11% of the group had 
clinically normal language and 73% had unimpaired articulation with mild or moderate 
impairments of higher order syntactic and semantic comprehension. This pattern conformed 
in general terms to the language profile that had been identified by the earlier studies of 
school age ALI’s mentioned above. For the 26% of children remaining, the majority were 
globally impaired both linguistically and intellectually apart from a small subset who had 
unimpaired comprehension but severe articulatory impairments. These findings have 
contributed significantly to our understanding of language profiles in ASD and particularly to 
what extent certain aspects of language impairments may resolve with age, but interestingly 
not in all cases.  
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Geurts and Embrechts (2008) found similar results supporting Rapin et al., (2009) study 
whereby at preschool age the language profiles of children with ASD largely resembled those 
of children with SLI. This included expressive phonological and syntactical impairments; 
however by school age the language profiles in the two groups had diverged. This is mainly 
due to higher order processing and pragmatic language impairments that become more 
dominant in children with ASD as they get older whereas in SLI, pragmatic development is 
conserved yet grammar and syntax are still impaired. Similarly, Bennetto et al., (2008) 
showed that structural language impairments were more common in children with ASD when 
assessed at 7 years of age and that these impairments at this particular age are likely to 
predict continued impairments into adolescence. 
 
Park et al., (2012) showed that young children in a mixed ability group (3-6 years) with 
autism demonstrate an uneven pattern of language development specifically in morphological 
and syntactic skills. Contrary to their hypothesis, only some skills (such as the use of verb 
phrases) were atypical, some were delayed due to overall developmental delay (the use of 
regular plurals, noun phrases, sentence structures, length of utterances as well as past tense 
and third person singular). Some skills were intact (the use of –ing, auxiliary verbs, 
contractible copula verbs and articles; questions and negation). These results differ quite 
substantially from those of a similar study conducted by Eigsti et al., (2007). Whilst Park et 
al., (2012) found that there were only impairments on a few of the measures, Eigsti et al., 
(2007) found a more consistent profile of impairments, which included a less developed use 
of noun and verb phrases, questions and negation and sentence structure when compared to 
both TD and DD children. Both studies used the Index of Productive Syntax (IPSyn, Moyle 
& Long, 2013) however, there were other methodological differences that could contribute to 
the discrepancy in findings, such as smaller sample sizes in the Park et al., (2012) study as 
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well as language samples that were collected from the ADOS rather than free-play sessions. 
In addition, unlike the Eigsti et al., (2007) study, the Park et al., study (2012) used a mixed 
ability group and the within-group variability was consistent with previous research that 
investigated heterogeneity within autistic populations (Jarrold, Boucher & Russell; 1997). 
Park et al., (2012) acknowledge that larger sample sizes are required to test within-group 
variability, which is critical to understanding the sub-groups of language skills present in 
autism.  
 
School age and adult 
 
Having looked at the pattern of profiles in the earlier years, language at school age, as well as 
in adulthood, needs attention.  Kjelgaard and Tager-Flusberg (2001) assessed language in a 
group of 89 children with autism between the ages of 4;0 and 14;0 years. They administered a 
wide battery of tests from the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals—Third Edition 
UK (CELF-3UK; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2000) and calculated participant scores against age 
appropriate norms. Given the wide range in both age and ability the results were 
heterogeneous. Yet when the scores were grouped into categories for normal language, 
language impaired (ALI) and borderline language, based on vocabulary comprehension, the 
pattern emerged that was noted in earlier studies with school-age children with ALI. 
Specifically, phonological impairments were absent in the normal and borderline groups and 
only mild in the ALI group. Expressive and receptive single word vocabularies were 
relatively more impaired than articulation in all three groups but most significantly in the ALI 
group. Only 44 out of the 89 children were able to complete all the tests and amongst them 
higher order receptive and expressive language was more impaired than single word 
vocabulary. The other half of the participants were unable to complete the tests which is 
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indicative of the low ability level of some of the participants.  Productive syntax was least 
affected throughout the whole sample whereas receptive language was markedly more 
impaired than expressive language. In terms of age and previous patterns of language 
mentioned above, interestingly the scores from the children that did the preschool CELF were 
lower than standard scores from those that did the CELF-3 UK for ages 6 years and above 
(Semel et al., 2000). This is consistent with Rapin et al.,’s (2009) findings that suggest that 
structural language impairment in autism is relatively more pronounced in the early preschool 
years as the profile changes with age. 
 
Syntactic abilities, specifically grammatical structures in spontaneous language, have been 
found to be relatively intact in school age children with ASD (Condouris, Meyer & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003). Also, in ALI’s from 6:0 years, use of syntax was unimpaired compared to 
TD children and superior to children with SLI (Shulman & Guberman, 2007). This marks a 
difference in language abilities and profiles between children with SLI and ASD and is 
further confirmed by studies also reporting superior performance of ALI’s on tests of the 
comprehension of grammar (Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2003) and the processing of syntactic 
complexity (Riches, Loucas, Baird, Charman and Simonoff, 2010).  
 
Further differences between ASD and SLI are found in an interesting study by Loucas, 
Charman, Pickles, Simonoff, Chandler, Meldrum & Baird, (2008) that investigated whether 
the co-occurrence of ASD and language impairment is linked with differences of severity or 
pattern of autistic symptomatology or language profile. Findings indicated that on the Social 
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003), a ratings scale for ASD, 
ALI’s did not exhibit more autistic symptoms than ALN’s and that children with SLI were 
well below the threshold for the number of traits related to ASD. Interestingly, in ALI’s the 
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combination of ASD and language impairment was linked with weaker functional 
communication and more severe receptive language difficulties than those found in SLI. 
Whilst receptive and expressive language were equally impaired in ALI, receptive language 
was stronger than expressive language in SLI. The authors conclude that the co-occurrence of 
ASD and LI is not associated with increased autistic symptomatology but rather with greater 
impairment in receptive language and functional communication.  
 
Unlike syntax, difficulties with morphology are often present in children with ASD. Three 
studies have found similar results.  Condouris et al., (2003), mentioned above, reported that 
in ALI’s, the mean MLU as measured by morphemes was 2 standard deviations (SD) below 
age-related norms in spite of the fact that vocabulary comprehension was around normal in 
most participants. Also, in a follow-up study from the Tager-Flusberg et al., (2001) study 
mentioned above, three groups of children (ALI, ALN and borderline) were tested for 
production of verb tense endings.  
 
The ALI group showed marked impairments and some morphological errors but the normal 
language and borderline language groups also showed error in use of irregular past tense 
verbs such as ‘spoke’ and ‘ran’ (Roberts, Rice and Tager-Flusberg, 2004).  Botting and 
Conti-Ramsden (2003) also found deviant use of verb tense marking in school age children 
with ALI but the type of errors were not recorded as part of the study. These findings point 
jointly towards an impairment in the acquisition and use of certain types of morphemes, such 
as past tense endings. 
 
Lexical-semantic ability has already been shown previously to throw up varying difficulties 
for children with ALI. In a word fluency task, children aged 4-9 with ALI were more likely to 
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choose unusual words like ‘aardvark’ over more prototypical items (Dunn, Gomes & 
Sebastian, 1996).  Compared to their TD counterparts who instead chose more ‘predictable’ 
and ‘likely’ items this indicates a possible difference in semantic organisation (Eigsti et al., 
2011). Moreover, in a word fluency task, it is more usual for participants to remember items 
in clusters of semantic meaning or informal categories. For example, if a participant 
remembers the word ‘sheep’, this will likely prompt them to remember other similar words of 
closer semantic meaning, such as other animals: ‘pig, ‘cow’ and so on. Therefore, the use of 
unusual words such as ‘aardvark’  could derive from reduced reliance on semantic 
connections that could normally aid word fluency, as it does in TD populations. 
 
In the study above by Condouris et al.; (2003) mean scores on a test of number of different 
word roots (NDWR) from a natural language sample were also 2 SD’s below age-related 
norms like MLU but this finding differs from a later study that found NDWR to be 
unimpaired in preschool children relative to a TD group and superior to a DD group (Eigsti et 
al., 2007). However, Condouris et al.,’s study was with older children and this finding may be 
explained by the formulaic and repetitive nature of spontaneous language used and ‘learnt’ by 
adults with ALI (Perkins, Dobbinson, Boucher, Bol & Bloom, 2006). The Perkins et al. study 
looked at natural language samples from seven young adults with ALI and noted that they 
show a repeated preference for certain lexical items, phrases and also grammatical structures 
which would limit the range and variety of words and word forms used. Referring back to 
Fay & Schuler’s (1980) point earlier of first learnt language words and structures, this further 
highlights the paucity of language ‘experience’ and context amongst ALI’s. In a more recent 
study, single sentence level semantic processing was found to be intact in a mixed ability 
group of children with ASD (mean verbal IQ = 77) when dative (a grammatical case 
indicating the indirect object of a verb) expressions used a prepositional phrase, such as ‘to’, 
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but when the dative action was expressed in the syntax they were relatively impaired 
(Stockbridge, Happé  & White, 2014). Hence the group with autism here performed more 
poorly when the dative expression could be syntactically alternated than when it was 
restricted.  The authors argue that this may be due to a weakness in central coherence and this 
is discussed further below. 
 
 
ALN – studies that use participants with ASD who have normal language 
 
Structural language, as defined in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), may appear to be ‘fairly normal’ 
in high functioning ASD (HFA), or ALN, but on closer examination this is not the case.  
Within phonology, whilst Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg (2001) found that articulation was 
normal in ALN’s, Shriberg, Paul, McSweeny, Klin and Cohen (2001) found that a third of 
their participants with ALN had sub-phonemic articulatory distortions (e.g. with ‘r’ and ‘s’). 
More recently, Cleland, Gibbon, Peppe, O’Hare and Rutherford (2010) reported that a higher 
41% of their participants with ASD with normal language had several articulatory errors with 
12% of the total group having impairments that were clinically significant.  
 
Whilst Asperger described language used by his patients to be superior in breadth (Asperger, 
1944/1991; translated in Frith, 1991), later studies found receptive and expressive 
vocabularies to be average (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001) or in the low normal range 
(Howlin, 2003).  Furthermore, higher order language processing is more impaired than 
vocabulary (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001) with comprehension being more affected 
(Salaasti et al., 2008).  The picture that begins to emerge from these findings is that 
performance on ‘simple’ tests may generally resemble controls but on more ‘complex’ tasks 
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impairments and anomalies start to appear. This is further confirmed in a study that tested 
performance on more ‘simple’ tests, such as the vocabulary subtest from the Weschler scales 
(Weschler, 1997,a,b); compared with more ‘complex’ tests of reading comprehension 
(Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel, 2006). Although it does not suggest that every individual with 
ALN has below average performance on complex language tasks, it nevertheless 
demonstrates that semantic and grammatical profiles in ALN do not follow the same pattern 
as TD individuals. 
 
The precise nature of these differences is not obvious and requires exploration. The 
idiosyncratic nature of language use regularly observed in ALN’s (Mayes & Calhoun, 2001; 
Volden & Lord, 1991) suggests differences in their semantic processing.  
Volden & Lord (1991) looked at samples of natural language and found that real words were 
often used with incorrect meaning such as ‘waves’ for ‘leaves’. In addition, Dunn, Gomes & 
Sebastian (1996) found an excess of low frequency responses in a category-cued word 
fluency test compared to groups with either SLI or TD.  Also, naming speed for low 
frequency stimuli was shown to be superior in ALN but contrastingly impaired for high 
frequency stimuli (Walenski, Mostofsky, Gidley-Larson & Ullman, 2008).  In addition, 
Kelley, Paul, Fein and Naigles (2006) found that children who no longer had diagnoses of 
ALN, despite showing intact receptive and expressive vocabularies, still showed immature 
lexical knowledge on a test of the understanding of verb-argument structures but performed 
normally on single word comprehension and naming tests. Verbal memory, also, is indicative 
of anomalous semantic processing. In particular, the use of semantic clustering is impaired 
(Bowler, Matthews & Gardiner, 1997). In another study, it was found that neurotypical 
individuals develop similar sequences in recall of words over repeated trials, but individuals 
with ALN developed idiosyncratic sequences (Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008).  
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Results from tests of semantic knowledge in ALN may sometimes appear comparable to TD 
populations and therefore may be interpreted as ‘normal’. For example, use of category cues 
in single word recall has been shown to be unimpaired in ALN’s (Mottron, Morasse & 
Belleville, 2001; Whitehouse, Maybery & Durkin, 2007) but ‘normal’ performance on these 
tests does not necessarily indicate ‘normal’ semantic processing. Kelley et al., (2006) note 
that whilst vocabulary tests assess knowledge of the identification function of words they do 
not probe conceptual networks that underpin word meanings. Hence there are different levels 
of semantic processing some of which are shown not to be intact even in ALN.  Dunn and 
Bates (2005) support this observation and note that individuals with autism do not seem able 
to extract and apply commonalities among category numbers. The fact that they are 
contrastingly able to comprehend basic concepts and word meanings can appear misleading 
to researchers if the varying levels of semantic processing are not investigated. 
 
Grammatical impairments in ALN are less clear-cut and there is mixed evidence in both 
syntax and morphology.  Kelley et al.,’s (2006) study found intact productive morphology 
and syntax alongside the subtle impairments of lexical-semantic knowledge and processing.  
Similarly, a more recent study by Diehl, Bennetto, Watson, Gunlogson and McDonough 
(2008) showed that use of syntax to disambiguate sentential meaning was not impaired in an 
ALN group who were matched to a control group for full scale IQ (FSIQ) and receptive 
language scores on the CELF. Contrastingly, Volden and Lord (1991) report that grammatical 
errors (unrelated to development) were significantly more common in school age children 
with ALN than in controls correlating also with MLU. In addition, Eigsti and Bennetto 
(2009) found a reduced sensitivity to grammatical errors in children with ALN but this 
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reduced sensitivity only occurred when errors were embedded in long sentences which may 
suggest that memory load is implicated here (Boucher, 2012).  
 
Interestingly, a study by Tyson, Kelley, Fein, Orinstein, Troyb, Bartron, Eigsti, Naigles, 
Schultsz, Stevens, Helt & Rosenthal (2013) found support for language relying on verbal 
memory even in individuals who had an original diagnosis of ASD and were now considered 
‘optimal outcome’ (OO) with no further diagnosis. Even if some individuals lose their ASD 
diagnosis, they found that subtle weaknesses in language may still persist. Although their OO 
group scored similarly to their TD group, unlike their higher functioning (HFA) group who 
performed relatively lower on multiple language measures, even when controlling for verbal 
IQ, the OO group still showed that their language demonstrated greater reliance on verbal 
memory. 
   
A number of useful pointers regarding expressive language development in both ALI and 
ALN have come from a recent study by Tek, Mesite, Fein and Naigles (2014) who found that 
there are likely two distinct language profiles children with ASD. Tek et al., (2014) stress the 
importance of separating ALN and ALI in research due to the fact that these two distinct 
profiles suggest two distinct developmental trajectories within ASD. They found that children 
with low verbal skills, (ASD-LV; broadly similar to ALI) showed a flatter trajectory across 
most expressive language measures and that their impairments were more indicative of a 
global delay; whereas children with higher verbal skills (ASD-HV; similar to ALN) not only 
had far fewer impairments but that they were also more specific to acquisition of certain 
grammatical structures, such as wh-question complexity. The implications of these findings 
are that if there are phenotypic differences at this level, this may suggest genotypic 
differences that are useful for identifying genetically meaningful subgroups in autism.  For 
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example, these subgroups may overlap with other developmental disorders such as SLI. 
However, one limitation of this study, by the authors’ own admission, was that only 
expressive language was investigated and it would be extremely useful to know if such 
patterns were similar in language comprehension.  Tek et al., (2014) also highlight a 
fundamental difficulty that is present within language research with children with ASD. Not 
only is it not useful to draw conclusions from mixed ability groups but also it is vital to 
recognise that because language acquisition is steeper at younger ages experimental groups 
need to equate verbal ages using a more narrow range to pinpoint this. 
 
 
Possible Causes of Structural Language Impairment in ASD: Theories and 
Findings 
 
It has now been recognised that there is unlikely a single cause to ASD (Waterhouse, 2013; 
Boucher, 2011; Szatmari, 2011; Happé, 2006).  Although the unifying factor of ASD is the 
co-occurrence of a specific set of separate behavioural and physical disorders, there are no 
serious attempts at proposing that one single mechanism either in the brain or less likely in 
the environment causes this range of symptoms (Waterhouse, 2013).  Happé et al., (2006) 
have argued that each of the diagnostic criteria for ASD is separate but the question is why 
these features occur together at above chance rates.  It remains a key question as to why this 
occurs and Boucher (2011) stresses the difficulty in explaining how such a co-occurrence of 
different symptoms in varying combinations could have created a single unified autism brain 
dysfunction.  Therefore whilst it is unknown as to why or how any mechanism would cause 
the wide range of individual variation in ASD to form itself into a meaningful continuum, it 
is still essential to look at a range of valid causal factors.   
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There are several proposed causal factors that arguably contribute to an impairment in 
structural language in ASD, such as Theory of Mind impairment; co-morbid specific 
language impairment (SLI), low nonverbal IQ and declarative memory impairment. It is also 
recognised that any additional hearing impairment will affect language acquisition and 
despite its bearing this will not be discussed here. In addition to these possible causes it is 
also necessary to examine how these causes may contribute to the main anomalies in 
structural language impairment described earlier: that is how is it that structural language 
impairment in ASD is simultaneously delayed, deviant and heterogeneous across the 
spectrum? Any valid causal factors of LI in ASD must be able to account for these 3 key 
language anomalies, not necessarily all together. 
 
 
Specific Language Impairment 
 
Earlier research has suggested that comorbid SLI constitutes a possible explanation of LI in 
ASD (Churchill, 1972; Rutter, Bartak & Newman, 1971). This was later rejected by evidence 
from longitudinal studies (Bartak et al., 1975, 1977; Cantwell, Baker & Rutter, 1978). More 
recently there has been renewed interest and it has been proposed by Tager-Flusberg and 
colleagues that there is a partial overlap between SLI and ASD.  They propose that among 
children with ASD there exists a subgroup who have both ASD and SLI whom they named 
‘ALI’ (note the italics), which is not to be confused with the terminology that is used 
consistently in this research referring to individuals with ASD and language impairment 
(ALI)). Tager-Flusberg and colleagues have presented findings showing similar language 
profiles as well as structural brain abnormalities in both SLI and ALI. There are similarities at 
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a behavioural level where certain ‘marker behaviours’ that feature in SLI are also seen in ALI. 
For example, impaired non-word repetition and confirmation of errors in verb tense marking 
are usually associated with SLI. However they have also been found to be present in some 
cases of ALI (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Roberts et al., 2004).  In their follow-up 
study of Kjelgaard & Tager Flusberg’s original study, Roberts et al., (2004) found that their 
ALI group made fewer correct responses on a past tense verb marking task and on 3rd person 
singular tests.  Roberts et al., (2004) interpreted this finding to be an indication of a 
significant similarity between ALI and SLI that would support the notion that co-morbid SLI 
is a main cause of LI in ASD.  However, Williams, Botting and Boucher (2008) conducted a 
re-analysis of Roberts et al.,’s (2004) findings and proposed that the types of errors made by 
the children in the ALI group were qualitatively different from the errors that are typically 
made by children with SLI. One example of this was that echolalic responses by children 
with ALI were collectively classified as being ‘no response’. Echolalia is a key trait in ASD 
and not in SLI, and a more extensive analysis of participants’ responses is shown to be 
necessary. For a more detailed account, see Williams et al., (2008) but this one example alone 
highlights the point that there is evidence for separate types of language difficulties in SLI 
and ASD. 
 
There is also a significant amount of research that has reported a subgroup of children with 
SLI who also have pragmatic impairments similar to those seen in ASD, sometimes with 
additional semantic impairments but with intact phonology and grammar (Bishop & Norbury, 
2002; Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 1999; Rapin & Allen, 1983). Interestingly there is also a 
subgroup of individuals with ASD that demonstrates phonological impairments in the 
absence of any intellectual disability or impairment of comprehension. These tend to be older 
individuals so their phonological difficulties would have usually resolved, yet instead, their 
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profile seems to correspond more with individuals with SLI (Cleland at al., 2010; Rapin et 
al., 2009). So there is an evident overlap from each disorder at a behavioural level. Bishop 
(2010) suggests that there is a genetic overlap as seen when cases of SLI resemble those of 
ALI and although such overlap represents only a minority of cases, it is unlikely to be due to 
chance.  
 
However, the typical language profile in ASD is very different to SLI because expression 
rather than comprehension is more usually impaired in SLI; as well as grammatical and 
phonological impairments being present (Loucas et al., 2008; Leonard, 2000). In another 
study that examined performance on measures of structural language and a structured 
narrative task, it was found that children with ASD were relatively more impaired on 
receptive language whereas they were equated on expressive language standardised tests 
compared to their SLI counterparts (Manolitsi & Botting, 2011).  More specifically, scores on 
the CELF-R (5-17 years) and CELF-P (3-7 years) (Clinical Evaluations of Language 
Fundamentals; Semel et al., 1987; Wiig et al., 1992) showed similar language profiles overall 
for both ASD and SLI groups but the ASD groups performed siginficantly less well on the 
subtests of linguistic concepts and sentence structure. By contrast, the measures using 
narrative skills elicited a significantly poorer performance in the ASD group where  
expressive skills were employed. These skills comprised wider story-telling and referencing 
within sentence-levels. This study is a clear example of where certain tests are sensitive 
enough to pick up these differences that may otherwise not be revealed by other behavioural 
tests. The authors conclude that ‘narrative’ may be a useful tool for showing qualitative 
differences in language as it provides extra information that is more usually lost in more 
formal tests.   
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It could be argued, therefore, that comorbid SLI is not necessarily a major constituent factor 
of ASD. To dismiss its contribution however would be injudicious and both the Cleland et al., 
(2010) and Rapin et al., (2009) studies show that in a minority of cases comorbid SLI is a 
likely contributory cause.  This could explain the heterogeneity not just at different points 
along the spectrum but also at similar severity levels.   
 
However, there is some evidence to suggest that there may be behavioural, neurobiological 
and etiological differences in a majority of cases  (Williams, Botting & Boucher, 2008).  
From their review of evidence of a possible overlap between ALI and SLI, Williams et al., 
(2008) concluded that overall there were many more specific differences in the language 
domain rather than similarities They also proposed that it would be more useful for research 
to focus on the varying types of language impairments that are present in ASD and SLI and to 
examine them separately from one another.  Finally, Tomblin (2011) makes a valid point that 
most of this debate is fuelled by the presumption that SLI constitutes a unique kind of 
language learner.  He argues overall that most of the features that are characteristic of SLI are 
also found in other neurodevelopmental disorders and that research should re-focus on why 
there are so many children with ASD who have poor language?   
 
 
Implicit Mindreading 
 
It is widely recognised that impaired mindreading is implicated in the communicative 
impairments that are diagnostic of ASD (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). A deficit in implicit 
mindreading has to originate from earlier impairments such as dyadic relating and empathy 
(Charman et al., 1997; Sigman, Kasari, Kwon & Yirmiya, 1992); ability to imitate the actions 
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of others spontaneously (Carpenter, Tomasello & Striano, 2005; Charman et al., 1997); a 
predisposition to respond preferentially to faces and voices (Baranek, 1999; Dawson, 
Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi & Brown, 1998; Dawson et al., 2004; Klin, 1991; Kuhl, Coffey-
Corina, Padden & Dawson, 2005); and impairments with timing that would impact on 
rhythmicity and synchronisation of interactions between infant and caregiver (Gernsbacher, 
Sazuer, Geye, Schweigert & Goldsmith, 2008; Wimpory, Nicholas & Nash, 2002).  
Furthermore, these early impairments of social-communication can be further impacted by 
abnormal speech perception (Lepisto et al., 2008, 2009), which could then lead to what 
Boucher (2012) terms as ‘self- originating social deprivation’. Most research focuses on 
isolated (but continuous) instances of specific impairments in ASD. However, it is the 
combination of impairments intermixed with environmental factors that produce a particular 
set of varied learned responses (or lack of) that need attention. If an infant is not able to 
respond or attend to people, specifically their caregiver, this can distort the response and 
interaction of the caregiver including the amount as well as the quality of language they use 
(Warren et al., 2010). This in turn will undoubtedly affect the infant by creating a cycle of 
social deprivation that will diminish the ability and potential for them to acquire language 
(Kuhl, 2004). This process can be illustrated well again by referring to the metaphor of 
Waddington’s Epigenetic Landscape, which describes a marble ‘stuck in a groove’ as it takes 
the fastest and steepest route down. So too does a child with ASD use their only available and 
immediate social cognition skills that in turn taper and restrict their overall experience from 
which they continue to learn. In addition, Sameroff and Chandler’s Transactional Model 
(1975) describes how development is a result of a complex interplay between the child and 
their natural traits, as well as their family experiences and economic, social and community 
resources. The emphasis is on the continuity over time of this interaction as well as the 
multitude of potentially ever-changing factors. This describes well the potential situation for 
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a child with ASD and the consequences of SCI and why structural language impairment can 
be delayed and limited in ASD.  
 
The various limitations mentioned above will have a dramatic and particular effect on 
language development and may help explain why after pre-school age, language profiles of 
children with ASD are likely to contribute to a  convergence of what is recognised as an ASD 
typical language profile (Boucher, 2012). Unlike any other instance of language impairment, 
the ASD profile contains impaired comprehension relative to expression that can be 
explained by the inability to take into account other people’s knowledge, speech and thoughts 
when they are interpreting and trying to understand spoken language (Surian, Baron-Cohen & 
Van der Lely, 1996). In terms of structural language impairment there are many aspects that 
can be linked to problems with implicit mindreading (Bloom, 2000; Frith and Happé, 1994; 
Hobson, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). First, difficulties with words associated with emotions 
(Hobson & Lee, 1989) and mental state words such as ‘know’, ‘believe’ and ‘think’ (Tager-
Flusberg, 2000) will limit the ability to relate to and understand others and consequently 
impact on how language and more specifically words are learnt. If an infant does not possess 
the ability to experience the wider social context in which certain words and expressions are 
formed then their ability to use and learn that word within its communicative social context 
will not be reinforced. Second, deictic terms that refer to the boundaries between self and 
other (you/me) and time and place (here/there) if not fully used and understood will not only 
present difficulties with comprehension but also expression. Deictic terms by definition can 
only be understood with additional contextual information so their semantic meaning must be 
fixed but their denotational meaning varies with time, place or person. Children with ASD 
have been shown to be able to spontaneously produce some person-centred deictic terms but 
struggle with distal terms in relation to themselves such as ‘here/there’; ‘come/go’ and 
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‘this/that’ (Hobson, Garcia-Perez & Lee, 2010).  The same study also showed that directed 
head-nods (non-verbal gestural deixis) were not fully comprehended by children with ASD. 
Thirdly, there is further substantial research which shows that the apprehension of social cues 
such as direction of gaze, if impaired (as shown in Charman, 2003; Charman et al., 1997; 
Stone et al., 1997), will have a negative impact on word learning at a young age (Baron-
Cohen, Baldwin & Crowson, 2007; Parish-Morris, Hennon, Hirsch-Pasek, Golinkoff & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Finally, deficits in joint attention are not only associated with 
language delay but will also predict later language abilities as a whole (Charman, 2003; Siller 
& Sigman, 2008; Stone et al., 1997). Therefore it is possible to see how a deficit in implicit 
mindreading skills is a contributory factor to structural language impairment in ASD and also 
how this particular deficit, can lead to the later manifestation of the impaired language profile 
that is characteristic of ASD.  
 
 
Non-verbal IQ 
 
Findings have shown that non-verbal IQ influences language outcomes in ASD in a variety of 
ways (Stevens, Fein, Dunn, Allen, Waterhouse, Feinstein & Rapin, 2000). These depend 
largely on whether an individual has relatively high or low non-verbal IQ.  For instance, in 
cases of high non-verbal IQ, individuals with autism may be able to use compensatory 
strategies to enable them to learn language albeit via an atypical route. Frith and Happé  
(1994) found that a high NVIQ in individuals with ALN can help them acquire language in 
such a way that may result in a precocious reading ability and/or the extended use of 
computational models that subserve the acquisition of phonology and syntax.  Bloom (2000) 
also found that a high NVIQ can help with the utilisation of superior rote learning and 
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associative ability often seen in higher functioning individuals with ASD.  Although these 
types of compensatory routes are narrow they are nevertheless extensive enough to equip 
individuals with the some language skills. In addition, this type of atypically acquired 
language will likely manifest as more deviant rather than delayed.  
 
Although a high NVIQ can have a positive influence on language outcomes, a normal NVIQ 
is not sufficient to enable compensatory strategies. Some research has found that it does not 
offer protection against having a clinically significant language impairment (Eigsti et al., 
2007; Stevens et al., 2000).  As would therefore be expected, a low NVIQ in ASD is 
associated with a global learning disability that would contribute to delayed and limited 
language (Stevens et al., 2000).  
 
What is not known, however, are the individual components that comprise NVIQ and how 
they may specifically enable these compensatory strategies. For instance, a relatively high 
score on a non-verbal IQ test such as the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices could 
demonstrate a wide range of specific non-verbal abilities.  These abilities would comprise 
both perceptual and conceptual processes such as extracting the rule that governs the pattern, 
selecting the correct option and possibly inhibiting salient others. Visual perceptual skills 
including attention to detail would also be requisite but it is not clear the extent to which each 
of these skills may contribute or enhance alternative ways of learning. There is still much to 
be learned of the role of NVIQ and how it interacts with other cognitive mechanisms, even 
when it is at a normal or lower level. 
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Sensory-Perceptual Processing 
 
Sensory-perceptual processing is universally atypical in ASD (Mottron & Burack, 2006) and 
this influences structural language acquisition as well as processing in a variety of ways 
across the spectrum. These anomalies are conceptualised into three overlapping but 
nonetheless distinct models comprising ‘weak central coherence’ (Happé  & Frith, 2006); 
‘enhanced perceptual functioning’ (EPF) (Mottron & Burack, 2001) and ‘enhanced 
discriminability/reduced generalisation’ (Plaisted, 2001; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007 (for 
overview of all three)).  
 
Weak central coherence (Happé  & Frith, 2006) and EPF (Mottron & Burack, 2001) will also 
have predictable effects on language acquisition such as how speech is encoded (Jarvinen-
Pasley, Wallace, Ramus, Happé  & Heaton, 2008). For instance weak central coherence could 
influence or alter speech perception by focusing more on the acoustic characteristics of 
speech rather than its actual meaning (Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008; Hermelin & O’Connor, 
1970; Toichi & Kamio, 2002). This type of causal factor may contribute to deviance in 
structural language across the spectrum and may also contribute to the ASD-specific 
language profile.  
 
More recent research has found evidence of the central coherence deficit in a mixed ability 
group of children limiting language comprehension on the borderline between syntax and 
semantics (Stockbridge, Happé  & White, 2014). These authors found that the comprehension 
of dative constructions was more impaired when used in the form of structure of word order 
rather than by using the explicit preposition ‘to’.  For example, ‘he shows the group the 
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painting’ would present more difficulty than ‘he shows the painting to the group’. 
Additionally, when these syntactic structures were alternated within sentences children with 
ASD found this relatively difficult compared to their neurotypical (NT) peers.  The authors 
claim that the alternating condition may have made it more difficult for children with ASD to 
generalise and form a rule (which was to identify the indirect object of the sentence in this 
case) rather, they would treat each new sentence (in a battery of 80) de novo. The authors 
claim that this research supports the weak central coherence theory because, in short, the 
children with ASD were unable to process the demands of the test globally (Happé  & Frith, 
2006).  In addition, whilst this global processing deficit is not necessarily relevant to 
interpretation of a single lexical item, it is relevant within more complex sentence structures. 
These enhanced skills combined with a good immediate and rote memory may contribute to 
echolalia which in turn would produce rote learned chunks of phrases as well as the 
formulaicity that constitutes the characterstic nature of expressive language in ASD (Perkins 
et al., 2006). 
 
Another aspect of sensory-perceptual processing is explained by Plaisted’s (2001) enhanced 
discriminabilty/reduced generalisation hypothesis that attempts to explain that narrowed 
meaning of substantive terms is caused by reduced categorisation ability. Plaisted (2001) 
goes on to state that individuals with ASD find it difficult to draw pieces of information 
together due to an impaired ability to recognize the similarities between situations and/or 
stimuli. This reduced ability occurs at the perceptual and attentional level, as so often seen in 
ASD, and can lead to abnormalities in how they conceptualise information. However, these 
findings were challenged in a study by Bott, Brock, Brockdorff, Boucher and Lamberts 
(2006) who found that in a test of perceptual similarity, participants with ALN, compared to 
ability-matched NT’s, did not show a relatively more accurate performance as would be 
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predicted by the ‘reduced generalisation’ account. In addition, they took reliably longer to 
learn new categories during the generalisation phase of the test.   
 
These competing models not only offer insightful explanations specific to individual aspects 
of sensory-perceptual processing and their potential effects on structural language but also 
highlight the etiological complexity. Whilst Frith and Happé  (2006) and Mottron and Burack 
(2001) propose a weakening of the central coherence mechanism (albeit for the latter authors 
this also enhances perceptual functioning), Plaisted (2001) stresses the importance of 
focussing instead on the ‘effects’ of weak central coherence, which point to an inability in 
recognising similarities between stimuli or situations.   This particular standpoint is an 
excellent example of how research is plagued by complex causal and contributing factors.  In 
WCC discourse, how sensory-perceptual anomalies are conceptualised as either a ‘weakness’ 
or a ‘skill’ and/or as a ‘cause’ or an ‘effect’ is complex.  
 
Another significant factor is that the majority of research in sensory-perceptual anomalies in 
ASD is conducted using behavioural paradigms that rely heavily on either computer screens 
or table-top tests. These types of tests show up skills in ‘small-scale’ searching and Baron-
Cohen (2008) argues that this is due to manifestations of an exaggerated form of an adaptive, 
evolutionary type of processing known as ‘systemising’ which is a predominantly ‘male’ trait 
(Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, Tavassoli & Chakrabarti, 2009; Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer 
& Belmonte, 2005; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005). If individuals with ASD perform 
relatively well compared to NT populations on tests of either visual search and/or weak 
central coherence (Jarrold, Gilchrist & Bender, 2005; Joseph, Keehn, Connolly, Wolfe & 
Horowitz, 2009; Plaisted, O’Riordan & Baron-Cohen, 1998), can this translate to more real 
life contexts such as finding milk on a supermarket shelf, looking for your purse in the sitting 
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room or finding your flight details and instructions on signs and displays at the airport?  
Baron-Cohen’s ‘hypersystemising’ account would contend that these skills are transferable, 
however other research has found that this is not the case. When visual skills are needed in a 
large scale environment there may be additional cognitive demands (such as short term 
spatial memory) which may impair or limit performance (Pellicano, Smith, Cristino, Hood, 
Briscoe and Gilchrist, 2011; Pellicano et al., (2011) demonstrated that individuals with ASD 
do not show proficient systemizing or foraging skills in a large-scale search task. These 
authors created a ‘foraging room’ in a purpose built laboratory where numerous green and red 
search options were embedded into the floor. 20 school-age children with ASD and 20 age 
and ability-matched TD controls were instructed to search an array of 16 (green) locations in 
order to find the hidden (red) target as quickly as possible.  The distribution of target 
locations was manipulated to appear on one side of the midline for 80% of the trials. 
Surprisingly, the children with ASD showed a far less efficient search behaviour compared to 
the TD group and they also showed reduced sensitivity to the statistical properties of the 
search array. In addition the children with ASD were relatively less able to create systematic 
and optimal search patterns to aid them in the task. The authors thus claim that a facility for 
systemising in ASD cannot explain why ASD children struggle with ‘searching’ in large-
scale environments and furthermore that this may be attributed to constraints rather than 
skills in their cognitive repertoire.  Whether or not these anomalies are conceptualised as 
skills or deficits has far reaching implications at an interventional level. It is important for 
educators to value and use the ‘skills’ present in ASD to help children to maximise their 
learning capacity by using pre-existing abilities. This can also contribute to a more positive 
interpretation of ASD, which is useful amongst peers in a social context. However, the 
danger of this is that pervasive deficits are potentially overlooked and not addressed, either at 
an individual level (in an interventional context) or at a conceptual level by researchers. 
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In addition, how these skills or deficits interface exactly with language anomalies is hard to 
determine. Nevertheless, research evidence is sufficient as shown above to conclude that 
there is a significant link between sensory-perceptual functioning and structural language 
ability in ASD. The nature of this link is not clear-cut but it needs careful consideration in 
this current research. Thus a test of visuo-spatial abilities  (The Children’s Embedded 
Features Test, CEFT, Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971) will be incorporated to 
investigate any contributions, one way or another, of perceptual processing to lexical 
semantic ability. 
 
 
Declarative memory 
 
The work presented in this thesis will attempt to take into consideration the role of theory of 
mind, non-verbal IQ and visuo-perceptual abilities . However the main focus of this research 
will be on the role of declarative memory and its contribution to conceptual semantic abiltity 
in ASD.  Recent theory and research has hypothesised that declarative memory, comprising 
semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1983; 1985) is necessary for lexical acquisition 
(Ullman, 2001) and would thus affect LI in ASD (Boucher, Mayes & Bigham, 2008).  
Boucher et al. (2008) propose that individuals with LFA are not only impaired in episodic 
memory like individuals with HFA, but also in semantic memory. If there is a ‘double’ 
impairment (semantic and episodic) then there could be a deleterious effect on lexical 
acquisition and ability. This is a broad area of language ability and would not just include 
learning of individual words such as nouns, adjectives and verb stems but also specific words 
with grammatical functions such as prepositions, articles and conjunctions as well as irregular 
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verb endings and irregular plurals. Hence this additional semantic memory impairment could 
in part explain why verbal intelligence (‘crystallized’) is relatively lower than nonverbal 
(‘fluid’) intelligence in the majority of individuals with LFA (Lord & Paul, 1997; Siegel, 
Minshew &Goldstein, 1996).  This is far reaching and is discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter as it forms the main content for this current research. 
  
 62 
Chapter Three 
Memory in ASD 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of memory in ASD particularly in relation to 
language impairment in ASD. Necessary theoretical and empirical paradigms of memory will 
be outlined first followed by the argument that declarative (and procedural) memory is 
associated with language ability (Ullman, 2004) in ASD. This will be followed by a literature 
review of memory in ASD divided into sections relating to recognition and recall and 
conclusions and summaries will be drawn in relation to familiarity and recollection 
specifically. The consequences of the ASD memory profile will also be considered. 
 
Introduction 
 
There is ample research showing that specific memory and learning impairments are present 
in all individuals with ASD (Boucher & Bowler, 2008). Yet, anomalous memory functioning 
has never been explicitly included in any diagnostic manual for autism. This is justified at 
present because memory functioning is sufficiently diverse in individuals for it not to be a 
useful diagnostic marker for ASD. In addition, the range and depth of anomalies in memory 
are not unique to ASD.  Nevertheless it is a significant area of the ASD profile that has a 
substantial impact on how and what children learn. From infancy, anomalous memory 
functioning can influence the developmental course and behavioural outcomes of an 
individual (Boucher & Bowler, 2008). Equally, how an individual interacts with the external 
world and how this in turn feeds back during their development can also be shaped by 
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atypical memory performance  (Boucher, 2009) At a very fundamental level structural 
language acquisition and usage is one critical area that is affected here (Boucher, 2011). This 
thesis is particularly concerned with this specific role of memory and how it interfaces with 
language in ASD. 
 
Memory anomalies in ASD have only recently been investigated in relation to whether 
individuals with autism have either ‘normal’ (ALN) or impaired language (ALI) (Boucher, 
Mayes & Bigham, 2012).  Early studies of memory and learning focused exclusively on 
groups with impaired language in accordance with early diagnostic criteria. The majority of 
memory research in autism (Bowler and colleagues; Minshew and colleagues; Mottron and 
colleagues), however, has since been with higher functioning groups where verbal ability is in 
the normal range. Very few studies have sought to clarify to what extent memory 
abnormalities in ASD might vary systematically across the autism spectrum, and to what 
extent this variability might relate to heterogeneity in other domains such as language 
impairments. It is this gap that this thesis will attempt to fill.  
 
 
ALI-ALN 
 
It should be noted that although ALI and ALN are dealt with in separate sections, the 
boundaries between the two are arbitrary and moreover exist on a continuum. As mentioned 
in Chapter One, ALI as used here, broadly comprises individuals with ASD who have a 
verbal IQ of less than 75 on standard test scores whilst ALN broadly refers to individuals 
with ASD who score above 85. In addition, although their language ability is within the 
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‘normal’ range, certain anomalies and idiosyncrasies will still be present (e.g., difficulties 
with pronouns and pragmatics). 
 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
 
There are two main approaches to conceptualising memory in empirical research; the 
‘processes’ approach, which views memory as the product of a number of interacting 
psychological and neural processes, and the ‘systems’ approach, which considers memory to 
be the result of a number of distinct systems. Different types of memory tests and 
experimental conditions have been developed to dissociate the different memory processes 
and systems, and before turning to the literature on ASD, it is important to provide an 
overview of the relevant conceptual and terminological distinctions that apply in this 
literature.  
 
There are three major types of tests of memory. ‘Recognition’ tests provide the most retrieval 
support of all three types of tests by presenting participants with already seen items alongside 
new information. They are then asked which items they have seen before.  ‘Cued-recall’ tests 
provide less support as they may present stimuli that prompt retrieval of items in relation to, 
for example, a category (e.g., which fruit did you see) or word fragments (‘Or_ _ _ e’). ‘Free 
recall’ tests, however, offer no support and participants are simply asked to reproduce already 
learned material as much as they are able. It is important to set out these distinctions early on 
because there is a considerable amount of evidence to show that these different types of tests 
tap into the different memory processes and systems described next in a variety of ways.  
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The “Systems” approach 
 
The systematic classification of human memory began with several dichotomies, the most 
dominant being the distinction between short and long-term memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 
1968) and Tulving’s distinction between non-declarative and declarative types of memory 
(Tulving, 1972; Tulving, 1985; Schacter & Tulving, 1994).  For a visual explanation, these 
types of memory are encapsulated in Figure 3.1. First, Atkinson and Shiffrin’s model 
distinguished between sensory memory, short-term memory and long-term memory.  Sensory 
memory holds the sensory form of a stimulus unaltered in the mind for a brief time (can be an 
auditory or visual trace) and then is rapidly lost through spontaneous decay. Short-term 
memory refers to a temporary storage place for information that does not alter or process the 
information in significant ways. It is relatively limited in capacity and can hold only about 
seven items (Miller, 1956) for about eighteen seconds (Peterson & Peterson, 1959) unless the 
information is maintained through rehearsal. Stimuli can be held in either the visual or 
auditory modality, though mainly the latter. There is evidence suggesting that visual and 
auditory stimuli are held in dissociable sub-systems of short-term memory.  For instance, a 
double dissociation has been shown between verbal and visual or spatial based interference 
tasks (Brandimonte, Hitch & Bishop, 1992; Logie, Zucco & Baddeley, 1990).  These 
experimental tasks are based on the dual-task interference paradigm, which assumes that if a 
task selectively interferes with a particular type of processing but not with another, then these 
two different processes must engage two separate cognitive systems.  Brandimonte et al., 
(1992) found that during learning, verbal recoding of visual stimuli in short term memory can 
disrupt the ability to elicit veridical images from long-term memory.  
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Figure 3.1 shows a taxonomy of memory systems
 
The above distinctions between different short-term memory stores are also reflected in 
Baddeley & Hitch’s (1974) working memory model. Working memory is a system not only 
for the short-term maintenance but also the manipulation of information involving thinking 
and reasoning (Baddeley, 2002). It consists of three, so called slave systems and a 
supervisory system. The slave systems comprise the ‘phonological loop’ that deals with 
verbal material and consists of an articulatory process and a phonological store.  Baddeley 
and Lewis (1981) found that articulatory suppression did not affect decisions, which involve 
acoustic (phonological) differences. This suggests that there is a separate store for this, which 
is supported by a study by Baddeley (1975). He gave participants a sequence of words to 
recall where typically the participants could perform better with short rather than long words 
(called the word-length effect). However, when an articulatory suppression task (counting 
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backwards) was incorporated there was no difference. According to Baddeley this 
demonstrates that the word–length effect depends on having access to the articulatory 
process.  The ‘visuo-spatial sketchpad’ holds visual memories in mind and the ‘episodic 
buffer’ integrates visual, spatial, and verbal information with information about their 
sequential order in time.  The supervisory system comprises the ‘central executive’, which 
allocates resources to the slave systems and is modality free, i.e. not visual or auditory; so it 
can store information in any sense modality.  It also binds information from different sources 
together into coherent episodes, which also helps to promote the consolidation of longer-
lasting memories (Baddeley, 1996).  Empirical support for the central executive comes from 
studies that have found that task similarity impairs performance, e.g. playing the piano and 
singing a song (both are auditory). This is due to competition within the one component 
(McLeod, 1977).  
 
Long-term memory refers to the relatively permanent store of information, which has 
unlimited capacity and is thought to comprise a number of distinct sub-systems, each 
dedicated to the storage of relatively distinct types of information. Declarative memory, as set 
out by Tulving (1972; 1985) stores memories of the past that can be consciously recalled, 
such as facts and events, and it is further subdivided into semantic memory and episodic 
memory. Semantic memory relates to decontextualised factual information comprising ‘who’, 
‘what’ and ‘why’.  It is the remembering of facts gathered from the time we are young such 
as remembering what a cat is or knowing that the grass is green. We know these facts without 
any memory of the context in which we have learned them. Episodic memory, by contrast, 
relates to contextual information associated with time and place as the memory was formed 
and is specific to the individual. This would include autobiographical experiences and 
specific events in time such as remembering your first day at school (Tulving, 1972).   
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In contrast to declarative memory, non-declarative memory uses past experiences to 
remember things without having to consciously think about them. It differs from declarative 
memory, which consists of facts and events that can be explicitly stored and consciously 
recalled, because no conscious thinking is required to access it. Non-declarative memory 
consists of ‘procedural’ and ‘perceptual’ memory.  Procedural memory comprises 
unconscious conditioning and learning, habit formation and acquisition of automatic 
sensorimotor and cognitive skills and basic level concepts. It is responsible for knowing 
‘how’ to do things, such as playing the piano or riding a bike. Perceptual memory, on the 
other hand, is the ability to interpret incoming stimuli through categorisation and recognition 
(Bitterman, 1965; Franklin, 2005). It involves the identification of objects as well as being 
able to process and recognise the structual elements of language such as grammar . This 
could be, for example,  learning how to distinguish well-formed strings of grammar. It is also 
responsible for the automatic encoding of spatial information. All of the above are done 
unconsciously and automatically and form long term memory traces. This is in contrast to 
short-term sensory memory and short-term perceptual memory (mentioned above) where 
memories are only held for a maximum of 1 second and either no processing (sensory 
memory) or only minimal processing (short term memory) takes place. Evidence for a long-
term store of perceptual memories came from studies in the working memory model 
framework. They found that attended information can be stored out of consciousness during 
gaps between operations which may suggest the need for a longer term memory store which 
is sometimes referred to as a visual cache (Quinn, 2008) 
 
Both declarative and non-declarative systems acquire and store information in the long term 
and a considerable amount of evidence, primarily from lesion and patient studies, supports 
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the distinctions just outlined (Graf and Schacter, 1985; Eichenbaum, 2000; Corkin, 2002).  
The declarative/non-declarative distinction can also be mapped onto the explicit (conscious) /  
implicit (unconscious) pair respectively.  
 
 
The “Processes” approach 
 
In the ‘processes’ approach memory is considered to be the outcome of a number of 
‘processes’ that include the encoding, storage and retrieval of information. Each of these 
principal processing stages is under the influence of cognitive factors as well as features of 
the to-be-remembered information, which has led to a number of sub-distinctions amongst 
memory processes.  
 
For instance, Craik & Lockhart (1975) argued that information can be encoded into memory 
by processing surface features of stimuli such as perceptual properties of visual stimuli or 
phonological properties of words that are relatively void of meaning. Such ‘shallow’ 
encoding is often engaged when trying to remember information such as abstract paintings or 
telephone numbers. Alternatively, information can be encoded at a ‘deeper’ level that 
involves making sense of the to-be-remembered information and relating it to already stored 
information. In a study by Craik and Lockhart (1975) they showed participants a list of 
words, each followed by a Yes/No answer. The questions belonged to one of three levels of 
analysis: shallow (e.g. is the word in capital letters?); phonemic (e.g. does the word rhyme 
with able?); or semantic (e.g. would the word fit into the sentence “I went to the ---- to buy 
some bread.”).  The words that had been given semantic type questions were remembered the 
most, with the phonemic the next best remembered; showing that deeper encoding leads to 
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better memory. There is no definite boundary between what constitutes a deep or shallow 
memory, and although deeper processing will most typically lead to better memory, there are 
also conditions where shallow processing can be more effective. For instance, Morris et al., 
(1977) demonstrated that if participants were given a rhyming recognition test they 
remembered the words that had received shallow processing better than the words that were 
more deeply processed. 
 
A second distinction is between that of item-specific and relational processing. Like deep and 
shallow processing this distinction also occurs at the encoding stage. Item specific 
information refers to information that is specific to the individual elements of a remembered 
set of materials. For example a shirt is made of fabric and you wear it and it is a type of 
clothing. Contrastingly, relational information refers to information that defines the relations 
between elements such as a shirt is similar to a dress because they are both types of clothing. 
Relational information pre-supposes item-specific information and it is only possible to relate 
shirt and dress if relevant item-specific knowledge is available about these two items (Hunt & 
Einstein, 1981; Gaigg & Bowler, 2012).  Certain situations will require a greater degree of 
relational processing (such as devising the ingredients for a particular meal) whilst others will 
require greater item processing (such as thinking about which of a number of meals you like 
best). They are thought to operate in parallel and when combined, they produce optimal recall 
(Hunt & Einstein, 1981). This has been shown in a series of experiments that used separate 
word lists and orienting conditions to manipulate the extent to which participants engaged 
item-specific and relational processing. Superior recall occurred when both processes were 
employed in a combined single item (rating the likeability of words) and relational 
(identifying commonalities amongst words) orienting task. Further evidence of superior recall 
was shown in an interaction of these orienting task the word list structure; where relational 
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orientation produced the best performance on lists of unrelated words and single item 
processing elicited the highest recall on lists of related words.   
 
A third pair of closely related processing distinctions can be made between automatic and 
effortful processing and explicit and implicit forms of memory.  These distinctions refer to 
differences in the level of conscious awareness we have as we encode or retrieve information. 
Effortful processing requires attention and some degree of conscious effort.  Automatic 
processing refers to our unconscious encoding of incidental information such as space, time 
and frequency, and of well-learned information.  Similarly, at retrieval, conscious awareness 
ranges from any basic memory such as learning to walk through to a fully conscious 
awareness where what is remembered is known as a memory rather than a fantasy. Between 
these two extremes would be conscious speculation along the lines of “I ‘think’ I remember 
it” as well as varying degrees of confidence in the speculation. Both kinds of processing can 
occur at encoding and retrieval (see Hasher and Zacks, (1979) for the original model and 
Arias, (1998) for a meta-analysis).   
 
Theories that centre on what causes us to forget are underpinned by a process-related 
distinction between decay vs. consolidation. Decay theory (Thorndike, 1914) states that we 
forget due to passive degeneration or to deterioration of memory traces (Jonides, Lewis, Nee, 
Lustig, Berman & Moore, 2008). On the other hand, with consolidation, our memories 
continue to strengthen after they have been formed, and they become more resilient to 
forgetting over time (e.g. Wixted, 2005). These two processes are primarily concerned with 
storage rather than encoding or retrieval. 
 
 72 
A final process-related distinction can be made between ‘recollection’ and ‘familiarity’. 
Familiarity is a feeling of memory for a stimulus that involves no recall of any associated 
information, whereas recollection involves the retrieval of contextual associations from the 
previous encounter relating to the stimulus (Montaldi & Mayes, 2010).  For example, 
familiarity may involve a sense of knowing that you know a person that you have just passed 
in the street but any detail as to how, where or why is absent. In contrast, recollection may 
involve recalling that the person is your local baker and that you bought rye bread and a 
cinnamon roll from them yesterday. As this example illustrates, familiarity memory is only 
able to support recognition whereas recollection memory involves the recall of contextual 
information and of associations between items in memory (e.g., buying rye bread and a 
cinnamon roll). Evidence for a dissociation between recollection and familiarity is 
underpinned by medial temporal lobe (MTL) dual process theories, which broadly state that 
the hippocampus is critical for recollection whilst the perirhinal cortex is critical for 
familiarity (Aggleton & Brown, 1999).  The perirhinal cortex receives object/item 
information whilst the parahippocampal cortex receives contextual information. The 
hippocampus receives high-level inputs that include both object/item information as well as 
contextual information and further information that is more complex. It is responsible for 
integrating information about temporal and spatial relations that are within different elements 
of experiences. These are then relayed in a segregated fashion through the surrounding MTL 
cortices (perirhinal and parahipppocampal cortices). The hippocampus binds together pattern-
separated representations that support recollection for contextually rich memories. By 
contrast, the MTL cortices only have access to fragmented information and so create pattern-
separated memories that support familiarity well, but recollection very poorly  (Montaldi & 
Migo, 2010).   
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Although familiarity and recollection processes are considered to be distinct, there are also 
multiple process theories that contrast with the view that both types of memory are mediated 
by interactions between all the components of the MTL, so that there is no MTL recollection 
and familiarity functional dissociations (Squire, Wixted & Clark, 2007). This view postulates 
that recollection and familiarity function more on a continuum as mentioned above by a 
single memory system that is determined by the strength of memories. More generally 
however, although recollection and familiarity are often referred to as processes, it is more 
useful to think of them as ‘kinds of memory’ each involving several processes working 
together that depend on a system of linked structures (Montaldi & Mayes, 2012).  
 
There are other process distinctions made in the memory literature but these particular ones 
mentioned above are mostly relevant to this current research. It is worth noting that these 
distinctions do not map onto each other in any uniform way and do not bear fixed 
relationships with one another. The distinctions themselves are also not clear-cut. For 
example, when we retrieve information we also re-encode it and when we encode 
information, we do so in part by retrieving information (already stored), which is relevant to 
the information being encoded. This is also likely to influence the probability of decay and 
forgetting or the extent to which information may be consolidated. In addition, there are some 
parallels between the systems and process theories. Of considerable overlap are the 
similarities between recollection vs. familiarity and episodic vs. semantic memory. Again, 
these do not map onto one another consistently. Although retrieval of episodic memories 
generally involves recollection, the nature of the relationship between semantic memory and 
familiarity is less clear.  It is important to note however, that episodic memory and 
recollection do have something in common and this is a useful basis from which to relate to 
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current ASD literature where episodic difficulties are often considered as a reflection of 
difficulties with recollection. 
 
 
The links between Memory and Language systems 
 
There is sufficient evidence pointing to a significant number of similarities between the 
functional aspects of the grammar and lexicon systems in language and the declarative and 
procedural memory systems (Ullman, 2001; 2004). These concordances underlie the principal 
claim of Ullman’s Declarative Procedural (DP) model; that is that the brain systems that 
subserve declarative and procedural memory play corresponding roles in the ‘mental lexicon’ 
and the ‘mental grammar’ systems respectively.  Language, as conceptualised by a dual-
system model, is assumed to have a fundamental distinction between the “mental lexicon” 
(mechanism that contains memorised word specific knowledge) and the “mental grammar” 
(mechanism that contains generative rules that combine words into an infinite number of 
larger words and phrases  (Chomsky, 1965; Pinker, 1994, 1999). More specifically, the 
mental lexicon is a repository for stored information, including all idiosyncratic word-specific 
information. This ranges from the arbitrary sound-meaning pairings of non-compositional 
words like fish to irregular morphological forms that a word may take such as the past tense 
spun (taken from present tense spin). The mental lexicon is not simply a rote memory store 
but can generalise patterns from previously stored forms; for example the novel irregular 
spling-splang pairing can be derived from sing-sang, and then spring-sprang (Pinker & 
Ullman, 2002a, Ullman, 2004). By contrast the “mental grammar” supports the conversion of 
smaller linguistic elements that are rule governed (like phonemes, morphemes and words) 
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into larger, more organised units (such as syllables, phrases, sentences and complex words) 
that are sequentially and hierarchically structured.  
 
 
 
Relationships between the declarative and procedural memory systems 
 
Extensive research on declarative and procedural memory has shown that there are numerous 
double dissociations that show that these two memory systems are largely independent from 
one another, but they also interact in several ways (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Mishkin, 
Malamut & Bachevalier, 1984; Poldrack & Packard, 2003, Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Squire 
& Knowlton, 2000). It might be where and how they overlap and interact that is of interest 
here, as well as their typical roles in addition to their specific roles.  These two systems 
contribute to the formation of a dynamic interactive network that produces simultaneous 
cooperative and competitive learning and processing so that memory can be optimised 
(Poldrack & Packard, 2003). The nature of these relationships is demonstrated in 
neurobiological studies relating to brain structure as well as in animal and human behavioural 
studies . 
 
First, evidence from the patient H.M. showed that the declarative memory system does not 
need to be intact for the procedural memory system to continue to learn (Corkin, 1984; 
Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Squire & Knowlton, 2000).  However, when these two systems 
are both intact they can complement one another in acquiring knowledge. For instance, in 
motor sequence learning, both systems can be used together to learn a task, which may 
optimise learning in some cases (Willingham, 1998).  The declarative memory system 
 76 
acquires knowledge initially through its rapid learning abilities whilst the procedural system 
learns the same or analogous knowledge more gradually (Poldrack & Packard, 2003).  
Interestingly, if a given sequence that is usually learned in the procedural system is 
memorised in declarative memory, its structure will likely be limited by the rules that govern 
the sequence in procedural memory. Furthermore, the time-course of this shift from 
declarative to procedural memory can be modulated pharmacologically (Packard, 1999). In a 
study using posttraining intracerebral glutamate infusions in rats, it was found that it is 
possible to modulate the distinct memory processes mediated by the hippocampus and 
caudate-putamen (namely declarative and procedural memory systems). More specifically, 
during a cross-maze task using ‘place’ and ‘response’ learning, rats received posttraining 
intrahippocampal or intracaudate injections of either glutamate or saline. Over the course of 
16 days the saline rats displayed place learning on day 8 and response learning on day 16. 
However, the learning behaviour of the caudate injected rats displayed response learning and 
the hippocampal injected rats displayed place learning on both days 8 and 16. This 
demonstrates that it is possible to bias the brain toward the use of a specific memory system 
to control learned behaviour and thereby influence the timing of the switch from the use of 
cognitive memory (declarative) to habit learning (procedural) to guide behaviour. This further 
highlights the degree of interaction and flexibility between the two systems. 
 
Second, at a neurological level, brain structures that are more generally implicated in 
procedural memory can also perform context dependent selection) of knowledge that has 
been stored in declarative memory (Ullman, 2004). For example, the cerebellum, which is 
more commonly implicated in procedural memory with the learning of new motor sequences 
(such as riding a bicycle) (Molinari, Leggio, Solida, Ciorra, Misciagna, Silveri and Petrosini, 
1997), is also involved in searching, retrieving and processing declarative memories 
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(Desmond & Fiez, 1998; Ivry & Fiez, 2000). Specifically, in a neurological review by 
Desmond and Fiez (1998) they identified that cerebellum activation has been observed under 
a variety of explicit retrieval conditions. These include the recognition of previously seen or 
heard words (Andreasen, O’Leary, Arndt, Cizadlo, Hurtig, Rezai, Watkins, Boles Ponto, 
Hichwa, 1995a; Nyberg et al., 1995), retrieval of autobiographical information (Andreasen et 
al., 1995b; Fink et al., 1996;) and the completion of three-letter stems with previously studied 
words (Backman et al., 1997; Schachter et al., 1996) as well as the recall of words that have 
been paired with other words (Cabeza et al., 1997).  Although the role of the cerebellar 
activation is currently unknown there are several theories that suggest that the cerebellum 
aids the ‘effort’ at retrieval. For instance, it can assist in the search for a valid response from 
semantic memory whilst identifying if the need is to elicit a memory from a few given 
options or to sort through and choose from a large number of options (Thompson-Schill et al., 
1997). Evidence has shown that the right cerebellum shows greater activation when there are 
few possible responses and the left cerebellum exhibited greater activation when the demands 
of a task require ‘selection’ from many possibilities (Desmond, Gabrieli & Glover, 1998).  
Similarly, superior aspects of the temporal lobe may act as a storage repository for learnt 
skills and habits in procedural memory whilst the same or nearby areas of the ventro-lateral 
prefrontal cortex is implicated in the encoding of new memories, as well as the selection, 
retrieval and ongoing evaluation of abstract and verbal memories (Buckner & Wheeler, 2001; 
Wagner et al., 1998). Whether these structures are part of the procedural system playing a 
more minimal role in the declarative system, or vice versa, is only a terminological issue. 
Either way, this evidence provides a certain degree of foundational neurological evidence that 
the declarative and procedural memory systems can co-operate due to their overlapping and 
supporting brain structures.  
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Third, as well as acting cooperatively, the two systems also interact competitively (Poldrack 
& Packard, 2003) which is what Ullman terms as a “see-saw” effect. If one system is more 
impaired than the other then this leads to the other system compensating and becoming more 
enhanced. However, it is equally possible that learning in one system depresses the 
functionality in the other (Ullman, 2004). Neurological evidence in animal studies has shown 
that damage to the medial-temporal lobe (MTL) structures, including the hippocampus, can 
enhance basal-ganglia-based procedural learning (McDonald & White, 1993; Schroeder, 
Wingard & Packard, 2002). Conversely, learning in declarative memory can be facilitated by 
damage to the neostriatum in the basal ganglia (Mitchell & Hall, 1988. For further evidence 
of this see-saw effect in animals see Ullman, 2004). Moreover, evidence from a series of 
neuroimaging experiments of healthy adults demonstrates the interactions between these two 
memory systems (Poldrack et al., 2001; Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger & Gabrieli, 1999). In 
tasks employing probabilistic rule learning (procedural learning), activation was shown in the 
caudate nucleus, as expected. However, there was also simultaneous deactivation in the 
medial temporal lobe (MTL).  Furthermore, there was a negative correlation across 
participants with the degree of activity in the caudate nucleus and the medial temporal lobe. 
Hence, participants with higher caudate activity had lower medial-temporal activity, and vice 
versa. Furthermore, the functional relationship between the MTL and caudate changed over 
the course of learning. At the early stages of learning the MTL structures were activated but 
the caudate was not. As learning progressed the MTL structures became deactivated and the 
caudate activation increased. This stresses that there is a competitive interaction between the 
two systems and supports Ullman’s (2004) suggestion that in early stages of learning, 
declarative memory is more dominant and that over time this shifts towards procedural 
learning; a pattern that seems evident also in language learning (Ullman, 2004). Importantly, 
individuals vary in their relative dependence on the declarative and procedural systems 
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during learning, which has implications for a developmental disorder such as ASD, where 
one or both systems are thought to develop abnormally.  
 
Ullman (2004) associates several developmental disorders with impairments of procedural 
memory related functions. These comprise Specific Langauge Impairment (SLI), Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), dyslexia and ASD.  According to the DP model, 
grammatical difficulties and lexical retrieval impairments should be seen in these disorders, 
although there are likely to be more particular characteristics of their respective language 
deficits that would be dependent on subtly different procedural memory difficulties. There 
has been evidence in ASD research to support this, mainly finding associations with 
cerebellar abnormalities and motor function deficits; as well as difficulties with procedural 
learning and structural language skills. More recently, as will be discussed below, there is 
accumulating evidence to implicate declarative memory impairments in both ALN and ALI.  
 
Ullman’s DP model has subsequently morphed into the Procedural Deficit Hypothesis (PDH, 
Ullman & Pierpoint, 2005), which emphasises brain systems that underlie procedural learning 
and how these interact and affect language language systems, specifically with respect to 
“mental grammar.”  Although there are some reports of procedural difficulties in ASD 
(Mostofsky et al., 2000; Ullman, 2004; Walenski et al., 2006), there are also studies that 
report intact procedural memory (Toal, Murphy & Murphy, 2005; Miller, 1999; Pring, 2008) 
as well as other relatively preserved areas of non-declarative memory such as implicit 
learning (Barnes et al., 2008; Travers, Klinger, Mussey and Klinger, 2010; Nemeth, Janacsek, 
Balogh, Londe, Mingesz, Fazekas & Vetro, 2010).  It is therefore important to recognise the 
large body of evidence relating to declarative memory in ASD as discussed below. With this 
in mind, Ullman’s model provides useful links between memory and language, specifically 
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procedural memory and syntax. However, less is known about the role of declarative memory 
anomalies in the language profile that characterises ASD.  This will be the focus of the 
research reported here.  
 
More recently, Ullman has revised his hypothesis by conceptualising the memory deficits as 
witnessed in developmental disorders as a Procedural Deficit Hypothesis (Ullman & 
Pierpoint, 2005; Ullman & Pullman, 2015).  It is more obvious as to why memory deficits in 
SLI may be attributed to a procedural memory deficit but it is questionable how useful this 
concept can be applied in the case of ASD where declarative memory impairments, 
particularly episodic or relational types of memory have been found to be relatively impaired 
in ASD (see following section).  However, as noted above, how these two systems interact 
needed attention and may help explain why Ullman and Pullman (2015) have recently 
speculated that declarative memory can play a compensatory role in developmental disorders.  
 
 
 
Memory Research in Autism Spectrum Disorder  
 
Historical Background 
 
Memory research in ASD has varied in its focus over the years. Early research that often 
included tests of memory focused on the possibility that autism was partly caused by 
developmental amnesia (Boucher et al., 2012; Rimland, 1964; Hauser, DeLong & Rosman, 
1975; Boucher & Warrington, 1976; DeLong, 1978). For instance, Boucher and Warrington 
(1976) used tests of recall, recognition and cued recall, similar to those experimental 
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paradigms used in amnesic syndrome with adults, with children with autism. The group of 
children with autism were matched to a control group that was age-matched and another 
control group that was matched on verbal and nonverbal ability.  Findings showed that these 
tests elicited similar results to individuals with amnesia in recall, cued recall and recognition 
(but not in paired-associate learning) thus prompting speculation that there may be some 
parallels between amnesia and autism. However, at that point, which predates the publication 
of the revisions to the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), the diagnostic criteria for 
ASD included structural language impairment that was clinically significant. These studies 
would therefore have included participants with ASD that would have had clinically 
significant language impairments (Rimland, 1964; Hauser, DeLong & Rosman, 1075; 
Boucher & Warrington, 1976; DeLong, 1978). The developmental amnesia hypothesis would 
therefore have referred only to individuals with ALI and not necessarily to the much broader 
spectrum of the ASD phenotype that included individuals with ALN in subsequent revisions 
to the diagnostic criteria (DSM-III-R 1987) and onwards. By contrast, from the publication of 
the DSM-III-R (1987) onwards, most behavioural research centred on individuals with ASD 
without any clinically significant language or intellectual impairments. This type of research 
was much more popular due to the advantage of ‘screening’ out any linguistic or intellectual 
impairments that would complicate the profile of what was then considered as ‘pure autism’.  
 
During the 1990s, research efforts went into establishing causal theories of autism that gave 
rise to the Theory of Mind theory, Weak Central Coherence theory and Executive 
Dysfunction theory (see Chapter One for an outline of these theories). These theories 
dominated research for some time and memory was relatively neglected. This was also partly 
due to the fact that this research was with individuals with ALN and therefore did not throw 
 82 
up any salient memory difficulties that would confirm the hypothesis that developmental 
amnesia was a cause of autism (Bennetto, Pennington & Rogers, 1996; Bowler, Matthews & 
Gardiner, 1997; Minshew & Goldstein, 1993; Renner, Klinger & Klinger, 2000). However, 
these studies did find subtle anomalies and impairments of memory in ALN.  
 
 
Review of literature of memory functioning in autism  
(See Appendix section for a summary table of studies) 
 
Memory in ASD has been studied under many of the theoretical distinctions between 
memory systems and processes set out earlier (see Boucher & Bowler, 2008 for a collection 
of reviews). The current thesis will approach the topic of memory in ASD utilising in 
particular the declarative/non-declarative distinction. Non-declarative memory comprises 
procedural memory and declarative memory encompasses the perspective of the dual process 
theory that distinguishes between recollection and familiarity. Since recollection and 
familiarity are experimentally operationalised through tests of recognition and recall, the 
following sections will review evidence stemming from these procedures.  
 
The focus of this research is on declarative memory but it is important to identify the skills 
and impairments present in non-declarative memory. As mentioned above, individuals with 
ASD are likely to use their intact skills to compensate for their impairments, in a “see-saw” 
effect (Ullman, 2004) not only later in life but also during the course of their learning phase 
as children. These early compensatory skills are likely to have direct effects on the course of 
their development. 
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Therefore the memory literature review sections of this chapter will fall under the main 
headings of ‘recognition’, ‘cued recall’, and ‘free recall’. Source memory is a specific type of 
cued recall so is presented under the heading for cued recall. 
 
To date there are several behavioural and neuropsychological reviews and extensive studies 
on memory in autism (e.g. Boucher, Mayes & Bigham, 2012; Williams, Goldstein & 
Minshew, 2006a; 2006b; Lind, 2010; Mottron, Morasse & Belleville, 2001), which 
emphasise the relevance of memory functioning as a partial yet valid window to 
understanding autism. Differences in memory abilities and profiles between ALN and ALI 
are key in this current research and will be addressed in separate sections and compared later. 
The purpose of this research is to establish how these differences may have an influential link 
to structural language ability in children therefore the literature review that follows will 
consider evidence relating to studies of ALI and ALN separately (see Boucher, 2012). 
Findings of mixed ability groups are less informative here. In addition, only studies that use 
non-social stimuli are considered because one of the main defining criteria in the diagnosis of 
ASD is a deficit in social communication and interaction, which is likely to render tests using 
social stimuli challenging in their own right for individuals with ASD. It would also be 
difficult to attribute test performance to the relative contributions of anomalies in either 
memory and/or social abilities. 
 
 
Non-declarative memory in ASD in groups with language impairments (ALI) 
  
Studies of non-declarative memory in ALI are sparse, however observational and clinical 
evidence point mainly towards a relative lack of impairment across most forms of non-
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declarative memory.  This is most obvious in the case of ‘low ability’ savants with an ASD 
who demonstrate exceptional abilities in drawing, calculation and/or musical improvisation. 
In these cases they rely on and use implicit perceptual representations and procedures that 
underpin non-declarative memory (Miller, 1999; Pring, 2008). Habit formation skills (where 
behaviour is directed to becoming more automatic) have also been shown to be relatively 
unimpaired in ALI. This can be explained by spontaneous behaviour that is often modified by 
habits and routines that would tap into procedural memory (Toal, Murphy & Murphy, 2005). 
In addition, implicit knowledge of basic-level categories has been shown to be largely intact 
in ALI in studies by Carter et al., (1998) and Kraijer, (2000). They both showed that daily 
living skills incorporating the use of everyday objects by individuals with ALI, even 
including some non-verbal individuals, did not show up any relative difficulties. 
 
 
Non-declarative memory in ASD in groups with normal language (ALN) 
 
Whilst many areas of non-declarative memory appear to be intact also in ALN,  
motor skills have been found to be impaired and some researchers argue that implicit learning 
is implicated (Romero-Munguia, 2008; Walenski, Tager-Flusberg & Ullman, 2006). 
However, there are many possible causes of motor skills impairments, which are diverse 
across the spectrum; such as dyspraxia and basic movement kinematic problems (Fournier, 
Hass, Naik, Lodha & Cauraugh, 2010; Cook, Blakemore & Press, 2013; MacNeil & 
Mostofsky, 2012). Therefore it is not possible to conclude that an impairment of implicit/non-
declarative learning is the sole cause of difficulties with motor skills (Boucher, 2012). In fact, 
there are three studies that demonstrate that implicit learning of motor sequences is 
unimpaired in ALN (Barnes et al., 2008; Travers, Klinger, Mussey and Klinger, 2010; 
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Nemeth, Janacsek, Balogh, Londe, Mingesz, Fazekas & Vetro, 2010). For example, the study 
by Nemeth et al. (2010) investigated probabilistic implicit sequence learning in children with 
ALN matched to two separate groups of age matched and IQ matched controls. All three 
groups of children were tested on the Alternating Serial Reaction Time Task (ASRT), making 
it possible to separate general skill learning from sequence-specific learning.  In the ASRT 
task, ‘predictable’ pattern trials alternate with ‘unpredictable random’ ones which causes 
certain “triplets” (a sequence of three trials) to occur at a higher frequency than others. 
Previous research has shown that participants do not gain explicit knowledge spontaneously 
in this task, and performance is sensitive to the relative frequencies of triplets, not to the 
alternating regularity (Howard et al, 2010).  The ASRT task was repeated after 16 hours. The 
study found that both control and ALN children showed similar sequence-specific and 
general skill learning in the learning phase. Consolidation of skill learning and sequence-
specific learning were also intact in the ALN compared to the control groups.  The authors 
suggest that autistic children can use the effects of implicit learning not only for a short 
period, but also for a longer stretch of time.  
 
There are other areas of non-declarative memory that are also relatively preserved in ALN 
including perceptual priming (based on the ‘form’ of the stimulus) and conceptual priming 
(based on the ‘meaning’ of the stimulus) using words, pictures or music (Bowler, Matthews 
& Gardiner, 1997; Gardiner, Bowler & Grice, 2003; Toichi, 2008).  Other implicit skills 
include category formation, which occurs when subjects encountering a series of stimuli learn 
about what all the stimuli have in common, with the result that information is acquired about 
the category defined by the objects (Squire & Knowlton, 1995). For example, in a study of 
implicit category formation by Molesworth, Bowler & Hampton (2005), participants with 
ALN matched to a group of age and ability matched TD controls were asked to complete a 
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picture recognition task.  They were then asked to study categories of cartoon animals with 
either an average prototype structure based on Younger’s (1985) stimuli or a modal structure 
based on Hayes and Taplin’s (1993b) stimuli. Following the study phases, participants 
completed the recognition tests comprising prototypes and other exemplars with varying 
degrees of similarity to the prototypes. Findings showed that recognition memory appeared 
intact and a full prototype effect in recognition memory was observed, thus failing to support 
predictions of impaired prototype effects in autism.  
 
In addition, implicit category formation has not just been shown to be unimpaired but there is 
also evidence to suggest that it is achieved atypically. Two studies found that compared to 
ability matched controls performance from ALN groups was slower though not less accurate 
at perceptual similarity (in the visual domain) and in low-level categorisation tasks  (Bott, 
Brock, Brockdorff, Boucher & Lamberts, 2006; Soulières, Mottron, Giguère & Larochelle, 
2011). Soulières et al., (2011) state that individuals with ALN can often use ‘guessing’ 
instead of top-down processing involved in rule-learning (in category formation); thus extra 
time at the learning phase may help them to avoid guessing. In short, when extra support in 
terms of time is provided, individuals with ALN have been shown to perform similarly to 
neurotypical adults (NT’s). 
 
There is mixed evidence relating to classical conditioning in ALN.  Any learning that occurs 
via classical conditioning is by association between two stimuli and is implicit. In a classical 
eye-blink conditioning study (where pairing an auditory or visual stimulus (the conditioned 
stimulus (CS)) with an eye-blink-eliciting unconditioned stimulus (US) (e.g. a minor puff of 
air to the cornea or throat), participants with ALN showed faster learning of the task but 
performed short latency, high amplitude conditioned responses (Sears, Finn & Steinmetz, 
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1994). This suggests that these participants are able to rapidly associate paired stimuli but 
they may have difficulties with modulating the timing and topography of the learned 
responses. This may be due to how certain contextual information is processed. Another 
study showed fear conditioning to be relatively preserved when tested within a fear potential 
startle paradigm (Bernier, Dawson, Panagiotides, & Webb, 2005). Participants were 
presented with a red square (CS) that co-terminated with an overlapping 50ms average air 
puff to the throat (US). After several acquisition trials, participants eye blink startle responses 
were examined to bursts of white noise that were either preceded by the red square 
(constituting a threat) or not (safe). Individuals with ALN had ‘learnt’ the aversive properties 
of the red square to the same degree as their control group thus showing that classical 
conditioning was not impaired in this case. In two aversive conditioning studies,  (Gaigg and 
Bowler, 2007; South, Larson, White, Dana & Crowley, 2011) results are mixed. Gaigg & 
Bowler (2007) added in an additional conditioning level (as compared to the Bernier et al. 
2005 study) involving a CS + colour that was paired with a startling noise (US) during 
acquisition and a CS – colour that was never paired with the UCS.  They found that fear 
acquisition of the CS + colour was significantly reduced in ALN relative to NT controls.  
Conversely, South et al. (2011) found no reductions in fear acquisition in ALN however they 
did find that the amplitude of acquired fear responses was associated with autistic severity 
(using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) Reciprocal Social Interaction 
scores). In all studies there were no differences in physiological responses to the US which 
implies that the emotional salience of the aversive stimuli was similar between groups 
(Gaigg, 2012). Inconsistencies between studies have been argued to reflect difficulties in 
ALN with adapting to ambiguous stimulus contingencies that would normally allow the 
prediction of biological events on a probabilistic basis. This would mean that ASD may be 
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characterised by anomalies in the mechanisms by which emotional salience facilitates 
associative learning in ‘uncertain’ conditions (Gaigg, 2012).  
 
Brown, Aczel, Jimenez, Kaufman & Grant, (2010) tested four areas of implicit learning: 
artificial grammar learning; contextual cueing; motor sequence and probabilistic learning. 
Adults with autistic spectrum condition (ASC) were matched on IQ to NT counterparts and 
there was evidence of statistical equivalence between all the groups across all four implicit 
tasks. This further highlights that implicit memory is relatively unimpaired in ALN. 
 
The studies above mainly refer to adults rather than children (with the exception of the 
Nemeth et al.(2010) study) but the overall picture of a non-declarative memory profile in 
both ALN and ALI is that there seem to be more areas intact than not. However, the nature of 
some of the anomalies in implicit memory and learning may warrant further examination and 
may be helpful in assisting our understanding of declarative memory performance, where 
there are more striking and obvious impairments. 
 
 
Declarative Memory 
Recognition in ALI 
 
Unlike studies in ALN there are few studies that investigate recognition in ALI and findings 
are mixed. For instance, there are four studies that report impairments in recognition but three 
other studies that report unimpaired recognition.  First, the four studies that find impairments 
in recognition are relative to both age-matched neurotypical (NT) individuals and 
intellectually disabled (ID) individuals except a study by Boucher, Bigham, Mayes & 
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Muskett, (2008) with children who found that recognition of coloured shapes was impaired 
relative to a younger, ability matched ALN and NT group but not relative to an age and 
ability matched ID group. Two of the four studies find impairments in ALI relative to NT, 
ALN and ID groups in recognition of pictures of everyday objects (Boucher & Warrington, 
1976) and named pictures of common objects (Lind, 2008). The fourth study only compares 
ALI with a younger, ability-matched NT group but nevertheless reports a relative impairment 
in recognition of words used to name objects (Summers & Craik, 1994). In addition, the 
studies by Lind (2008) and Summers & Craik (1994) showed that although recognition was 
compromised, it was improved when participant children handled the stimuli themselves as 
opposed to the experimenter. This would suggest that there was an effect of self-enactment 
that is also witnessed in NT children.  
 
Conversely, there are three studies that show recognition to be intact under diverse 
conditions. For example, the first study by Boucher & Lewis (1992) investigated picture 
recognition but testing was immediate rather than delayed which may have been 
advantageous, thus possibly accounting for the discrepancy between the mixed evidence so 
far. However, two other studies that reported intact recognition both tested recognition 
unexpectedly; thus participants did not have the chance to use effortful and/or intentional 
learning that would normally be expected to elicit more positive results. First, Hill and 
Russell’s (2002) study with children tested recognition of common objects that had been 
handled in a preceding task and the objects were later presented unexpectedly in a different 
experiment. Similarly, Hauck, Fein, Maltby, Waterhouse & Feinstein (1998) assessed 
recognition of pictures of common objects which were presented in a previous matching task 
and later used unexpectedly in the test. It would be plausible to conclude that the 
‘unexpected’ element of the test made it more difficult for comparison but not ALI 
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participants suggesting that relatively automatic processes involved in recognition memory 
may be preserved in ALI.  
 
Recognition in ALN 
 
Findings from recognition studies in ALN are also varied but unlike in ALI the evidence 
overall favours the view that recognition is generally preserved. There are only a few cases 
that show mild impairments, specifically of written words (Bowler, Gardiner & Berthollier, 
2004) and when foils (non-target stimuli) that are used in forced choice tests are notably 
similar to the target item (Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2010a; Williams, Goldstein & 
Minshew, 2006a). Toichi and Kamio (2002) also found that performance on a task using 
semantically encoded words was unimpaired. However, whilst a control group showed 
enhanced recognition of words selected to describe or not to describe themselves with, e.g. 
shy; the ALN group did not perform in this way. Similar findings have been shown by 
Henderson et al., (2009) and by Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright and Baron-Cohen (2007).  
Interesting results have been found when effects of different encoding conditions have been 
used. For example, Bowler, Gaigg and Gardiner (2008a) investigated recognition of written 
words that were presented in the context of a semantically related second word or when 
unrelated to the target word.  They found that recognition was enhanced by relatedness in 
both ALN and NT groups demonstrating an intact ability in ALN. 
 
Otherwise, in contrast to these few mixed and anomalous findings, most other studies in this 
area point to either normal or superior performance in recognition across a wider range of 
specific skills especially when compared to the current research in ALI.  First, Toichi et al., 
(2002) found superior word recognition when followed by phonological encoding and 
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interestingly in an unexpected recognition test also. Further evidence of superior recognition 
performance was noted by Hillier et al., (2007) where different coloured and numbered 
geometric shapes and symbols were used. An additional three studies have found unimpaired 
but not superior recognition with non-meaningful shapes or patterns (Buitelaar, van der 
Wees, Swaab-Barneveld and van der Gaag, 1999; Bigham, Boucher, Mayes & Anns, 2010; 
Boucher, Bigham, Mayes & Muskett, 2008) and similarly unimpaired performance with 
common objects and colours (Hillier et al., 2007). Recognition of both spoken and written 
words have also been shown to be intact (Beversdorf et al., 2000; Hillier, Campbell, Keillor, 
Phillips & Bevensdorf, 2007; Salmond et al., 2005’ Boucher et al., 2005; Bowler, Gardiner & 
Grice, 2000; Bowler, Gardiner, Grice & Salavalainen, 2000b) as well as spoken sentences 
(Kamio & Toichi, 2007) and heard stories (Salmond et al., 2005; Williams, Goldstein & 
Minshew, 2006a).  Pictures of common objects have been the most popular stimulus for 
testing recognition in ALN to date and evidence across four studies demonstrates intact 
performance on this type of task (Lind, 2008; Boucher et al., 2005; Joseph, Steele, Meyer & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Ambery, Russell, Perry, Morris & Murphy, 2006).  Recognition tests 
rely on a combination of familiarity and recollection and so far the evidence points towards 
familiarity being mostly preserved in ALN at this stage. 
 
There are, however, a number of studies that show impairments on recognition tests that 
probe recollection (Bowler, Gardiner & Berthollier, 2004; Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000; 
Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008a; 2009; 2014). For example, in a recent study, participants 
with ALN were matched to controls on the number of years in formal education and on 
cognitive ability measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III, The 
Psychological Corporation, 2000). Participants were asked to study grids in which some cells 
contained drawings of objects in non-canonical colours. They were then told that at the study 
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phase which features relating to colour, item and location, would be tested later. In a second 
experiment, the participants studied similar grids and were told that they would be tested later 
on object-location or object-colour combinations. The findings from this study demonstrated 
that even when recognition was tested for specific combinations of items or item features that 
the ALN group performed significantly worse than their NT counterparts. The encoding of 
relations between items and between items and their contexts appears at this stage to be 
compromised in ALN whilst the encoding of item-specific information is relatively preserved 
(Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2014; Gaigg et al., 2008). 
 
In summary, there is considerably more evidence concerning recognition memory in ALN 
than ALI, both in amount and breadth of analysis. ALI demonstrates a more complex mix of 
diverse recognition profiles, and the limited research and heterogeneous findings make any 
conclusions difficult.  Straightforward recognition is most usually preserved but will be 
diminished when the task is more embedded in something more complex such as source 
memory or relational memory that will also employ recollective proceses. It is therefore 
difficult to identify the exact contributions of familiarity and recollection in such tasks and 
then to pinpoint where impairments may lie.  In relation to ALN, evidence overall points to 
intact performance on recognition with some notable exceptions that point toward a pattern of 
preserved familiarity but compromised recollection processes. 
 
 
Free recall in ALI 
 
Tests of free recall in ALI have highlighted interesting findings relating particularly to 
whether the material used in tests is semantically related or unrelated to other items used. 
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Overall it appears that individuals with ALI show more relative impairments when material is 
related. Early studies such as one by Hermelin and O’Connor (1970) found that children did 
not show any impairments with immediate free recall of unrelated word lists. However, when 
semantic relatedness or syntactic structure was incorporated into the material for recall, 
children with ALI performed relatively poorly. Some later studies echoed this performance 
where performance on free recall tests of supra-span unrelated word lists was relatively 
unimpaired whilst conceptually or semantically structured lists posed difficulties (Boucher, 
1978, 1981a; Fyffe & Prior, 1978; Tager-Flusberg, 1991). This implies difficulties with deep 
levels of encoding or use of organisational strategies during retrieval (e.g., the extent to 
which semantically or categorically related items are recalled adjacently during retrieval (e.g., 
Hunt & Seta, 1984). 
 
Looking more closely at recall performance in children with ALI, equivalent recency effects 
to age-matched typically developing (TD) children have been observed, sometimes offsetting 
reduced primacy effects when recalling lists of semantically unrelated words (Boucher, 1978, 
1981a). Fyffe and Prior (1978) suggested that uneven primacy vs. recency effects might 
contribute to difficulties on memory tests involving semantically related material. They found 
that impaired recall of sentences (semantically related words) in ALI was associated with the 
magnitude of the recency effect. Frith (1970) also noted that enhanced recency effects in ALI 
can disrupt serial recall, which may contribute or perpetuate the difficulties in using category 
clustering as noted in studies such as by Tager-Flusberg (1991). 
 
There are a few earlier studies that found impaired delayed free recall in ALI (Boucher & 
Warrington, 1976; Boucher & Lewis, 1989) and findings are further complicated by possible 
enactment (self-performed tasks) effects (Boucher, 1981b;). Boucher (1981b) showed that on 
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activities performed by an ALI group, their free recall of participation in these activities was 
imapired relative to children with ID.  Another study reported a similar finding but compared 
children with ALI to a younger group of NT children (Millward, Powell, Messer & Jordan, 
2000). They also reported that recall of what another child did was not impaired showing a  
reverse enactment effect. However, this study  was replicated by Hare et al., (2007) who later 
found no reverse enactment effect in very low ability adults compared with adults with ID.  
Yet there was a trend in each of these groups towards a self-enactment effect with the ALI 
group performing less well than the ID group but not at a significant level. Furthermore, the 
group sizes in this study were small and some of the participants in each group performed at 
floor (Boucher, 2012).  Overall, the findings from these studies demonstrate that delayed free 
recall in ALI is impaired (Boucher & Lewis, 1989; Millward et al., 2000). 
 
 
Free recall in ALN 
 
As in ALI, findings for ALN for free recall are diverse but show a similar pattern where free 
recall of related items are relatively impaired to NT’s whilst unrelated items are more 
congruent with typical performance. In studies using sets of unrelated words or pictures of 
everyday objects or words from a single category, intact performance has been shown 
regardless of whether recall is delayed or immediate and regardless of age (Ambery et al., 
2006; Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008a; Bowler et al., 1997; Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz & 
Payton, 1992; Mottron, Morasse & Belleville, 2001; Renner et al., 2000; Smith, Gardiner & 
Bowler, 2007; Williams et al., 2006a).  There is slightly mixed evidence with the ability to 
learn long lists of unrelated words over repeated trials. In a study by Minshew and Goldstein 
(2001) recall of unrelated words was shown to be mildly impaired on Trial 1 and subsequent 
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trials in adults with ALN. Otherwise most other studies report performance to be unimpaired 
(Bowler, Limoges & Mottron, 2009; Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Barnevald & van der 
Gaag, 1999; Salmond et al., 2005). The exception to this was the subjective organisation 
study by Bowler et al., (2008a) where ALN and TD groups were similar in performance over 
the first few trials, but later the group with ALN reached a plateau thus demonstrating a 
deficit in recall. 
 
In spite of the majority of findings pointing towards this equivalent ability to NT’s of free 
recall of unrelated words and everyday items, there is also evidence of anomalous learning in 
both single and multiple trial tests. Renner, Klinger & Klinger (2000) found that children 
showed a lack of the usual primacy effect (memory for items at the beginning of the trial/list) 
on single–trial recall of items to be remembered whereas recall for the items at the end of the 
list (recency effect) was shown to be intact.  The authors suggest that these findings show that 
children with ALN use different organisational strategies during encoding and/or retrieval of 
items from declarative memory.  In addition, Bowler, Limoges et al., (2009) found that the 
primacy effect increases atypically slowly in adults with ALN over repeated trials. Also, in 
repeated trials, the subjective organisation of unrelated words in recall, both written and oral, 
has been found to be idiosyncratic in adults with ALN but convergent in an NT comparison 
group (Bowler, Gaigg et al., 2008a). In the Bowler et al., (2008a) subjective organisation 
study, strategies in the learning phase were different in the ALN group who showed lack of 
improvement on subjective organisation and free recall compared to NT individuals over the 
course of the repeated trials. 
 
In free recall tests using semantically related word lists and items ALN performance is less 
intact than in free recall of unrelated items.  In two studies mentioned above where adults 
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were shown to have intact performance of free recall of unrelated items, a test of free recall 
using a word list of semantically related words presented more difficulties and thus showed 
relative impairments (Bowler et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2007).  The effects of either related or 
non-related context in recall and recognition were tested in a study with adults with ALN 
(Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008b). Participants were asked to study words that were shown 
inside a red rectangle. They were also told to ignore context words that were shown outside 
the red rectangle. The context words were either related or unrelated to the study words. 
Results from this study showed that whilst recall of words presented in the context of an 
unrelated word was intact, when words were presented in the context of semantically related 
words that NT ability matched adults with ALN showed diminished recall. In addition, 
another study found that amongst adults with ALN who studied lists of associated items, their 
responses were characterised by excess false positive responses (Bowler, Gardiner, Grice & 
Saavalainen, 2000).The authors suggest that this anomaly is due to a difficulty with the use 
and organisation of semantic information.  
 
There are two studies which showed that immediate recall of a list of related words by adults 
with ALN was impaired initially but then resolved over subsequent trials (Salmond, 
Ashburner, Connelly, Friston, Gadian & Vargha-Khadem, 2005; Minshew & Goldstein, 
2001). Moreover, if items in a list of words are organised under hierarchical category 
headings, or if participants are instructed to encode words whilst sorting them into their 
respective categories, adults with ALN appear to be unimpaired (Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 
2009, Gaigg, Gardiner & Bowler, 2008). This suggests that the ability to utilise semantic 
information is in principle preserved but not spontaneously engaged in ALN.   
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In addition, free recall of sentences and stories are generally more impaired in individuals 
with ALN also (Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2003; Williams et al., 2006a; Salmond et al., 
2005; Minshew & Goldstein, 2001; Williams, Goldstein & Minshew). There are some 
exceptions with story recall but this may be due to the fact that age of participants is of 
relevance (Boucher, 2012). For instance, there are three studies that report intact abilities of 
story recall but these studies were conducted with adults only Ambery et al., 2006; Boucher 
et al., 2005; Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2005). It is also possible that this discrepancy 
in the findings may result from the differences in the stories used and the varying level of 
social understanding required (Boucher, 2012). 
 
 
Cued recall in ALI 
 
Standard tests of cued recall have been used in four studies with ALI groups. The ability to 
use phonological cues has been found to be unimpaired relative to an age and ability-matched 
group without autism and also to an age-matched neurotypical (NT) group (Boucher & 
Warrington, 1976). In addition, the ALI group’s performance was superior in terms of 
number of items recalled. In the same article, but a separate study, the ability to use semantic 
cues was also found to be intact in ALI in relation to an ability-matched group without autism 
and an age-matched NT group. Rhyme cues and category cues have also been tested and 
found to be unimpaired (Tager-Flusberg, 1991). There were also no differences between any 
of the three groups between the ability to use rhyme or category cues.  Farrant, Boucher & 
Blades (1999) investigated the spontaneous use of visually available category cues (e.g. a 
picture of a bathroom to cue verbal recall of toothbrush, soap etc.) and found intact 
performance again in an ALI group. Also Klin, Sparrow, de Bildt, Cicchetti, Cohen & 
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Volkmar (1999) reported intact ability to recall the location of a picture on a page when cued 
with the picture. This was relative to a group of children with non-ASD related 
developmental or psychiatric disorders.  
 
Paired associate learning (PAL) constitutes a type of cued recall where a novel and arbitrary 
relationship is established between two different stimuli during the study phase. One stimulus 
is then used to cue recall of the other. This was also shown to be intact by the Boucher & 
Warrington (1976) study in that ALI performance was at an age-appropriate level and 
superior to that of ability-matched groups. Finally, in studies of free recall where 
performance has been impaired, using informative cues such as “what did you buy in the 
shop?” significantly improved recall (Boucher & Lewis, 1989).  
 
Source memory tests are a specific type of cued memory task where stimuli that have been 
correctly identified in a previous recognition task are used as cues to (contextual) information 
associated with that stimulus when it was seen in the study phase. Source memory can be 
assessed by either cued recall (e.g. “what colour was this word printed in?”) or cued 
recognition (“Which of these colours was the word printed in?”). At test the associations 
between the cues and the targets may be explicitly encouraged by the experimenter to be 
remembered (intentionally) or not mentioned directly (incidentally).  
 
There are only two studies of source memory using participants with ALI, one of source 
recognition (Russell & Jarrold, 1999) and one of source recall (Bigham, Boucher, Mayes & 
Anns, 2010).  In the source recognition study, picture cards were taken from, and returned to, 
one of four differently coloured boxes during the study phase. In one condition the 
experimenter moved the cards, and in the other condition the child participant moved the 
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cards. Source memory was tested by asking children to return correctly recognised picture 
cards to their appropriate boxes. Children with ALI were not impaired on this task but they 
did differ from their ID and younger NT comparison groups when a reverse enactment effect 
occurred. Children in the ID and NT groups recalled colour source more accurately in the 
experimenter-performed condition but the ALI group showed no differences in either 
experimenter or self-performed conditions.  
 
In the source recall study testing temporal source memory (recollection) (Bigham et al, 
2010), participants were shown a set of everyday objects one by one, with a banana always 
being presented as one of the objects in the middle of the sequence. At test, participants were 
asked whether they had seen the everyday object before or after the banana. Teenagers with 
ALI showed impaired performance relative to their nonautistic ID and young NT comparison 
groups on this task.  
 
 
Cued recall in ALN 
 
As in ALI, performance on standard tests of cued-recall and PAL is largely intact. Mottron et 
al., (2001) used category names to cue delayed recall of category exemplars as well as initial 
syllables to cue recall of polysyllabic words. Bowler et al, (1997) and Gardiner et al., (2003) 
reported intact performance on delayed recall of words in response to written word-fragment 
cues, and Ambery at al., (2006) found unimpaired delayed recall of unfamiliar proper names 
in response to cues relating to occupations in a study with adults. In relation to PAL 
paradigms, both the study by Gardiner et al., (2003) and Ambery et al., (2006) showed that 
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paired word associate learning was preserved in ALN and this was also shown in further 
studies by Minshew & Goldstein (2001) and by Williams, Goldstein and Minshew (2005). 
 
Further evidence for preserved cued recall in ALN stems from studies that use leading or 
direct questions as cues to recall. This has been shown in two separate studies. First, a study 
by McCrory, Henry & Happe (2007) tested free recall of passively observed naturalistic 
events and found that performance was impaired but when leading or direct questions were 
incorporated as recall cues (e.g. what were they wearing?) performance improved to the 
levels of comparison groups. Similarly, in an eye-witness testimony study with adults with 
ALN by Maras and Bowler (2010) it was shown that non-informative prompts and direct 
questions could elicit unimpaired recall relative to ability matched NT adults. It was 
important that the questions were phrased in a way that was sensitive to the needs of the 
individuals. 
 
In source memory, the findings with ALN are mixed. Bowler et al. (2004) found unimpaired 
ability to recognise a description of what participants had been asked to do when a particular 
word had appeared on a screen during the study phase (e.g. “think of a related word,” or “find 
a rhyme”). However, on a recall test of the same contextual information the same participants 
were impaired, even though only four options were incorporated.  Bowler et al. (2000) have 
also showed impaired recall in a ‘remember – know’ study which tested recall of self-
experienced contextual information associated with remembered words by adults. Likewise 
with children, and based on a remember-know paradigm also, Bigham et al. (2010) found 
impaired recall of manual actions that had been arbitrarily associated with a non-meaningful 
shape. These studies rely on the use of recollection skills because they rely on the ability to 
recall contextual information present at study rather than recognise them. There are two 
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studies that tested recall of temporal source using a word recognition test. Salmond et al. 
(2005) found adolescents with ALN to be unimpaired whereas Bennetto et al. (1996) found 
children of mixed ability (ALN & ALI) to be impaired. In another more recent mixed ability 
study (the mean full IQ score was 108, but the lowest went down to 73) spatial memory was 
investigated using tests where participants were presented with pictures of rooms and pictures 
of objects (Ring, Gaigg & Bowler, 2015).  The location of the objects was highlighted in the 
rooms and participants were then asked which locations belonged to the objects and vice 
versa. ASD individuals found it relatively difficult to retrieve the object locations and the 
authors reported that these difficulties result not from a specific difficulty with spatial 
information but rather the relational encoding of both location and object.  
 
 
 
Conclusions and Predictions 
 
Summary of similarities and differences of the memory profile between ALI and ALN 
 
Although ALN groups will generally be expected to perform better on most tests than ALI 
groups there are some exceptions and anomalies that are difficult to explain. In the main, the 
memory profile in both ALI and ALN is broadly similar and the strengths and weaknesses in 
each group reflect their appropriate control group.  Similarities in declarative memory 
between ALI and ALN include preserved functioning in areas of cued recall, PAL and 
immediate free recall of semantically unrelated materials. In terms of non-declarative 
memory it is more difficult to draw firm conclusions as there are not many studies in ALI. 
However, the evidence that does exist points toward shared strengths across the autism 
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spectrum (Boucher et al., 2012).  There are shared impairments in both ALI and ALN in free 
recall of semantically related stimuli and on source memory tasks that require the recall of 
contextual information, there is little evidence relating to ALI. 
 
What is different between ALI and ALN is centred on evidence concerning recognition 
memory. There is sufficient evidence that finds recognition to be relatively preserved in ALN 
whereas in ALI it is most often found to be compromised. When stimuli are related in free 
recall word list learning there is mixed performance in ALN but in ALI it is highly 
compromised.  Overall the memory profile for ALI points to a more pervasive declarative 
memory impairment comprising both familiarity as well as recollection, which is also present 
in ALN. The consequences of such compromised memory abilities are considered below. 
 
 
Conceptualising memory impairments in ALI and ALN 
 
The profile of memory strengths and weaknesses set out above has led to a number of 
different interpretations in the ASD literature. Early attempts to explain the profile, took 
recourse to prevalent theories at the time such as the weak central coherence theory 
(difficulties with semantic relations) or executive dysfunctions account (using organisational 
strategies) but these theories do not fully capture all the nuances in the ASD memory profile 
that recent evidence highlights, such as why semantic relations pose difficulties on tasks of 
recall but not on recognition (e.g., Bowler et al., 2007). More recent conceptualisations of the 
ASD memory profile, capture these various nuances much better. 
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For example, Minshew’s complexity hypothesis (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998; Williams, 
Minshew & Goldstein, 2015) states that the cognitive profile in ASD, including various 
difficulties in the domain of memory, reflects complex information processing demands. 
‘Complex information processing’ is described as the detection or use of organisational 
strategies, a high processing load or a requirement for the integration of information. This is 
in contrast to ‘simple information processing’ that is described as the use of basic perceptual 
processes or a low information-processing load.  This can be usefully applied to 
understanding memory deficits in ASD in two ways. First, at a conceptual level, it has 
already been noted that the process of familiarity involves memory for single facts (such as 
how old you are) and could be assumed to be relatively less complex than the process of 
recollection which involves a richer, contextual and autobiographical content of different 
elements that combine into one memory event (such as a memory of a previous birthday 
party). It is consistent with the literature discussed so far that individuals with ASD find 
recollection more difficult than familiarity. Therefore Minshew’s complexity hypothesis at 
first glance is a useful explanation here.  
 
A second way of defining complexity could be along the lines of establishing a scale of 
complexity in relation to memory tasks.  For example, findings have indicated that 
individuals with ASD perform typically on short-term memory and paired-associate tasks but 
on more complex tasks such as list-learning and delayed recall of stories their performance is 
poorer (Minshew & Goldstein, 2001). Considering the former types of tasks less complex 
than the latter is intuitively a sensible conclusion. However it does not involve a formal 
operationalisation of complexity such as the amount of information that is processed. Halford 
(1993) offers a useful framework in this context. He explains that  ‘binary relations’ between 
a studied item and its activation set is relatively simpler than when a categorised list of items 
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is learnt that allows information to be stored in a way that may support recall. This is much 
more complex and Halford terms this ‘ternary relations’ where not only inter-word relations 
need to be processed but also the relations between the words and their category label 
(Bowler & Gaigg, 2008). Hence, these two ways of defining ‘complexity’ in terms of either 
‘amount to be processed’ verses ‘the level of complexity’ are not obviously dissociable. It is 
therefore difficult to operationalize ‘complexity’ in the domain of memory, whether at a 
conceptual or empirical level. Another way of formalising the notion of complexity in 
memory is the Task Support Hypothesis (TSH) that has been proposed by Bowler, Gaigg and 
Lind (2011).  
 
The TSH (Bowler, Matthews & Gardiner, 1997) addresses levels of complexity in test 
conditions at retrieval and suggests that certain levels of support can enable individuals with 
autism to improve their performance, sometimes up to a similar level of NT’s.  This could be 
in a variety of ways that scaffold memory retrieval such as by cueing recall. So, although 
reducing the complexity of the retrieval situation can boost memory performance, the TSH 
does not attempt to explain why individuals with ASD rely on more support at retrieval. It 
could be the case that at retrieval, if there is more than one item to remember (such as a 
memory of how old you are), a combination of items and how they intermesh to form a single 
event (such as a memory of a birthday party) is too complex. Hence it may be useful to 
conceptualise this type of memory processing as relational processing (memory of a birthday 
party), contrasted with single item memory (how old you are). 
 
It is useful at this point to see how relational vs. item-specific information relate to 
recollection vs. familiarity. Neurological evidence shows that the entorhinal and perirhinal 
cortices of the medial temporal lobe (MTL) process item-specific information whilst the 
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hippocampus processes relational information (Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw & Rugg, 2005; 
Mayes, Montaldi & Migo, 2007; Mayes, Montaldi, Spencer & Roberts, 2004; Brown & 
Aggleton, 2001). The pre-frontal cortex (PFC) is implicated invariably at both encoding and 
retrieval stages. Moreover, the PFC and hippocampus work together to establish a contextual 
(spatial and/or temporal) memory at the stage of retrieval that constitutes a process of 
‘recollection’. On the other hand, when the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices yield 
information that either relates to single items or decontextualized facts about the past, the 
process of familiarity is created (Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Eichenbaum, 2004). Relational 
and item-specific processing do not directly map onto recollection and familiarity but there is 
a significant overlap and they are seen as complementary processes (Gaigg et al., 2015).  This 
overlap is of importance when investigating the memory profile in ASD.  However, although 
these theories attempt to explain to a useful degree the memory difficulties experienced by 
individuals with ASD, none of them pays sufficient attention to the functional consequences. 
 
The functional consequences stemming from such uneven memory abilities are long lasting 
and significant. For individuals with ALN, the ability to compensate for their impairments by 
capitalising on their preserved abilities can be advantageous. From a developmental 
perspective these compensatory adaptations can take place from a very early age (Boucher, 
2012) and will likely have a dramatic effect on the course of an individual’s development. At 
best, this can be beneficial, where individuals with ALN can use their preserved abilities in 
habit forming and routines (procedural memory) combined with their knowledge for facts 
(semantic memory) and verbal ability.  Longer-term outcomes may then be more positive as 
these types of skills can be utilised in the workplace especially if combined with a high IQ 
(Boucher, 2012).  
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However, in ALI, whilst research is less well established, there is still enough evidence to 
suggest that if familiarity is additionally impaired by comparison with recollection then the 
behavioural consequences are likely to be more significant. As discussed in Chapter Two, in 
spite of phonology and syntax being intact, the acquisition of word meanings and factual 
knowledge will be impaired. Again, this is likely to occur from a very early age and the 
overall developmental consequences within structural language can be great.  In the context 
of Ullman’s DP hypothesis, if there is a pervasive impairment in declarative memory 
particularly in ALI, then it likely that this is contributing to those individuals' structural 
language impairment. It is also worth noting that in the several ways that the declarative and 
procedural systems are able to interact, compensate and co-operate with each other, this may 
also have an influence on particular aspects of structural language that may account for the 
extreme diversity up and down the ASD spectrum as well as among individuals with ASD. 
 
 
Aims and predictions 
 
The primary aim of the research reported in this thesis is to investigate the contribution of 
declarative memory impairment to impaired semantic knowledge and its possible role as a 
cause of structural language impairment in lower-functioning children with ASD.   
 
There are two secondary aims. The first of these is to obtain data on possible causes of 
language impairment in children with intellectual disability (without ASD). The second is to 
compare memory abilities and their relations with semantic knowledge in language-impaired 
and non-language-impaired children with ASD. 
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The design of this research consists of two major experiments each assessing the dual 
components of declarative memory  - familiarity and recollection - and how they relate to 
semantic knowledge as assessed by the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (PPT; Howard & 
Patterson, 1992). Anticipated effects on semantic knowledge of age, nonverbal IQ (measured 
using raw scores from Ravens), theory of mind (ToM) and visuo-perceptual abilities 
(measured using the Children’s Embedded Figures Test, (CEFT), Karp & Konstadt, 1963) 
will be controlled for. Four groups of child and adolescent participants will be assessed: two 
ASD groups (with typical language (ALN) and impaired language (ALI)), one intellectually 
disabled (ID) group and a typically developing (TD) group, as set out in the following 
chapter. 
 
 
Predictions 
 
On tests of familiarity in both Experiments 1 and 2: the ALI group will be impaired relative 
to the TD and ALN groups; the TD and ALN groups will perform similarly and the ID group 
will perform similarly to the ALI group, or at a level intermediate between the ALI and the 
TD and ALN groups. On tests of recollection in both Experiments 1 and 2: the ALI and ALN 
group will be impaired relative to the TD group; the ID group will either perform similarly to 
the ALI and ALN groups, or at an intermediate level between these two groups and the TD 
group. 
 
Correlation tests to assess the main determinants of semantic knowledge will show: in the 
combined groups, scores on the PPT and WASI verbal intelligence tests will correlate with 
each other and with scores on the familiarity measures. In the 4 groups separately, 
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correlations between scores on the PPT and WASI with scores on the familiarity measures 
may not reach significance, but will be greatest in the ALN group [because they compensate 
for impaired recollection, using familiarity], followed by the ALI group [because the 
impairment of familiarity may show up in a correlation, as it did in the early recognition 
experiment by Boucher et al., 2008], with small or non-significant correlation in the TD 
group. No prediction is made concerning correlation in the ID group [because there is little 
research on likely causes of ID-without autism – but it is expected that NVIQ is likely to 
contribute]. 
 
In the combined groups, the PPT scores will correlate with nonverbal IQ. In the four groups 
separately, correlations between scores on the PPT and NVIQ may not reach significance, but 
will possibly be greatest in the ID group and least in the ALI group.  
 
In the combined groups, scores on the CEFT (visuo-perceptual abilities) will correlate with 
scores on 3 out of the 4 subtests used to assess recollection and familiarity, all of which 
involved attention to visuo-spatial detail.  In the groups separately, we predict relatively high 
CEFT scores in both ASD groups, facilitating correct responses to the three memory subtests.  
We made no specific predictions concerning relations between CEFT scores and memory 
subtest scores in either of the two other groups. 
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Chapter Four 
General Methodological Design, Points and Procedures 
 
In this chapter, general points relating to experimental design, participant recruitment and 
testing will be described first, including ethical procedures..  Materials and procedures used 
in the subsidiary tests will be outlined in Chapter Five. The majority of these tests used 
standardised materials and methods. Details of participant groups, material and methods used 
in the two major experiments, both of which comprise tests of declarative memory, will be 
given in Chapters Six and Seven, in which these two experiments are described separately.   
 
 
Design 
 
Two separate experiments formed the core of this empirical research and each experiment 
assesesed the contributions of familairity and recollection to declarative memory.  In addition 
lconceptual  semantic knowledge (a component of structural  language) was assessed using 
the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (PPT) – Picture Version (Howard & Patterson, 1992) and 
formed the outcome measure.  
 
There are other known factors that contribute to semantic knowedge which include non-
verbal ability or fluid intelligence as assessed by the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices 
and theory of mind (ToM) which was assessed using a standard false belief task (SFB, 
‘unexpected contents’ task). A test of implicit ToM was also intended to have been included 
but shortage of time as well as problems with the timing settings within Tobii software meant 
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that the data analysis would have been too time-consuming. Chronological age (CA) was also 
recorded and noted as it contributes to semantic knowledge.  
 
Finally, both experimental tests used visuo-spatial materials and this was because it was 
important that the familiarity and recollection could be tested as independently from language 
as possible. Therefore the tests had to be as non-verbal as possible and be appropriate for 
children. It was expected that these type of stimuli might have advantaged the ASD groups 
due to their visuo-spatial skills therefore to control for this potential group difference a test of 
central coherence was included (The Children’s Embedded Figures Test, Karp & Konstadt, 
1963) to account for any influence of the material on the results of declarative memory tests. 
 
Four separate participant groups were formed to assess possible structural language 
differences between children with ASD with typical language (ALN) and those with language 
impairment (ALI).  A group of typically developing children (TD) was recruited to act as a 
comparison group, mainly for the ALN group; and a group of children with intellectual 
disability with no autism (ID) acted as either a potential control group to the ALI group 
and/or a clinical group with their own distinct language anomalies to be investigated that may 
be different from those with ASD. Further details are set out below. 
 
 
Participants 
 
Four groups of children were recruited to the study:  two groups of older children and 
teenagers, one group with lower functioning autism or autistic disorder (ALI); and the other 
group with intellectual disabilities without autism (ID); and two further groups of children, 
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one group with high functioning autism or Asperger syndrome (ALN); and another group of 
typically developing (TD) children.  The ALI group were equated with the ID group for 
chronological age (CA) and verbal ability, and the ALN group was equated with the TD 
group for CA and verbal ability. Verbal ability was assessed using the two verbal subscales 
‘Vocabulary’ and ‘Similarities’ from the Weschler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence 
(WASI; 1999). Scores on these two tests combined to give a verbal intelligence quotient 
score (VIQ).  In the ALI and ID groups, VIQ scores below and including 75 were allowed 
and in the ALN and TD groups, VIQ scores above and including 90 were allowed with no 
upper limit. 
 
In the ALI group, all children and young people attended special schools catering for autism 
either exclusively or inclusive of intellectual disabilities without autism.  All had been 
diagnosed as autistic by experienced Psychiatrists or Clinical Psychologists using the DSM-
IV (APA, 1994) and statements were provided by the schools to the experimenter.  In the 
ALN group all children attended mainstream schools that catered for Asperger’s syndrome 
and ALN either by attending a special unit or by being integrated into normal class and in 
some cases with a learning support assistant. All had been diagnosed as autistic by 
experienced Psychiatrists or Clinical Psychologists using DSM-IV (APA, 1994).  In the ID 
group all children and young people attended special schools catering for autism and 
intellectual disabilities without autism.  None of them had a diagnosis on the autistic 
spectrum or had a record of any autistic features of behaviour. They also displayed no 
obvious autistic traits as observed by the experimenter; apart from one child in the ID group 
who was excluded from the study from the start. This child evidently displayed signs of both 
SCI’s ad RRB’s despite no diagnosis of autism. All children in the TD group attended 
mainstream junior schools serving mixed catchment areas and had no record of autistic 
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features of behaviour as well as showing no obvious signs of autistic traits as observed by the 
experimenter.   
 
Every participant in Experiment 1 also took part in Experiment 2 but Experiment 2 included 
extra participants across all four groups.  A summary of all included participants and their 
descriptive statistics is shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Participant Groups 
      ASD       
  
  ALI  
(n = 20) 
  
ALN 
(n = 26) 
 
       Measure Mean SD  Range Mean SD Range 
       Age (months) 178.1 24.99 123-218 108.96 15.99 75-136 
VIQa 64.75 6.17 55-75 104.92 11.92 91-135 
Ravensb 25.9 7.54 7-36 24.31 8.11 8-36 
 
    Non-ASD       
  
ID  
(n = 26) 
  
TD  
(n = 32) 
 
       Measure Mean SD  Range Mean SD Range 
 
  
     Age (months) 176.42 21.72 136-214 98.53 9.44 81-114 
VIQa 61.96 4.84 55-74 109.9 11.35 90-142 
Ravensb 17.11 6.93 6-27 24.68 5.78 10-36 
a WASI verbal subscales 
     b Ravens CPM 
      
 
 
Exclusion Criteria 
 
The criteria for exclusion included hearing impairment, neurological condition or epilepsy 
but no participants had any of these. Further exclusions of participants, from an initial total of 
133 were made based on incomplete datasets (n = 17), attrition due to pupils leaving their 
school (n = 7) and where participants were untestable due to the tasks being too demanding (n 
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= 5).  These exclusions occurred across all groups but with 12 from the TD group where 
schools were changed and testing was incomplete for Experiment 1. 
 
 
Participant Recruitment 
 
Special and mainstream schools were identified for potential participants mainly in the 
Sussex area.  Schools were contacted by letter and then followed up with a meeting between 
the experimenter and a representative from the school (Headteacher or Special Needs Co-
ordinator). Schools gave their consent for children to participate subject to parental consent.  
In total, 10 schools agreed to work with the experimenter and the numbers of children 
recruited ranged from 6-24 per school. 
 
The first visit between each child and the experimenter involved ensuring the child was at 
ease with the experimenter; either by general talking or doing an activity of the child’s 
choice, for example, threading beads or looking at pictures.  In some cases the child preferred 
to start doing the verbal tests straight away.  In several cases, if a child was a little unsettled, 
the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices test was administered first due to its non-verbal 
and engaging nature. In addition, this change of order in testing contributed to 
counterbalancing all the tests in order to avoid test effects.  The child was asked for their 
continued consent during all contact with the experimenter to ascertain that they would like to 
continue with any of the tests.  This continued throughout the testing phase that included a 
number of visits sometimes totalling up to 9 or 10 per child.  
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Ethical procedures  
 
The experimental procedures outlined below for both experiments adhere to the ethical 
guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society and were approved by the City 
University London’s Senate Ethical Committee.  
 
During all testing procedures, continued consent was conducted mainly verbally at 
approximately 10-minute intervals where the experimenter asked the child if they were happy 
to continue with the ‘activity.’ If the child became tired or lacked concentration testing would 
cease and resume at another appropriate time.  It was never the case that a child received no 
credit because of failure to complete a test.  In order for children to perform well in their 
tasks they needed to not only feel settled and content but also be willing to sit down and keen 
to do the tasks.  It was established at the outset of each testing period with each child that 
they and their teacher were happy for testing to proceed.  
 
 
Recruitment Difficulties 
 
There were several delays associated with the University's Ethics Committee procedures; 
very slow responses from schools initially approached; failures of schools to respond to 
letters or e-mails; as well as time-consuming demands made by individual schools (e.g. that 
the experimenter sit in children's classes for a week before taking any child out for testing); 
time-wasting restrictions on child availability and numerous other factors. Most of this would 
be considered typical for recruiting children but on advice, it was quite extreme. 
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Despite the numerous challenges, strict and rigorous testing in terms of consistency and 
organisation was employed by the experimenter. Every effort went into establishing a 
stringent methodological approach which was exercised in all of the tests, both experimental 
and subsidiary, which are described in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Five 
Methods and Results of Subsidiary Tests 
 
Method 
 
1) The Social Responsiveness Scale – Second Edition, (SRS, Constantino, 2012) 
 
The SRS identifies social impairment associated with Autism Spectrum Disorderss and 
quantifies its severity. It is sensitive enough to detect even subtle symptoms, yet specific 
enough to differentiate clinical groups, both within the autism spectrum and between ASD 
and other disorders. This questionnaire is on a likert scale and is filled in by teachers and/or 
teaching assistants that know the child. Parents did not fill in the questionnaire as teachers 
were considered to be able to provide a more objective assessment of each child. 
Unfortunately, this was the most difficult test from which to gain feedback from teachers and 
only 28 questionnaires in total were returned despite numerous attempts by the experimenter 
to follow this up with schools. It is therefore not possible to use this test in any analyses. 
However, there were no children with scores that would suggest that a participant should be 
excluded from any groups. For example, from the questionnaires returned, there were no TD 
children or ID children displaying autistic traits above what would be considered normal for a 
non-ASD population. The experimenter also used their own judgement when informally 
observing children. There was one child in the ID group who did display ‘autism-like 
behaviours’ (such as lack of eye contact, monotone prosody, repeating phrases and obsession 
with threading beads) which was confirmed in a conversation with their class teacher and the 
child was then excluded from the study. 
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2) Weschler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI; 1999) 
 
The WASI consists of four subtests: Vocabulary (verbal), Similarities (verbal), Block Design 
(non-verbal), and Matrix Reasoning (non-verbal). In the present study, two of the verbal 
subtests (Vocabulary and Similarities) were combined to provide a VIQ score which was then 
used for selecting and matching participant groups. The Vocabulary subtest is a measure of 
word knowledge, verbal concept formation, and fund of knowledge;  the Similarities subtest 
measures verbal reasoning and concept formation. Both provide a brief and reliable measure 
of cognitive ability for use with children and measure crystallized abilities (Cattell, 1961). 
The Vocabulary subtest asks participants to describe a word verbally such as ‘shoes,’ ‘cart,’ 
‘alligator.’ The Similarities subtest asks participants to describe verbally how two things are 
similar such as ‘blue and red,’ ‘bowl and spoon,’ ‘song and photograph.’ 
 
 
3) The Children’s Embedded Figures Test (CEFT, Karp & Konstadt, 1963) 
 
The Children’s Embedded Figures Test is a measure of weak central coherence involving 
visual search for simple figures or objects embedded in larger, more complex figures. 24 test 
items were presented on black and white laminated paper A4 sheets. The Embedded Figures 
Test (EFT) was originally designed to assess the concepts of “field dependence – 
independence” (e.g., Witkin & Goodenough, 1981). Good performance on the EFT is taken 
as a marker of field independence, the ability to disembed information from context or 
surrounding gestalt. The test requires the participant to spot a simple form within a more 
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complex figure; the colour and form of the latter create a gestalt within which the part is 
hidden (see Figure 5.1). In the Children’s EFT, the complex figure is also meaningful (e.g., a 
pram, within which the triangle to be found is hidden in the hood of the pram).  
 
Figure 5.1   Example of a test item from the CEFT 
       
 
 
4) Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices (1976) 
 
This is a non-verbal test comprising 60 multiple-choice tasks, presented in ascending order of 
difficulty. It is designed to measure reasoning ability involving the capacity to store and 
reproduce information, as well as the eductive component of general intelligence which 
involves the ability to think clearly and make sense of complexity. In each test item, the 
participant is asked to identify the missing element that completes a given pattern. A series of 
patterns is presented in the form of a 4x4, 3x3, or 2x2 matrix (see Figure 5.2).  Raven’s 
Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) measures clear-thinking ability and is designed for 
young children ages 5:0-11:0 years and older adults. The test consists of 36 items in 3 sets 
(A, Ab, B), with 12 items per set. 
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The CPM produces a single raw score that can be converted to a percentile based on 
normative data and which is generally accepted as being a measure of non-verbal intelligence 
(NVIQ)  and what Cattell (1961) has termed fluid intelligence. In this research it is largely 
referred to as fluid intelligence (FI) as it is not a strict measure of NVIQ. 
In addition,  the raw scores were used for the analysis because conversions to a standard 
scoring system are limited to steps of five points which may not provide a sufficiently 
sensitive measure. A minority of participants had only been tested on the Standard 
Progressive Matrices (SPM) and so their score was converted to a CPM score using the 
Tables provided in the Ravens manual.  
Figure 5.2. Examples of two test items from the CPM 
 
 
 
5) Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (PPT) – picture version (Howard & Patterson, 1992)  
 
This test consists of 3 trial items and 40 test items and is a forced-choice test. The participant 
is shown three pictures, one above the other two and is asked to match the top picture to one 
of the other two pictures with which it is most closely associated. No names of the pictures 
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are mentioned, and the participant is asked not to name the objects. Because the task requires 
no overt language, it is considered a relatively pure measure of conceptual semantic 
processing and can test the degree to which a participant can access meaning from pictures 
and words. The pattern of results can be used to build up a picture of the participant's ability 
to access semantic and conceptual information. For this reason the scores from this test were 
used as the clinical outcome measure for both experiments one and two. 
 
 
6) Standard Explicit False Belief Task – Unexpected Contents Test 
 
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest a significant relation between mindreading skills 
and structural language ability therefore it was important to include a test of implicit and 
explicit mindreading ability in the experiments. The capacity to mind-read is often measured 
by false belief tasks, one of which, the unexpected contents task, was used here. Originally, 
an implicit mindreading test was devised using video materials from a study by Senju, 
Southgate, White and Frith (2009).  As mentioned above this was not possible to complete. 
However, a simple explicit false belief task was conducted with a subset of participants 
across groups. 
 
The standard  false belief task (SFB) was based on the ‘Smarties’ test, or ‘unexpected 
contents’ test used to test mindreading skills (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). In case the child 
was familiar with this test a different set of materials was used to the more familiar box of 
“Smarties’ and pencils. Here, a jar looking as if it contained hot chocolate was used and 
inside there was a highlighter pen. 
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The experimenter asked the participant what they believed to be the contents of a jar that 
looks as though it contained hot chocolate. After the child guessed (usually) "hot chocolate", 
it was shown that the jar in fact contained a highlighter pen. The experimenter then closed the 
box and asked the child what he/she thought their teacher, who has not been shown the true 
contents of the box, would think was inside. The child passed the test if they stated that 
another person would think that there was "hot chocolate" in the box, but failed the task if 
they stated their teacher would think that the jar contained a highlighter pen. Typically 
developing children usually pass this test around the age of four to five years (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). This task tested the mentalizing ability that other people may have beliefs 
that diverge from their own as well as their ability to attribute to another person a mental state 
or standpoint that is different from their own. Due to the pass/fail scoring on the test the data 
was unable to be used for covariant purposes. 
 
 
General Procedures for all Tests (Subsidiary and Experimental) 
 
Children were tested individually and they were seated at a table with the experimenter in a 
familiar room or working area in their school.  They either sat next to or opposite the 
experimenter depending on the test.  In some cases a teaching assistant would also be present 
to either ensure that the child was not anxious or to supervise children who were prone to 
difficult behaviour.  
 
Scoring of the tests was mainly done after the child had left the room. All children were 
continuously encouraged and made to feel that they were always succeeding.  The 
experimenter helped focus their attention when necessary by, for example, pointing to objects 
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or tapping the laptop screen to encourage looking when appropriate. A certificate was shown 
to each child and after each test the child ticked a box to confirm success and completion.  
When boxes for all the tests were ticked, the child received the certificate and was thanked by 
the experimenter.   
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Results 
 
Scores from the subsidiary tests are presented in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1   Mean scores on subsidiary tests, n in parentheses 
 
  
 
    ASD     
 
ALI (20) 
 
ALN (26) 
Measure Mean SD    Mean SD 
      Voc Rawa 21.3 (20) 8.33 
 
31.81 (26) 9.32 
Sim Rawb 17.9 (20)  7.12 
 
25.11 (26) 5.72 
SFBe 45% (11) 0.52 
 
70% (14) 0.47 
PPTf 35.9 (20) 2.95 
 
35.77 (26) 2.52 
CEFTg 16.35 (20) 5.83 
 
15.15 (26) 6.09 
Ravensh 25.9 (20) 7.54   24.31 (26) 8.11 
      
 
    Non-ASD    
 
ID (26) 
 
TD (32) 
Measure Mean SD    Mean SD 
 
  
    Voc Rawa 17.38 (26) 4.3 
 
29.41 (32) 5.87 
Sim Rawb 17.12 (26) 3.91 
 
24.72 (32) 3.45 
SFBe 50% (10) 0.53 
 
100% (8) 0 
PPTf 35.23 (26) 2.93 
 
37.41 (32) 1.9 
CEFTg 8.31 (26) 4.42 
 
15.47 (32) 4.81 
Ravensh 17.12 (26) 6.94   24.69 (32) 5.78 
 
a Raw scores from the Vocabulary verbal subtest of the WASI 
b Raw scores from the Similarities verbal subtest of the WASI 
e Standard False Belief test – Unexpected Contents task 
f Pyraminds and Palm Trees Test (PPT) 
g Children’s Embedded Figures Test 
h Fluid Intelligence (FI) as measured by the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices 
 
 
Separate scores from the WASI verbal subtests are given and due to the fact that some 
participants scored at floor when scores were standardised, raw scores were used as outcome 
measures in the analysis. The standard false belief task is a correct/incorrect test therefore the 
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percentage score represents a group percentage of correct answers. The PPT test has a total 
score of 40, and the CEFT test is scored out of 24. The Ravens test has a maximum of 36 and 
represents a raw score.  
 
The data summarised in Table 5.1 will be analysed in conjunction with data from the two 
main experiments, to be reported in Chapters Six and Seven.  Inspection of the Table shows 
that the TD, ALN and ALI groups are matched on Ravens, a measure of fluid intelliegnce and 
non-verbal ability, whereas the ID group scores are relatively lower.  Similarly, the TD, ALN 
and ALI groups score very similarly on the CEFT, whereas the ID group scores are markedly 
lower. Further discussion of these observations will be presented in Chapter Eight.    
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Chapter Six 
Experiment 1 - Forced Choice Recognition Test 
 
Background 
 
The aim of this experiment was to identify the distinct contributions of recollection and 
familiarity to performance on a declarative memory task by children in each of the four 
groups using a pair of specially designed forced choice recognition tasks. These tasks were 
initially developed for use in studies of amnesic adults by Migo, Montaldi, Norman, Quamme 
and Mayes (2009).  However, the stimuli to be used here are from a later study conducted by 
Migo, Montaldi and Mayes (2013), which will be discussed below. The next aim, which 
relates to the  hypothesis of this research, was to determine the relative contribution of 
familiarity to semantic knowledge across the different diagnostic groups. 
 
The basic task for children was to try to remember a series of black and white photographs of 
everyday objects. The test phase comprised 12 items containing the target and three foils in a 
forced choice recognition paradigm. The two separate tasks in this experiment differed only 
in the kind of foils used. In one of the tasks, referred to as the ‘forced choice corresponding 
test’ (FCC, see Figure 6.3), foils resembled the target stimulus, whereas in the other task, 
referred to as the ‘forced choice non-corresponding test’ (FCNC, see Figure 6.4) foils did not 
resemble the target stimulus, but instead comprised pictures closely resembling other recently 
seen target stimuli. The former FCC test is thought to favour the use of familiarity to achieve 
correct performance (Parkin, Yeomans & Bindschaedler, 1994) because the very similar 
options to choose from would trigger indistinguishable levels of recollection; whilst the 
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correct target gives rise to a somewhat greater sense of familiarity that thus allows for a 
correct response. By contrast the FCNC test favours the use of event recollection to achieve 
correct performance because the sense of familiarity the foils give rise to cannot be directly 
compared to the levels of familiarity of the relevant target item. 
 
This involvement of both familiarity and recollection in recognition tests is consistent with 
the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) model proposed by Norman and O’Reilly 
(2003). This dual-process computational model of memory comprises a neocortical 
component that supports familiarity processing and a hippocampal component that supports 
recollective processing. The model predicts that where targets and foils are very similar 
(FCC), familiarity will be relied upon rather than recollection because the targets’ familiarity 
can be directly compared to the familiarity of the foils. In a FCNC such a direct comparison 
between the familiarity signals of the targets and foils is not possible because all the foils are 
related to different target items and so they will be nearly as likely to be more familiar than 
the target as they will be less familiar. Therefore there is no principled decision rule that can 
allow targets to be reliably distinguished from their foils based on familiarity alone and 
participants are thus biased to rely on their recollection skills (See Migo et al. (2009) for a 
more in depth description). In short, the FCC test is a reliable test of familiarity whilst the 
FCNC test relies more upon the process of recollection. This method has been used reliably 
and repeatedly with amnesic patients and patients with hippocampal damage (Mayes and 
colleagues; Holdstock and colleagues; Westerberg and colleagues), in whom performance on 
the FCNC test is more substantially impaired than on the FCC test where there is no 
impairment. Given its non-verbal nature, the task is ideally suited to be adapted for use with 
the children that comprise the sample for the current research. For such children, alternative 
paradigms such as the Remember/Know paradigm that has been used with adults with ASD 
 127 
(e.g., Bowler et al., 2007) would be unsuitable because they ask participants if they have a 
sense that they ‘know’ an item and have seen it before, or whether they ‘remember’ some 
contextual details about a given item. These type of questions or instructions require a high 
level of receptive and expressive language that participants may not have. Therefore the 
familiarity and recollection paradigm developed by Migo and colleagues is a more effective 
test for children. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
Ninety one children and adolescents were recruited for this experiment, including 24 TD, 23 
ID, 18 ALI and 24 ALN as set out in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for participant groups 
      ASD       
  
ALI  
(n = 18) 
  
ALN  
(n = 26) 
       Measure Mean SD  Range Mean SD Range 
       Age (months) 180.17 25.54 123-218 108.96 15.99 75-136 
VIQa 65.17 6.23 55-75 104.92 11.92 91-135 
Ravensb 27.67 5.43 16-36 24.31 8.11 8-36 
 
    Non-ASD     
  
ID  
(n = 23) 
  
TD 
(n = 24) 
       Measure Mean SD  Range Mean SD Range 
 
  
     Age (months) 175 21.66 136-213 98.42 10.8 81-114 
VIQa 62.48 4.84 55-74 107.04 7.36 95-119 
Ravensb 17.57 7.11 6-27 22.5 4.41 10-28 
a WASI verbal subscales 
b Ravens CPM 
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All participants were recruited in line with the general recruitment procedures outlined in 
Chapter Four and their descriptive statistics are re-presented in Table 6.1 as this dataset 
represents a subset of the overall dataset presented in Chapter Four. 
 
 
Materials 
 
The stimuli used for the experimental tasks were taken from Migo et al (2013) and comprised 
a series of grayscale photographs of everyday items on a plain background (see Figures 6.3 
and 6.4). Through a set of carefully designed pilot studies, Migo et al (2013) derived 50 sets 
of picture quartets comprising four very similar items (e.g., four forks or four dolls) of which 
one could serve as a to-be-remembered target and the rest as foils during the recognition test. 
From this original set of 50 quartets, 12 were selected for each condition (as in the previous 
Migo and colleagues studies; FCC and FCNC) for the current experiment with an additional 4 
for each practice phase (FCC and FCNC), totalling 32. The item quartets were selected on the 
basis that they would be age and gender appropriate. For example, an item portraying a nail 
varnish bottle was omitted on the grounds that it may not be familiar to all younger 
participants, in particular younger boys. The stimuli were presented on a 15” screen laptop 
computer and the images shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 have been directly taken from the 
experimental files; hence they represent the exact size proportion of the individual items and 
images to the laptop screen size.  The introductory learning phase used laminated A4 cards 
with coloured pictures of items on them (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
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Figure 6.1.  FCC Introductory Learning Phase 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the target item on the left that would be shown at study; and the quartet of 
items on the right constitutes the choices during the recognition test. 
 
 
Figure 6.2  FCNC Introductory Learning Phase 
 
      
 
Figure 6.2 shows the study items on the left; and the quartet of items on the right constitutes 
the choices during the recognition test showing that the pencil is the only item that has been 
seen before.. The bird, witch’s hat and hand are similar but have not been seen before. 
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Procedure 
 
In the original study by Migo et al. (2009), the FCC and FCNC items were interleaved in a 
single test with one study trial and one test trial. To adapt this task for use with children the 
FCC and FCNC tasks were run as separate blocks comprising 2 study trials and 1 test trial to 
simplify the task demands. The task was then piloted on 11  children with ASD or ID 
following the same procedure as in the original Migo et al. (2009) study but with instructions 
adapted for our children. The initial piloting indicated that the task was too difficult and 
therefore an additional ‘introductory learning phase’ was required prior to the experimental 
practise phase.  Hence, new materials were devised specially for this phase and the test was 
then re-piloted with a different set of children from the same school. The new ‘introductory 
learning phase’ consisted of showing the children 3 coloured pictures of everyday items to 
remember during the study phase. Then at test, for the FCC test, 3 foils were shown in 
addition to the target. For the FCNC test, 3 items were also presented but at test, the first item 
only had one foil, the second item had two foils and the third item had three foils. This 
‘introductory learning phase’ was necessary to train children not only in the test format but 
also on how their memory would be tested in two different ways. It was important for the 
children to realise that the foils were similar but different to the target and that it was 
necessary to study the items properly rather than just make a guess. This was particularly the 
case with the FCNC condition where the participants needed to realise that the foils were 
NOT other targets, but rather that they were very similar to other previously seen targets.  
This is why the number of foils was built in gradually on the FCNC introductory learning 
phase. It was established during piloting that during the first ‘run through’ of either the FCC 
or FCNC learning phase it would be necessary to confirm to participants why and how their 
responses were correct. This was done by pointing to the targets and foils and showing where 
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they were different and where they were the same.  Success on the 3rd item led to inclusion to 
the experiment. However, if this last item was not remembered correctly, an explanation 
followed with the participant looking at the pictures to establish similarities and differences 
between the target and foils. A second round then be administered with no assistance 
provided and success on the final item would ensure inclusion. All participants achieved 
success at this stage. 
 
The overall test procedure for each condition (FCC and FCNC) therefore consisted of the 
‘introductory learning’ phase (described above), a practice phase followed by the 
experimental condition.  The two practice phases included a study and test phase in 
immediate succession of one another. The experimental condition consisted of a study phase, 
where items were presented twice, followed by a 5-minute filler task and then the recognition 
test phase (see Figure 6.3 for a procedure summary).   
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Figure 6.3   Overall experimental procedure including practice phases (e.g. FCC) 
 
FCC Introductory Learning Phase 
FCC Practice Phase 
1st Study Phase: 
 
2nd Study Phase: 
 
5-minute filler task 
Test Phase: 
 
 
 
Experimental Phase 
 
The order of the FCC and FCNC conditions was counterbalanced across participants to 
counter potential practice effects. In addition, each condition was administered on a different 
day for each participant to avoid effects of tiredness or fatigue. For both FCC and FCNC 
conditions, individual participants were shown 12 items, one by one, until the participant had 
looked at it for a total of 3 seconds. This ‘looking rate’ was considered more appropriate than 
a standard presentation rate to allow for participants becoming distracted whilst watching the 
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materials. The 3 seconds of looking time was monitored carefully by the tester using both a 
stopwatch, and from vigilantly observing the participant’s attention to the stimuli.  
 
Some participants required encouragement from the tester who softly tapped or pointed to the 
laptop screen to enhance the focus of the participant during the study phase. Participants were 
shown the 12 items twice in the same order before the 5-minute filler task and recognition 
test.  See Figure 6.4 for FCC/FCNC test procedure. 
 
Figure 6.4  FCNC (same for FCC) Experimental Procedure 
 
1st Study Phase: 
 
2nd Study Phase: 
 
5 minute filler task – playing cards 
Test Phase: 
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When the participant had arrived and was ready to begin, the tester asked something along 
the lines of: “Are you good at remembering things, I wonder?  Today, we are going to do a 
fun memory test; what’s your memory like?”  It was very important to instate at the outset 
that a test or game involving memory is what they have come to do.  The following dialogue 
sets out what and how instructions were consistently given and emphasised by the tester 
throughout the different stages of the experiment. 
 
 
Practise Phase 
a) Study phase 
“First, before we start the memory game I will show you some pictures on this computer. I 
want you to look at each picture and tell me if it’s a picture of something you could eat.  So, if 
you think it is a picture of something you could eat then say “yes” and if you think it is not a 
picture of something you could eat then say “no” – do you understand?” 
 
The tester then said: “Ok, ready?” This was taken as a form of verbal continued consent that 
the participant was happy to continue with the test. The first item was shown on the laptop 
screen and the tester said:“Could you eat this?” The tester discouraged labelling and ensured 
that the participants simply said “yes” or “no”. If a participant was unsure they were then 
encouraged to: “have a guess, quick as you can.” 
 
When all the pictures were seen, the tester paused and said: “Ok, now we’re going to look at 
the same pictures again.  This time I want you to look VERY, VERY carefully at each one, 
look at everything about them and try to remember them, because later on I’m going to see 
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how many of them you can remember. Ok, ready?”  The tester paused again once all the 
items had been presented. 
 
b) Test phase (following immediately from the study phase) 
The tester then said: “Ok, now I’m going to show you four pictures. You only saw one of 
these pictures earlier on. The others look a bit like ones you saw, but are not quite the same.  
I want you to point to the picture that is EXACTLY the same as one you saw earlier. Have a 
good look at each picture and then point to the one EXACTLY like one you saw earlier.  If 
you’re not sure which one you saw earlier then just take a guess. Ok, ready?” 
 
When necessary, correction was given on the first example of each condition. The tester 
would say: “this one is EXACTLY the same, these aren’t quite the same” The second 
example of each condition must be correct in order to proceed (i.e. 2/4). When the test format 
changed from FCNC to FCC, the child was reminded that only one of the pictures had been 
seen before. The tester would say: “This time all the pictures look nearly the same, but still 
you’ve only seen one of them before.” When the format changed from FCC to FCNC the 
tester would say: “These ones are a bit tricky. You might think that you’ve seen all of them 
before, but only one is EXACTLY the same as one of the pictures you saw earlier.” 
 
Test Phase 
a) Study phase (same procedure as during practice) 
When the practise phase was finished, the tester said: “Very good!  Ok, that was just a 
practice.  Now I’m going to show you some more pictures.  Just like before, I want you to 
look at each picture and tell me if it’s a picture of something you could eat.”  If the 
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participant hesitated they were encouraged by the tester to respond quickly by saying: “fast 
as you can/guess if you’re not sure.” The tester went on to say: “Good, now just like before, 
we’re going to look at the pictures again and I want you look VERY, VERY carefully at each 
one, look at everything about them and try to remember them, because later on I’m going test 
your memory/see how many of them you can remember.”  The 12 picture items were 
presented again one by one. 
  
b) Filler task (Playing cards) 
When all 12 items had been presented the tester congratulated the participant on their 
excellent concentration and said: “Before I ask you to remember those items, we are going to 
play a game of cards for five minutes.” The tester then ascertained with the participant a 
version of ‘snap’ appropriate to their age and ability, which used a full pack of normal 
playing cards. The tester asked the participant to share out the pack of cards between each of 
them. It was then established that they would turn over their cards, one by one, adjacent to 
one another, and if their cards simultaneously matched on either suit, colour or number 
(depending on the participant) then the participant should put their hand down quickly on the 
cards and say “snap!”  All participants managed this at least once. 5 minutes was recorded 
using a stopwatch, which included time to deal and put away the cards. 
 
c) Test phase (same procedure as during practice) 
The tester then said: “Ok, let’s see how many of the pictures you can remember from before. 
Now I’m going to show you four pictures. You only saw one of the pictures earlier on, and I 
want you to point to the picture that is EXACTLY the same as one you saw earlier.  If you’re 
not sure which one you saw earlier then just have a guess.”  
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Slides were then presented with a 3 second looking time. When the test format changed from 
FCNC to FCC, the child was reminded by the tester that only one of the pictures had been 
seen before: “This time all the pictures look nearly the same, but still you’ve only seen one of 
them before.” When the format changed from FCC to FCNC, the tester said: “These can be 
difficult because you might think that you’ve seen them all before, but only one is EXACTLY 
the same as one of the pictures you saw earlier.” 
 
The tester praised the child by saying “good” or “well done” for the first two correct 
responses for each test format. The tester recorded responses, with the participant pointing to 
one of the four pictures (in all cases) to be the item they selected as having seen before. This 
was the case in each the FCC and FCNC condition. Pre-prepared score sheets were used by 
the tester, which included the two practice phases and the experiment FCC or FCNC. The 
tester filled these in during the tests but disguised the responses using ticks (a normal tick for 
a correct answer, and a normal tick with a tiny tail on the end for an incorrect answer) to 
ensure that the participant felt success throughout the test, regardless of their performance. 
Scores were calculated by the tester as soon as the participant left the room and prior to the 
next participant. 
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Results 
Analysis 
 
The analysis conducted for Experiment 1 initially addressed the predictions relating to the 
processes of familiarity as assessed by the FCC test, followed by the predictions relating to 
the processes of recollection as assessed by the FCNC test. Briefly, the main predictions were 
that on FCC, the ALI group would perform significantly worse relative to the TD and ALN 
groups and the ID group would perform either similarly to the ALI group or at a level 
between the ALI and the TD/ALN groups. On FCNC, it was predicted that the ALI and ALN 
groups would perform significantly worse than the TD group and that the ID group would 
either perform similarly to the ALI group or midway between the ASD groups and the TD 
group.  
 
After addressing these predictions concerning the functional integrity of declarative memory 
processes in the ASD and ID groups, the final analyses examined the role of these processes 
in relation to conceptual semantic knowledge. Correlation tests were run to identify the main 
correlates of semantic word knowledge (measured by the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test, 
PPT) and analyses of co-variance (ANCOVA) and regressions were used to test specific 
predictions regarding the role of familiarity (FCC) in this context, as well as the role of visuo-
perceptual abilities  (CEFT) and fluid intelligence (FI, Ravens). For a fuller description of the 
predictions, please refer back to the end of Chapter Three. All analyses relating to the FCC 
and FCNC used the proportion of correct responses as the dependent variable. For all 
statistical tests, a standard alpha criterion of p < .05 was used to reject the null hypothesis and 
as estimates of effect sizes Cohen’s d (t-tests) and partial eta square (Analyses of Variance) 
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will be reported. Unless otherwise stated, p values were reported as exact when results were 
non-significant. 
 
For an overall picture initially, correlation matrices were created and examined at both the 
group and combined groups level incorporating all the key variables (see Table 6.2). First, it 
was important to see if chronological age (CA) correlated with any scores related to the 
predictions.  As expected,  CA did not correlate with any of the memory measures apart from 
recollection in the ALN group. The age range of younger children in this group was relatively 
wide so this was not surprising. CA was therefore not considered to be a factor affecting 
performance however this was re-checked at a later stage of the regression analyses. 
 
Table 6.2   Correlation matrices for combined and separate groups using Pearson r 
All Groups 
(n = 91) 
 
CA VIQ Ravens CEFT PPT Familiarity Recollection DecMemory 
 
CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -0.85** 1 
      
 
Ravens -0.05 0.19 1 
     
 
CEFT -0.15 0.28** 0.65** 1 
    
 
PPT 0.01 0.19 0.30** 0.41** 1 
   
 
Familiarity 0.06 0.06 0.48** 0.59** 0.44** 1 
  
 
Recollection -0.24* 0.39** 0.24* 0.42** 0.44** 0.29** 1 
 
 
DecMemory -0.13 0.29** 0.44** 0.55** 0.62** 0.77** 0.84** 1 
          
 
Group 
          
ALI (n = 18) CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -0.10 1 
      
 
Ravens 0.16 0.20 1 
     
 
CEFT -0.01 0.21 0.56* 1 
    
 
PPT 0.44 0.51* 0.48* 0.47* 1 
   
 
Familiarity 0.23 0.11 0.53* 0.75** 0.63** 1 
  
 
Recollection 0.28 0.17 0.37 0.57* 0.47* 0.64** 1 
 
 
DecMemory 0.28 0.16 0.49* 0.60** 0.72** 0.90** 0.91** 1 
          ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6.2 continued overleaf. 
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Table 6.2   
ALN (n = 26) 
 
CA VIQ Ravens CEFT PPT Familiarity Recollection DecMemory 
 
CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -0.01 1 
      
 
Ravens 0.11 0.38 1 
     
 
CEFT 0.39* 0.35 0.55** 1 
    
 
PPT 0.35 0.31 0.14 0.38 1 
   
 
Familiarity 0.29 0.26 0.38 0.65** 0.60** 1 
  
 
Recollection 0.41* 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.64** 0.36 1 
 
 
DecMemory 0.43* 0.34 0.41* 0.75** 0.61** 0.82** 0.84** 1 
         
ID (n = 23) 
CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -.63** 1 
      
 
Ravens -0.29 0.32 1 
     
 
CEFT -0.30 0.52* 0.65** 1 
    
 
PPT -0.07 0.22 0.30 0.56** 1 
   
 
Familiarity -0.25 0.36 0.50* 0.56** 0.43* 1 
  
 
Recollection -0.15 0.40 0.13 0.44* 0.16 0.21 1 
 
 
DecMemory -0.25 0.49* 0.38 0.36 0.63** 0.73** 0.82** 1 
TD (n = 24) 
CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -0.13 1 
      
 
Ravens 0.59** -0.07 1 
     
 
CEFT 0.22 -0.31 0.42* 1 
    
 
PPT 0.43* 0.18 0.57** 0.23 1 
   
 
Familiarity 0.38 -0.31 0.26 0.16 -0.07 1 
  
 
Recollection -0.02 0.03 -0.15 0.02 0.37 -0.16 1 
 
 
DecMemory 0.26 -0.21 0.07 0.24 0.14 0.62 0.68 1 
 1) Familiarity – FCC 
 
Figure 6.5 sets out the average proportion correct responses on the FCC as a function of 
group.  
 
Figure 6.5   Mean proportion correct scores on the FCC test. Error bars represent +/- 1 
SE 
 
 
A univariate ANOVA was conducted to assess whether or not there was an overall group 
difference on this measure of familiarity. As predicted this was the case where F(3, 87) = 
2.91, p < .05, ��2 = .09. However, the F score was only just significant indicating that the 
model might be underpowered for further pairwise comparison tests. Sheffé post hoc 
comparisons revealed a significant difference only between ALI and ID groups only where p 
< .05. The predictions were also tested with individual planned comparisons using t-tests. 
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proportion of correct responses showed no significant difference between the TD and the ALI 
group t(40) = 1.74, p > .05, d = .53 or between the ALN and ALI group t(42) = 1.54, p = .13, 
d = .48. In fact, the ALI group achieved the highest performance of all groups (mean score 
(M) = .8, SD = .19) as illustrated in Figure 6.5. 
 
In relation to the ALN group, it was predicted that scores on FCC would be unimpaired 
compared to the TD group, which was the case: t(48) = 0.05, p = .96, d = 0.00 It was also 
predicted that the ID group would either perform similarly to the ALI group or at an 
intermediate level between the ALI and the TD and ALN groups. This prediction was not 
supported. The ID group performed lowest of all groups with a mean accuracy score of .63 
(SD = .17). Although  this was not significantly different from the performance of the ALN 
(t(47) = -1.40, p = .17, d = .40) or TD group (t(45) = -1.56, p = .13, d = .45) the difference 
from the ALI group: t(39) = -2.96, p < .05, d = .94 was significant. It is worth noting, 
however, that the performance of the ID group in relation to the TD and ALI groups was not 
in line with predictions because of the unexpectedly high performance of the ALI group. 
Overall, one of the three predictions was supported which was the similar performance in the 
ALN and TD groups. However, due circumspectness is required at this point because the 
overall F score for the initial overall group comparison only just reached significance and 
there was variability within each group. Subsequent analyses attempt to address this factor. 
 
2) Recollection – FCNC 
 
Figure 6.6 sets out the mean proportion correct scores for the FCNC test.   
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Figure 6.6    Mean proportion correct scores on the FCNC test. Error bars represent +/- 
1 SE 
 
  
 
 
Following the analyses for the FCC test, overall group differences for FCNC were tested first 
using a univariate ANOVA. Again, as predicted there was a significant difference between 
groups where F(3,87) = 6.45, p < .001, ��2 = .18; which was stronger than the overall 
comparison for FCC with a larger effect size. Scheffé post hoc comparisons showed that 
there was a significant difference between ID and TD where p < .001. 
 
For tests on FCNC it was predicted that both the ALI and ALN group would be impaired 
relative to the TD group and the ID group would either perform similarly to the ALI and 
ALN groups or somewhere at an intermediate level between these two groups and the TD 
group. To test these predictions independent t-tests were used for the relevant comparisons.  
As predicted, the ALI group (mean (M) = .42; standard deviation (SD) = .19) performed at a 
significantly lower level to the TD group (M = .56; SD = .16): t(40) = -2.45, p = .02, d = .75. 
Also as expected, the ALN group (M = .43; SD = .2) performed significantly worse than the 
TD group:  t(48) = -2.36, p = .02, d = .68. 
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The ID group, similarly to the FCC test, performed worse again out of all groups with a mean 
score of .31 (SD = .17), which was not predicted. Independent t-tests between the ID and TD 
groups demonstrated highly significant differences with a large effect size: t(45) = -4.59, p < 
.01, d = 1.31. The difference between the ID and ALN group (t(47) = -2.09, p = .04, d = .57) 
was also significant with a moderate effect size and although the difference between the ID 
and ALI group was only marginally significant, the effect size was again moderate (t(39) = -
1.77, p = .09, d = .54). Thus, overall for recollection, the pattern of results was again largely 
as predicted, apart from the ID group, who again achieved the lowest scores as in FCC. 
 
 
3) Determinants of conceptual semantic knowledge 
 
To test for the main determinants of semantic knowledge the following correlational tests 
were conducted. First it was important to establish whether the familiarity measure (FCC) did 
relate to the lexical semantic measure (PPT). Across all groups Pearson’s correlation 
confirmed that this was indeed the case  (r(89) = .44, p < .001, 2-tailed). To examine this 
association within each of the four participant groups, the correlations were repeated within 
groups and the results are illustrated in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7.  Graphs showing relationship between PPT and FCC tests in ALI, ALN, ID 
and TD groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was predicted that in the four groups separately, correlations between the PPT and FCC 
would be greatest in the ALN group, followed by the ALI group, with a small or non-
significant correlation in the TD group. This pattern was almost confirmed with both ASD 
groups demonstrating similarly robust correlations (ALI group: r(16) = .63, p < .05; ALN 
group:  r(24) = .60, p < .001) the ID group demonstrating a moderate correlation (r(21) = .43, 
p < .05) and no correlation in the TD group (r(22) = -.07, p > 0.05), although this last 
observation is tempered by the near ceiling performance on the PPT as illustrated in Figure 
6.7 above.  
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At this point it is clear that there was a relation between familiarity and semantic knowledge 
in ASD as predicted; however, the strikingly high scores on FCC in the ALI group were 
unexpected and require further attention. The FCC and FCNC tests used visual stimuli so it 
was important to consider the possible effects participants’ visual-perceptual skills might 
have on their memory performance. As noted in the ‘participants’ section in Chapter Five, the 
ALI group demonstrated very strong visual-perceptual skills as measured by the CEFT as 
well as the Ravens matrices, which may have benefitted their performance. For ease of 
reference, the data on these measures have been replicated in Figures 6.8 and 6.9. To test this 
conjecture, the correlation was calculated between FCC and both Ravens (fluid intelligence) 
and CEFT (visuo-perceptual abilities) to determine how strongly these measures correlated 
with FCC across all groups and within each group. Results showed that across groups, the 
FCC measure of familiarity did indeed correlate highly with CEFT: r(89) = .59, p < .001 and 
Ravens: r(89) = .48, p < .001. However, when these associations were examined within 
groups a different pattern emerged. FCC and CEFT correlated highly in the ALI: r(16) = .75, 
p < .001, ALN: r(24) = .65, p < .001 and ID: r(21) = .56, p < .005 groups but not in the TD 
group: r(22) = .16, p = .45.  
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Figure 6.8   Mean scores (out of 24) on CEFT. Error bars represent +/- 1SE 
 
 
 
For Ravens, in the ALI group, Ravens and FCC also correlated significantly (r(16) = .53, p < 
.05) and in the ALN group this association almost reached significance (r(24) = .38, p = .06). 
There was a significant correlation in the ID group (r(21) = .50, p < .05) but no significant 
association in the TD group (r(22) = .26, p = .28). 
 
Figure 6.9    Mean raw scores on Ravens. Error bars represent +/- 1SE  
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It was also predicted that across groups, scores from the CEFT would correlate with FCNC 
scores which depended upon very similar visuo-spatial detail to FCC. This was found to be 
the case where r(89) = .42, p < .01. In the analysis of the groups separately, it was predicted 
that the CEFT scores in the ALI and ALN groups would correlate with the FCNC test.  
Indeed this was the case in the ALI group (r(16) = .48, p < .05), with the relation approaching 
significance in the ALN group (r(24) = .36, p = .07). CEFT also correlated with FCNC in the 
ID group (r(21) = .43, p < .05) but not at all in the TD group (r(22) = .02, p = .93). 
 
Given these significant relations, it was important to determine to what extent CEFT and 
Ravens performance may be contributing to the group differences observed on FCC and 
FCNC tests noted above. Thus the univariate ANCOVA testing for any effect of Group was 
conducted again but this time adding CEFT and Ravens as covariates. When CEFT and 
Ravens were controlled, the Group difference in FCC became non-significant: F(3, 85) =  .7, 
p = .56, ��2 = .02. CEFT was highly significant as a covariate (F(1,85) = 19.2, p < .001), but 
Ravens was not (F(1,85) = 2.14, p > .1). Including CA as a covariate had no effect on this 
pattern of results. 
 
The results outlined so far have confirmed that processes of familiarity as measured by FCC 
are associated with conceptual word knowledge as measured by PPT. This appears also to be 
the case for recollection but not for chronological age, fluid intelligence or visuo-perceptual 
abilities.  Contrary to more specific predictions however, the ALI group outperformed all 
other groups on the FCC measure of familiarity, which the correlational analyses suggest 
might be due to the visual-perceptual nature of the task, which constitutes an area of relative 
strength for the ALI group. To examine the relative contributions of processes of familiarity 
(FCC), visual perceptual skills (CEFT) and fluid intelligence (Ravens) to semantic word 
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knowledge (PPT) further regression analyses were run looking first at the pattern of these 
relations within each group.  An initial exploratory regression analysis using the ‘enter’ 
method showed that there was a different pattern of predictors for each of the four groups 
(see table 6.3). 
 
 
Table 6.3   Results for regression analysis for the main predictors in each group with 
PPT as the outcome variable 
 
 
Group 
R Adj RSQ Sig F FCC FCNC CEFT Ravens CA 
ALI 0.72 0.31 0.09 0.40 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.35 
ALN 0.78 0.51 0.01** 0.50* 0.53** -0.04 -0.19 0.02 
ID 0.61 0.19 0.13 0.21 -0.14 0.65* -0.19 0.10 
TD 0.77 0.48 0.01** -0.21 0.43* -0.05 0.61** 0.18 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
 
The ALI and ID groups did not show any overall significant predictability for PPT although 
CEFT was a strong predictor for the ID group. In the higher functioning groups (ALN and 
TD), FCNC was a significant predictor but the ALN group also had FCC whilst the TD group 
had Ravens. Although FCC was not a significant predictor in the ALI group as expected, it 
was still a relatively higher score (.40) compared to the non-ASD ID (.21) and TD (-.21) 
groups. These current patterns warrant further investigation into differences between ASD 
more generally compared to ID or TD.  
 
The group sizes were not large enough to run individual regression analyses and it was 
important to minimise potential problems with group matching between the two age and VIQ 
‘tiers’ (ALI/ID and ALN/TD).  First, to test for any effects of CA, a regression analysis using 
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the ‘enter’ method was run with CA as a predictor variable and PPT as the outcome variable. 
CA was not a significant predictor in this model where p = .892.  However, a second 
regression was then run incorporating dummy group variables, Dummy group variables were 
created by recoding the existing group variable into 3 separate variables for ALI, ALN and 
ID. For example, to create the ALI dummy variable ‘ALI’ was coded from ‘group’ using 
binary coding where ‘1’ was assigned to ALI participants and ‘0’ was assigned to ALN, ID 
and TD participants. There are only 3 degrees of freedom in a factor with four levels so the 
TD group variable acted as a baseline control. When dummy group variables were included 
in the model CA became a significant predictor of PPT where p < .05. Therefore it was 
deemed necessary that CA should be included in the next regression analysis.  
 
As individual groups had low numbers for a powerful regression model it was difficult to 
obtain robust between group findings. So in order to test the existing findings from the 
correlational between groups analyses, differences between ASD and Non-ASD required 
further exploration.  Therefore one grouping variable was created called ‘ASD’ with a 1 for 
ALI and ALN and a 0 for ID and TD groups. A value of 1 for this variable represented an 
ASD participant, and a value of 0 a non-ASD participant.  
 
Two regressions were then run, combining the ASD groups and comparing them first with 
TD cases, and then in a second analysis comparing them with ID cases. Backward 
elimination was used since the sample size was small, and the purpose of the analysis was 
therefore primarily exploratory.  Each regression analysis included PPT as the dependent 
variable and independent variables: FCC, FCNC, CEFT, Ravens, CA, theory of mind (ToM; 
with ID not TD because of no data), ASD and interaction variables: ASD*FCC, ASD*FCNC. 
The comparison with ID showed no significant effects for the two interaction terms as all the 
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predictors were excluded from the model. However, for the comparison with TD there was a 
significant effect for ASD*FCC. Backward elimination for the TD comparison left FCC, 
FCNC, ASD and ASD*FCC as significant predictors for PPT with CA, Ravens, ToM, CEFT, 
ASD*FCNC excluded. This is shown in table 6.4 
 
Table 6.4    Regression table comparing ASD with TD showing the final model from 
backward elimination 
 
 
 
Both FCC, FCNC and ASD status (versus TD not ID) seem to predict PPT but also there is 
an interaction of ASD status with FCC performance on PPT performance. In terms of the 
predictions, this shows that there does seem to be a relationship between ASD and FCC 
(familiarity) in explaining PPT performance. Namely, FCC predicts performance on PPT for 
participants with ASD but not for typically developing children. So those in the ASD groups 
who have better FCC find that this helps them in the PPT task (if some kind of causal 
explanation is considered).  Or it may be that the PPT task and FCC tasks tap into the same 
cognitive skill that some children with ASD have more than others. 
 
It was then necessary to see if CEFT and Ravens account for variance in PPT once FCC is 
controlled. A hierarchical (blockwise entry) regression analysis was selected where 
       
  
Final 
Model   
Coefficients with PPT 
     
    Adjusted 
 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
 
R 
R 
Square R Square 
FCC 6.10 1.59 0.46 3.84 0.01** 
 
      
FCNC 4.52 1.33 0.37 3.41 0.01** 
 
0.65 0.44 0.39 
ASD 4.95 2.28 0.99 2.17 0.03* 
 
      
ASD*FCC -6.23 3.04 -0.91 -2.05 0.05* 
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familiarity, as predicted, was entered as the first predictor of PPT in the model, allowing for 
further contributions from CEFT and Ravens in the second step. A hierarchical model was 
chosen over a ‘forced entry’ model, where all predictors are added simultaneously, because 
of the specific predictions concerning the role of FCC based on the existing literature. A 
‘stepwise’ model, where predictors are ordered on a purely mathematical basis as determined 
by SPSS was also decided against for the same reasons (i.e., it is already known that memory 
and language are associated with one another Ullman, 2004). The regressions were carried 
out for the four groups separately so that group differences could be explored.  Table 6.5 
provides an overview of the results. 
 
Table 6.5 Regression table showing 2 block entry phases presented by group 
 
 
         
Final 
Model  
           
Group Model (Block) 
 
B SE Beta t Sig. R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
            ALI 1 FCC 9.33 2.90 0.63 3.22 0.01 .627a 0.39 0.36 
 
 
2 FCC 8.41 4.63 0.56 1.82 0.09 .652b 0.43 0.30 
 
  
CEFT -0.03 0.15 -0.07 -0.23 0.82 
    
  
Rav* 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.89 0.39 
    
            ALN 1 FCC 7.67 2.08 0.60 3.69 0.00 .601a 0.36 0.34 
 
 
2 FCC 7.92 2.84 0.62 2.79 0.01 .610b 0.37 0.29 
 
  
CEFT 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.87 
    
  
Rav* -0.04 0.06 -0.12 -0.60 0.55 
    
            ID 1 FCC 7.46 3.42 0.43 2.18 0.04 .430a 0.19 0.15 
 
 
2 FCC 3.47 3.98 0.20 0.87 0.40 .589b 0.35 0.24 
 
  
CEFT 0.36 0.17 0.55 2.11 0.05 
    
  
Rav* -0.07 0.11 -0.16 -0.65 0.52 
    
            TD 1 FCC -0.91 2.61 -0.07 -0.35 0.73 .074a 0.01 -0.04 
 
 
2 FCC -2.90 2.24 -0.24 -1.30 0.21 .617c 0.38 0.29 
 
  
CEFT 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.98 
    
  
Rav* 0.28 0.09 0.64 3.20 0.00 
    * Ravens 
a Predictors: FCC 
          b Predictors: FCC, Rav, CEFT 
          c Predictors: FCC, CEFT, Rav 
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As Table 6.5 illustrates, when FCC was entered into the model in the first step, it predicted a 
significant proportion of variance in PPT in all groups apart from the TD group. When CEFT 
and Ravens were added into the model, the pattern was largely unchanged for the two ASD 
groups with FCC remaining a marginally significant predictor of PPT in the ALI group (p = 
.09) and a significant predictor in the ALN group (p < .05) with non-significant contributions 
from either CEFT or Ravens. However, in the ID group, FCC was no longer a significant 
predictor; instead PPT is now predicted by CEFT with no significant contribution from 
Ravens. Finally, in the TD group, Ravens was a highly significant predictor of PPT whereas 
neither FCC nor CEFT were significant predictors.  
 
The prediction that FCC was a main contributor to semantic knowledge in the ALI group was 
demonstrated by the adjusted R square values. FCC was a significant predictor of semantic 
knowledge in both ASD groups, explaining 36% of PPT in the ALI and 34 % in the ALN 
group.  This is partly surprising given the strong association between CEFT and FCC 
demonstrated earlier, but indicates that although CEFT may assist with performance on FCC 
and FCNC, it does not contribute to semantic knowledge (PPT) in ASD. When CEFT and 
Ravens are added into the model there is only a small change between blocks one and two but 
there are salient changes in the ID and TD groups. In the TD group the PPT scores were at 
ceiling and so caution in interpretation is required here. However, to confirm that the 
association between PPT and FCC was significantly different between the ALI and TD 
groups a Fisher’s Z calculation showed that Z = 1.99, p < .05. This significant difference was 
also shown between the ALN and TD groups: Z = 2.06, p < .05; but there were no other 
between group associations that were significant. These calculations go further to support the 
hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between FCC (familiarity) and PPT 
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(conceptual word knowledge) not just in individuals with ALI but also with ALN, but this 
does not seem to show up in either typically developing or intellectually disabled individuals. 
 
 
Summary and comments 
 
Correlational analyses confirmed a significant relationship between familiarity and 
conceptual semantic ability in ASD but not in Non-ASD groups, which supports the main 
prediction. This was still the case despite the unpredicted raised familiarity scores in the ALI 
group. These higher scores may have resulted from enhanced influence of visuo-spatial 
ability induced by the nature of the stimuli in this experiment. This possibility highlighted the 
importance of testing the same components of memory but within a different testing 
paradigm. Instead of using known photographed grayscale objects it would also be worth 
trying non-meaningful shapes via a different medium to a computer laptop. 
 
What appears to drive semantic knowledge in the ID group appears to have nothing to do 
with familiarity but possibly more to do with CEFT. However, as other variables were not 
entered into the model that could be possible predictors of semantic knowledge in ID, it 
cannot be concluded that CEFT is the only significant factor involved.  It is more useful to 
note that familiarity was not associated with conceptual semantic knowledge unlike the two 
ASD groups.   
 
Overall, the mean scores for recollection as assessed by the FCNC test were as predicted and 
in line with current research stating that ASD groups would be impaired relative to a TD 
control group. The FCNC scores for the ID group were lower than expected however. Also, 
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for a purer test of recollection, an element of free or cued recall may be more reliable rather 
than the recognition test used for FCNC. Experiment 2 in Chapter Seven attempts to address 
these factors. 
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Chapter Seven 
Experiment 2:  Shape Recognition-Action Recall (SR-AR) Test 
 
Background 
The aim of this experiment was to tease apart the skills of familiarity and recollection in 
children (and adolescents) using a shape recognition (SR) and cued action recall (AR) test. 
The main task for the participants was to remember 16 non-meaningful shapes for the shape 
recognition (SR) test and then for the action recall (AR) test, using 10 of the previously seen 
shapes recall an action that was paired with the shape. To avoid any effects of verbal or 
semantic knowledge, non-meaningful shapes were used to test familiarity in the SR test.  In 
contrast to the forced choice non-corresponding (FCNC) test in Experiment 1, it was 
expected that the action recall element of this experiment may be a purer test of recollection. 
This is because recollection skills are employed more in a cued recall task rather than a 
recognition task where familiarity can also contribute. Another aim of this experiment was to 
re-test and devise a set of stimuli that could be used in a non-verbal test with children with 
severe developmental difficulties. This test could then be used as an alternative to tests using 
the remember/know paradigm with neurotypical adults. 
 
The stimuli have been used once before with higher functioning children with ASD (ALN) 
and with typically developing children and findings were reported in Bigham, Boucher, 
Mayes and Anns (2012).  This study showed that a group of ALN children were relatively 
impaired to a TD group on recollection skills as tested by the cued action-recall test; but their 
familiarity skills, as measured by a forced choice recognition test were relatively preserved. 
Bigham et al., (2012) judged the two tests to be both valid and reliable tests of recollection 
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and familiarity and effective with children also. The stimuli were re-piloted here with 
language-impaired children with ASD (ALI) and intellectual disabilities (ID) and the 
modifications are reported in the ‘piloting’ section below.  
 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
102 children and adolescents were recruited to this experiment as set out in Table 4.1 in 
Chapter Four. Table 4.1 of participant characteristics reported in Chapter Four is repeated 
here as an aid to the reader. All participants were recruited in line with the procedures 
described above in Chapter Four. 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics for Participant Groups 
 
      ASD       
  
ALI 
 (n = 20) 
  
ALN  
(n = 26) 
 
      Measure Mean SD  Range Mean SD Range 
       Age (months) 178.1 24.99 123-218 108.96 15.99 75-136 
VIQa 64.75 6.17 55-75 104.92 11.92 91-135 
Ravensb 25.9 7.54 7-36 24.31 8.11 8-36 
 
    Non-ASD       
  
ID  
(n = 26) 
  
TD  
(n = 32) 
 Measure Mean SD  Range Mean SD Range 
 
  
     Age (months) 176.42 21.72 136-214 98.53 9.44 81-114 
VIQa 61.96 4.84 55-74 109.9 11.35 90-142 
Ravensb 17.11 6.93 6-27 24.68 5.78 10-36 
a WASI verbal subscales 
     b Ravens CPM 
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Materials 
For the main SR test, a set of 16 non-representational shapes were cut out of blue card and 
stuck onto pieces of white card approximately 15x10cms. There were also 16 A4 cards, each 
containing one target plus 3 foils. An example of a target card and target-foil card is shown in 
Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 An example of the target on the left shown at study; and the target plus 3 
foils on the right shown at test. 
 
 
For the main AR test, 10 target shapes from the Shape Recognition (SR) test were used, and 
each of these was paired with only one foil (different from those used in SR). Use of target 
shapes from SR, and use of a single foil, was designed to facilitate recognition, because we 
were aiming for 100% correct recognition in both groups to exclude any effects of impaired 
familiarity in this second test.    
 
Each target shape was paired with a target-focused manual action, such as picking up the card 
and placing it face down or placing a clenched fist on the card. Actions involving bringing 
the card into relation with the participants’ own body were not used because tests of imitation 
suggest that this kind of action may be difficult for children with autism to encode (Hobson & 
Lee, 1999), whereas object-directed actions are imitated normally (Williams, Whiten, & 
Singh, 2004).  
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Figure 7.2   A child recalling the ‘karate chop’ action cued from the blue shape on card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Procedures for SR-AR 
 
Piloting 
Calibrating difficulty levels for mixed ability groups constitutes a particularly significant 
element of research design when working not only with children but particularly with 
children with developmental difficulties.  There are two obvious hurdles that need to be 
addressed. First the tasks must not be beyond the cognitive capacities of the least able, risking 
floor effects. Second, the tasks must not be too easy for the most able, risking ceiling effects. 
The SR-AR test has been used before (Bigham et al, 2012) but only with ALN and TD 
children who were ‘higher functioning’ in terms of their verbal ability. Therefore, it was 
necessary to re-pilot the test with ALI and ID children and adolescents who may find the tests 
more challenging.   
 
As a result of the current piloting phase a few minor changes were made. In the Shape 
Recognition (SR) task, verbal encouragement was introduced after presentation of the 11th 
item (16 items in total) to encourage further concentration.  This was felt necessary due to the 
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addition of the ALI and ID groups who may find it relatively more difficult to maintain focus 
and concentration. The tester said, “Well done, just a few more to go now.”  This was 
particularly important because the study phase (which contains 16 items) is quite long; 
however with continued encouragement all participants were able to complete the task.  
 
In the Action-Recall task, 4 out of 10 actions were re-invented.  In addition, the link between 
each stimulus (a card with an abstract shape drawn on it) and the action to be recalled (for 
example, placing a clenched fist on the card) was tightened by making the to-be-recalled 
action relate more directly to the stimulus. This involved for instance, an action of tracing 
round the shape on the card; or doing an action of a gentle karate chop next to the card rather 
than anywhere on the table (see Figure 7.2). This was a key change in ensuring the validity of 
the task; that is that recall was definitely being cued by the stimuli thus testing cued recall.  
 
The method of scoring was also changed to ensure that children were not distracted by what 
the tester was writing down and to also ensure that the tester was able to administer the test 
more smoothly and consistently.  Hence, after the presentation of each test card, it was 
immediately placed into a file with pre-labelled and scored dividers (not visible to the 
participant) and the scores were calculated after the test when the child was not present.  The 
system used for awarding points was unchanged. 
 
Procedure 
The SR-AR tests were administered during one session and consisted of two subtests, one 
shape-recognition test (SR) and one action-recall test (AR). Each test had a practice phase. 
The recognition test was always presented first and then immediately followed by the action 
recall test. Each child sat opposite the tester at a table where the test materials were presented. 
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A stopwatch was used to maintain presentation rates and time allowed for recall in the AR 
test. Pre-prepared score sheets were used to record the children’s responses and score their 
accuracies. Practice in the procedure of either SR or AR was given immediately prior to each 
test, using 4 easy-to-be remembered stimuli and precisely the same procedures to be used in 
the actual test. Two practice runs were given for each practise phase, with instruction and 
support on the first run if necessary to ensure correct responding. No support was given on 
the second practice run. None of the children failed more than one item on the second 
practice run and therefore none were excluded on the grounds of failure to understand the 
procedure. All of the children were thanked at the end and awarded a certificate as set out in 
Chapter Four. 
 
Details of the test procedures are given under the individual test headings, below.  
   
Shape Recognition (SR): Procedure 
Practice was given to ensure that all children fully understood what they were required to do. 
For practice, 4 non-representational shapes cut out of red card and stuck on pieces of white 
card were used as stimuli, with recognition tested using an easy 4-choice forced recognition 
task (foils were relatively unlike target stimuli). The procedure used during practice was 
identical to that described below for the test proper. Two practice runs were given, with 
additional instruction and support provided on the first run, if needed to ensure correct 
responding. All participants recognised at least 3 shapes correctly on one or both of the 
practice runs, and none were excluded. 
 
The tester introduced the study phase by saying: “We’ll play that game again, but it will be a 
bit harder this time as I have many more shapes and they are different from the ones that I 
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have just shown you.” – (i.e. the practice materials). “Try to remember exactly what each 
shape looks like. They all look a bit the same, so you need to look at each one carefully. Are 
you ready?”  Each card with the target shape was presented in a predetermined order and 
orientation, at three-second intervals. When all of the target items had been presented the 
tester said: “Let’s see how many of the shapes you can remember. I’m going to show you four 
shapes and I want you to tell me which one is exactly the same as one of the ones you just 
saw. Are you ready?”  
 
During the test phase, the tester presented the target-foil cards one at a time in a 
predetermined order, different to that used at study, and said, “Which one of these shapes 
have you seen before?” Children were required to point to the item of their choice. When the 
child responded the target-foil card was removed from sight and the next one was presented. 
If the child was reluctant to respond the tester elicited a response by saying, “Just have a 
guess, quick as you can”. There were no instances in which a child perseverated to a 
particular location.  A child was credited with one point for each correctly recognised target 
item. Incorrect responses did not result in any points. Possible scores therefore ranged from 0 
to 16, which were then converted to percentages of total scores prior to analysis. 
 
Action Recall (AR): Procedure 
For practice, 4 non-representational shapes cut out of red card and stuck on pieces of white 
card were used as stimuli, with recognition tested using an easy 2-choice forced recognition 
task (as opposed to 4-choice which was used in the SR test previously). Each target shape 
was paired with a target-focused manual action, demonstrated by the tester twice, such as 
blowing it or moving it from side to side. The procedure used during practice was identical to 
that described below for the test proper. Two practice runs were given, with additional 
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instruction and support on the first run, if needed, to ensure correct responding. All 
participants recognized at least 3 shapes and recalled at least 2 actions on one or both of the 
practice runs, and none were excluded.     
 
The Action-Recall (AR) test immediately followed the SR test. Children were congratulated 
on their success in SR and asked:  “Do you want to play another game?  It is a bit harder this 
time but more fun?”  Every child chose to continue. After the practise phase, the tester said, 
“I’ve got some more shapes here, different to the ones I showed you before” (indicating the 
practice materials). “ This time I’m going to do a different action with each of them, and I 
will show you the action twice.  I’m going to go a bit faster than before.  Try to remember 
what each shape looks like and the action that goes with it.  Are you ready?”  The 10 target 
shapes were presented one at a time in a predetermined order and orientation, each being 
placed centrally in front of the child.  After 3 seconds, the tester performed the action 
associated with the target item twice, quite slowly in succession, checking that the child was 
attending to the action.  The target shape was then removed and the next shape-action pair 
were presented until all 10 shape-action pairs had been presented and actions performed by 
the tester. 
 
Then, at test, the tester said:  “Let’s see how many of the shapes and actions you can 
remember.  I’m going to show you two shapes and I want you to point to the one that I just 
showed you ” - placing the first target-foil pair centrally in front of the child, in a pre-
prescribed orientation and with the position of the target stimulus to the left or right of the 
foil in a pre-determined order.  The order in which target-foil pairs were presented was 
different to the order of presentation during study.  If the child failed to respond or looked 
uncertain the tester prompted by saying: “Have a guess. Which one did you see before, this 
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one?  Or this one?”  If the child indicated the incorrect picture, that target-foil pair was 
removed and the next pair of shapes were presented. However, if the child indicated the 
correct picture, the foil was removed, the target item moved to a central position in front of 
the child, and the tester said:  “What was the action that went with it?”  Five seconds were 
allowed for the child to reproduce the original action. The tester prompted if necessary by 
encouraging the child to have a guess if uncertain.  
 
Performance on the recognition pre-test was scored out of 10, each correctly recognized 
shape was awarded one point.  Not all participants achieved 100% correct recognition: two 
children in the ALI group scored 9 out of 10 and one child scored 8 out of 10.  In the ALN 
group one child scored 9 and one child scored 8; and in the ID group one child scored 9 and 
the other 7.  Scores for the main action-recall test were therefore calculated as percentages of 
correct responses out of the number of action-recall items given.  ‘Correct’ recall was 
operationalized as an unambiguous attempt to reproduce the required action, not taking into 
account person-related detail such as the hand used, or the direction in which an action had 
been carried out (e.g. sliding the card from one side of the table to the other).  
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Results 
Analysis 
 
The analysis conducted for Experiment 2 dealt first with predictions relating to familiarity, as 
assessed by the shape recognition (SR) test; and then recollection as assessed by the action 
recall (AR) test. The main predictions were that on SR, the ALI group would perform 
significantly worse relative to the TD and ALN groups and the ID group would perform 
either similarly to the ALI group or between the ALI and the TD - ALN groups.  On AR, it 
was predicted that the ALI and ALN groups would perform significantly worse than the TD 
group and the ID group would either perform similarly to the ALI group or midway between 
the ASD groups and the TD group.  Having established what the individual group scores 
were on the memory tasks, the primary aim of assessing the main predictors of conceptual 
semantic knowledge was addressed. As in Experiment 1, correlation tests were run to identify 
the main predictors of semantic knowledge (measured by the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test, 
PPT) followed by regression analyses to ascertain what specific contribution familiarity (SR) 
makes to semantic knowledge, over and above any effects of visuo-perceptual abilities 
(CEFT) and fluid intelligence (Ravens). Performance on a standard false belief task 
(attempting to measure theory of mind) was compared between groups with the expectation 
that ASD groups would perform more poorly than the ID and TD groups. Unless otherwise 
stated, p values were reported as exact when results were non-significant. 
 
To begin, correlation matrices were created and examined at both the group and combined 
groups level incorporating all the key variables. First, it was important to see if chronological 
age (CA) correlated with any scores related to the predictions.  As expected,  CA did not 
correlate with any of the memory measures apart from recollection in the ALN group. The 
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age range of younger children in this group is relatively wide so this is not surprising. CA 
was therefore not considered to be a factor affecting performance however this would be re-
checked at the later stage of the regression analyses. 
 
 
 
Table 7.2   Correlation matrices for combined and separate groups using Pearson’s r 
 
All Groups 
(n = 104) 
 
CA VIQ Ravens CEFT PPT Familiarity Recollection DecMemory 
 
CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -0.85** 1 
      
 
Ravens -0.17 0.35** 1 
     
 
CEFT -0.23* 0.37** 0.67** 1 
    
 
PPT -0.13 0.34** 0.43** 0.46** 1 
   
 
Familiarity -0.34** 0.39** 0.49** 0.51** 0.42** 1 
  
 
Recollection -0.18 0.25* 0.23* 0.30** 0.33** 0.45** 1 
 
 
DecMemory -0.30** 0.37** 0.41** 0.44** 0.47** 0.83** 0.87** 1 
           
  
 
 
 
        
Group 
 
CA VIQ Ravens CEFT PPT Familiarity Recollection DecMemory 
ALI (n = 20) CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -0.04 1 
      
 
Ravens 0.29 0.25 1 
     
 
CEFT 0.07 0.27 0.58** 1 
    
 
PPT 0.49* 0.50* 0.63** 0.53* 1 
   
 
Familiarity -0.14 0.31 0.65** 0.65** 0.39 1 
  
 
Recollection 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.31 0.50* 1 
 
 
DecMemory 0.06 0.31 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.81** 0.91** 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.2 contd 
 
ALN (n = 26) 
 
CA VIQ Ravens CEFT PPT Familiarity Recollection DecMemory 
 
CA 1 
       
 
VIQ -0.01 1 
      
 
Ravens 0.11 0.38 1 
     
 
CEFT 0.39* 0.35 0.55** 1 
    
 
PPT 0.35 0.31 0.14 0.38 1 
   
 
Familiarity 0.20 0.32 0.48* 0.64** 0.44* 1 
  
 
Recollection 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.61** 0.52** 0.42* 1 
 
 
DecMemory 0.19 0.30 0.38 0.57** 0.74** 0.82** 0.87** 1 
         
 
CA 1 
       
ID (n = 26) VIQ -0.60** 1 
      
 
Ravens -0.26 0.38 1 
     
 
CEFT -0.31 0.53** 0.65** 1 
    
 
PPT -0.14 0.29 0.33 0.58** 1 
   
 
Familiarity -0.37 0.44* 0.53** 0.52** 0.42* 1 
  
 
Recollection -0.21 0.59** 0.46* 0.22 0.17 0.48* 1 
 
 
DecMemory -0.33 0.61** 0.57** 0.33 0.41* 0.83** 0.88** 1 
          
 
CA 1 
       
TD (n – 32) VIQ -0.16 1 
      
 
Ravens 0.34* 0.40* 1 
     
 
CEFT 0.16 0.09 0.53** 1 
    
 
PPT 0.35* 0.40* 0.68** 0.34 1 
   
 
Familiarity 0.17 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 0.01 1 
  
 
Recollection 0.14 -0.20 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.19 1 
 
 
DecMemory 0.20 -0.14 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.77** 0.77** 1 
  
1) Familiarity - SR 
 
The Figure 7.3 sets out the mean scores in each group for the shape recognition (SR) task. 
 
Figure 7.3  Proportion correct mean scores on SR and AR. Error bars represent +/- 1SE 
 
 
First, a univariate ANOVA was conducted in order to see whether there was an overall group 
difference on SR scores. As predicted, there was a significant difference where F(3,104) = 
6.48, p < .001, ��2 = .16. Individual group proportion correct scores can be seen in Figure 7.3. 
 
In order to test the prediction that, on the test of SR, the ALI group would be impaired 
relative to the TD and ALN group, two separate independent samples t-tests were run to 
compare the relevant groups. These comparisons confirmed that there was a significant 
difference between the TD group (mean (M) = .83, standard deviation (SD) = .15) and the 
ALI group scores (M = .71, SD = .19) with the ALI group scoring significantly worse (t(50) 
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= -2.48, p < .05, d = .68). However, compared to the ALN group, the ALI group did not score 
significantly worse ( t(44) = -.40, p > .05, d = .12). As Figure 7.1 indicates, this unexpected 
similarity between the ALI and ALN groups is a result of significantly worse performance by 
the ALN as compared to the TD group: t(56) = 2.02, p  < .05, d = .52, contrary to predictions. 
Compared to Experiment 1 however,  the ALI participants did not perform at the highest 
level of all groups. 
 
In relation to the ID group it was predicted that they would either perform similarly to the 
ALI group or at an intermediate level between the ALI and the TD and ALN groups. 
However, similar to the results reported in Experiment 1, the ID group performed worse than 
all of the other groups.  There were no significant differences in mean scores between the ID 
and ALI group: t(44) = 1.64, p = 0.10, d = .49; but the ID group performance was the lowest 
of all groups with a mean score of .62 (SD = .18) The ALN mean score was .73 (SD = .2) and 
in the ALI group, as mentioned above, it was .71 (SD = .19).  There was a significant 
difference between the ID group and the ALN group scores: t(50) = 2.14, p < .05, d = .59 and 
the TD group: t(56) = 4.78, p < 0.001, d = 1.25. 
 
Due to the high CEFT scores in the ASD groups in Experiment 1, as well as the strong 
relationship between CEFT and the test of familiarity (FCC), this relation was tested for 
earlier on in this analysis. Across all groups it was expected that scores on the CEFT (test of 
visuo-perceptual abilities) would correlate with the SR (familiarity) test scores, which 
requires attention to visuo-spatial detail to discriminate targets from distracters.  
 
However, this was not predicted for the AR test, which involved recalling actions that had 
been performed by the tester. Indeed this was the case with SR scores highly correlated with 
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CEFT across all groups: r(102) = 0.51, p < .001, whereas the correlation between CEFT and 
AR was r(102) = .3, p < .01; which was still significant but less than on FCNC where r(102) 
= .42, p < .001. Based on the observations in the previous chapter, it was expected that CEFT 
would correlate more strongly with SR performance in the two ASD groups compared to the 
TD and ID groups because the SR test also relies heavily on visuo-spatial skills (advantaging 
ASD groups) whereas AR has the element of cued action recall which does not employ these 
skills, unlike FCNC in Experiment 1. Again, these predictions were confirmed, whereby in 
the ALI group there was a highly significant relationship: r(18) = 0.65, p < .001, as well as in 
the ALN group: r(24) = 0.64, p < .001. There was no significant link in the TD group on SR: 
r(30) = -.10, p = .64 but in the ID group there was also evidence also of a strong association. 
r(24) = 0.52, p < .001.  
 
Therefore, given some of these significant relationships it was still important to determine to 
what extent CEFT and Ravens may be facilitating SR scores in the ASD groups, even though 
they were not as unexpectedly high as in Experiment 1. A univariate ANCOVA was 
conducted again across groups looking at scores on SR and an effect of group but this time 
controlling for CEFT and Ravens. Unlike Experiment 1, the effect of group remained 
significant at F(3, 98) = 3.33, p < .05, ��2 = .09. However, there were also significant effects 
from CEFT: F(1,98) = 8.20, p < .01, ��2 =  .08 and Ravens: F(1,98) = 5.45, p < .05, ��2 = .05. 
 
2) Recollection - AR  
 
For tests of AR it was predicted that both the ALI and ALN group would be impaired relative 
to the TD group, and the ID group would either perform similarly to the ALI and ALN 
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groups or somewhere at an intermediate level between these two groups and the TD group.  
Average group scores for AR can be seen in Figure 7.4.  
 
 
Figure 7.4   Proportion correct mean scores on AR. Error bars represent +/- 1SE 
 
 
To test the aforementioned predictions individual t-tests were used, as before, to determine 
mean scores and group differences. As predicted, the ALI group (mean score = .55) 
performed at a significantly lower level than the TD group (mean score .68): t(50) = 2.29, p < 
.05, d = .61. However, unexpectedly the ALN group (mean score = .63) did not perform 
significantly worse than the TD group:  t(56) = -1.08, p = .28, d = .28 and although their 
scores were numerically lower, the size of this effect was relatively small. 
 
For the ID group, their mean score was .58, which was marginally better than the ALI 
group’s score of .55 but not near significance. This was confirmed by a t-test between the ID 
and ALI group: t(44) = -0.36, p = .72, d = .11. The ALN group scored a little higher with .63 
but not significant: t(50) = 0.81; p = .42, d = .22.  As predicted the ID group did perform 
significantly worse compared to TD’s: t(42.1) = 2.11, p < .05, d = .57. 
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3) Determinants of conceptual semantic knowledge 
 
To identify the principal predictors of semantic knowledge the same analysis strategy was 
adopted as in Experiment 1, beginning with a set of correlational tests to gain insight into the 
main correlates of semantic knowledge. First it was necessary to establish that the familiarity 
measure of SR did indeed correlate with the semantic knowledge measure (PPT) as predicted. 
A two-tailed bivariate Pearson’s correlation confirmed that these variables were indeed 
significantly correlated r(102) = .41, p < .001. 
 
It was predicted that in the four groups separately, correlations between scores on the PPT 
and performance on SR would be greatest in the ALN group (because they compensate for 
impaired recollection using familiarity), followed by the ALI group (possibly mirroring 
findings from Boucher et al., (2008)), with a small or non-significant correlation in the TD 
group. Individual two-tailed Pearson’s correlations within groups supported this pattern. 
Specifically, in the ALN group there was a significant correlation between SR and PPT: r(24) 
= 0.44, p < .05. In the ALI group the correlation was of a similar magnitude although not 
significant: r(18) = .39, p = .09. It is evident from looking at Figure 7.5 that this marginal 
significance level in the ALI group may be due to an outlier (labelled in red), who performed 
at ceiling on the SR test but was the worst performer on the PPT. By contrast, the remaining 
participants fall on a clear diagonal resembling a strong correlation between SR and PPT. In 
fact, when the outlier was omitted from the dataset the correlation in the ALI group became 
significant: r(17) = .67, p < .01. In the TD group there was no evidence for a relationship 
between SR and PPT: r(30) = .01, p = .96, whereas in the ID group, a significant relationship 
was found that was similar in magnitude to the ALN group: r (24) = .42, p < .05. As already 
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noted in the previous chapter, the non-significant correlation in the TD group needs to be 
interpreted with some caution due many participants in this group performing at or near 
ceiling on the PPT.  
 
 
Figure 7.5    Graphs showing the relationship between PPT and SR tests in ALI, ALN, 
ID and TD groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial correlation matrices for the ALI and TD groups showed that CA correlated with 
PPT so partial correlations were run between groups controlling for CA. Results remained 
broadly unchanged where ALI: r(16) = .70, p <.001; ALN: r(23) = .41, p < .05; ID: r(23) = 
.40, p < .05 and TD: r(29) = -.06, p = .77.  However in the ALI group the relationship was 
stronger. 
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The following prediction set out that PPT and Ravens would correlate across all groups. So a 
bivariate correlation was conducted that demonstrated, as predicted, that PPT and Ravens 
were highly correlated: r(102) = .40, p < .001. Within groups it was predicted that 
correlations between scores on PPT and Ravens might not reach significance but would 
possibly be the greatest in the ID group and the least in the ALI group. These predictions 
were not supported as the ALI group had the highest correlation where r(18) = .62, p < .01 
and in the ID group there was a small correlation but not significant: as r(24) = .32, p = .10. 
 
In order to assess the relative contributions of familiarity, recollection, fluid intelligence, 
visuo-perceptual abilities and chronological age to conceptual semantic ability, an initial 
exploratory linear regression model using the ‘enter’ method was run. The aim of this was to 
see if there was a differing pattern of key predictors of PPT between the groups. This is set 
out in table 7.3. 
 
 
Table 7.3 Results for regression analysis showing the main predictors of PPT (outcome 
variable) by group 
 
 
Group R Adj RSQ Sig F SR AR CEFT Ravens CA 
ALI 0.79 0.48 0.02* 0.04 0.27 0.27 0.43 0.09 
ALN 0.64 0.27 0.04* 0.35 0.49* -0.26 -0.01 0.32 
ID 0.61 0.22 0.08 0.21 0.03 0.60* 1.16 0.09 
TD 0.69 0.38 0.01** -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.65** 0.12 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 7.3 demonstrates a different pattern in each group with the ASD and TD groups 
showing an overall significant predictability for PPT.  Although the ALI group shows the 
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model as significant where p < .05 there are no individual significant predictors. This is 
similar to Experiment 1. However, in the other groups there was one clear and differing 
significant predictor in each group.  In the ALN group, AR (recollection) was a significant 
predictor of PPT whereas in the ID group it was CEFT (as in Experiment 1) and in the TD 
group it was Ravens (as in Experiment 1).  
 
CA was not a significant predictor of PPT in any of the groups and an additional regression to 
test for its overall predictability in explaining the variance in PPT was run using the ‘enter’ 
method. CA remained an insignificant predictor where p = .173. This was important to 
establish due to the ‘two-tiered’ ages of the 4 groups. 
 
Although group sizes were slightly larger in Experiment 2 they were nevertheless too small to 
run individual regression analyses. In order to investigate differences between ASD more 
generally compared to Non-ASD, one similar regression was run using backward elimination 
as in Experiment 1. However, instead of doing two separate comparisons for ID and TD, this 
was combined in one model (because there was SFB (theory of mind) data for both ID and 
TD groups). Individual groups were therefore dummy coded and an ASD variable was 
created from the ALI and ALN groups (see Experiment 1).  PPT was included as the 
dependent variable and SR, AR, CEFT, Ravens, CA, SFB, ASD and interaction variables: 
ASD*SR, ASD*AR were added as independent variables. CA was included for cautionary 
purposes and it did show up as a significant predictor as shown in table 7.4. Backward 
elimination yielded 7 variables in the third model as significant predictors for PPT whilst 
Ravens and SFB were excluded (see table 7.4).  
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Table 7.4  Regression table comparing ASD and NonASD showing the 3rd final model 
using backward elimination 
 
 
       
  
Final 
Model   
Coefficients with PPT 
     
    Adjusted 
 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
 
R R Square  R Square 
          
ASD -4.99 2.38 0.87 -2.09 0.04* 
 
      
SR -21.39 6.02 -1.47 -3.55 0.01** 
 
      
AR 11.60 4.13 0.98 2.81 0.01* 
 
0.82 0.67 0.60 
ASD*SR 16.42 3.91 2.62 4.20 0.01** 
 
      
ASD*AR -7.41 3.06 -1.29 -2.42 0.02* 
 
      
CEFT 0.29 0.06 0.66 4.63 0.01** 
 
      
CA 0.03 0.01 0.40 3.36 0.01* 
 
      
          
* Significant at level of p < .05 
       
**Significant at level of p < .001 
       
 
Both SR, AR and ASD status (versus both ID and TD) predict PPT but there is also an 
interaction of ASD status with SR and AR performance on PPT performance.  CEFT and CA 
were also significant predictors although CA should be interpreted with caution due to the 
two-tier groups and its effects so far have been shown to be inconsistent. In relation to the 
predictions, there is a strong relationship between ASD and SR (familiarity) in explaining 
PPT where p < .001. AR (recollection) showed a weaker relationship with ASD in explaining 
PPT where p <  .02.  SFB (Theory of mind) although only included as a dichotomous variable 
was excluded in model 1 of the regression.  
 
To return to the overall hypothesis of whether familiarity predicts difficulties with conceptual 
semantic ability in ASD, another regression analysis was needed to assess the relative 
contributions of SR (familiarity) to semantic knowledge (PPT), as well as CEFT (visuo-
perceptual abilities) and Ravens within groups. A hierarchical (blockwise entry) regression 
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analysis was selected where familiarity, as theoretically predicted, was the main predictor in 
the model, allowing for further contributions from CEFT and Ravens in no particular order. 
As in Experiment 1, a hierarchical model, where predictors are selected based on past work 
and theoretical contributions, was chosen.  The outlier in the ALI group was omitted and then 
SR was entered in the first block. CEFT and Ravens were then added simultaneously in the 
second block and the dependant variable was PPT.  Groups were split so that group 
differences could be determined.  Table 7.5 shows the coefficients for each group as well as 
the relevant statistical values. 
 
 
Table 7.5    Regression table showing 2 block entry phases presented by group 
examining the contributions of SR, CEFT and Ravens to PPT 
 
         Final 
Model 
 
Group Model  B SE Beta t Sig. R R2 Adjusted 
R Square 
           
ALI 1 SR 9.82 2.61 0.67 3.76 0.00 .674a 0.45 0.42 
 2 SR 3.98 4.19 0.27 0.95 0.36 .742b 0.55 0.46 
  CEFT 0.83 0.11 0.16 0.75 0.47    
  Ravens 0.13 0.10 0.38 1.50 0.16 
 
   
ALN 1 SR 5.50 2.27 0.44 2.42 0.02 .442a 0.20 0.16 
 2 SR 4.66 3.09 0.38 1.51 0.15 .480b 0.23 0.13 
  CEFT 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.89 0.39    
  Ravens -0.05 0.07 -0.17 -0.75 0.46 
 
   
ID 1 SR 6.63 2.94 0.42 2.26 0.03 .418a 0.18 0.14 
 2 SR 3.14 3.30 0.20 0.95 0.35 .604c 0.37 0.28 
  CEFT 0.38 0.16 0.57 2.46 0.02    
  Ravens -0.06 0.10 -0.15 -0.65 0.53 
 
   
TD 1 SR 0.11 2.36 0.01 0.05 0.96 .008a 0.00 -0.03 
 2 SR 0.24 1.79 0.02 0.13 0.89   0.41 
  CEFT -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.19 0.85    
  Ravens 0.23 0.05 0.70 4.31 0.00    
 
a Predictors: SR 
       
b Predictors: SR, Ravens, CEFT        
c Predictors: SR, CEFT, Ravens        
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The regression table set out in Table 7.5 shows that in the ALI group, SR in the first block is  
a significant predictor variable for PPT where p < .01 However, when CEFT and Ravens are 
added into the model in block 2, there are no significant predictors. CEFT and SR are no 
longer significant predictors unlike in Experiment 1 where familiarity remained a predictor of 
PPT performance in ASD groups. In the ALN group a similar pattern emerges where SR is a 
significant predictor at block 1, p < .05, but when CEFT and Ravens are added in block 2, 
none of the factors seem to significantly predict PPT performance. This was likely due to 
collinearity of the variables and that they all correlated with one another. In the ID group, SR 
is significant at block 1 but then CEFT becomes the significant predictor at block 2 and SR 
and Ravens are not significant. In the TD group, SR is not a predictor at either block 1 or 2, 
nor  CEFT at block 2, but Ravens is a highly significant predictor of PPT. However, there 
may be other factors in the TD group that would contribute to PPT performance such as VIQ 
but this was not part of the model so results should be interpreted with caution. Another 
regression was run to check any effects of CA and AR in block 2 (because they have been 
shown in analyses above to make a contribution) but there were no significant changes other 
than AR significantly predicting PPT performance in the ALN group where p < .05. CA 
remained insignificant and the CEFT and Ravens remained significant in the ID and TD 
groups respectively. 
 
The prediction that SR (familiarity) would be a main contributor to PPT (semantic 
knowledge) in the ALI group was demonstrated by the adjusted R square values of 42% 
which is higher than Experiment 1. However there was more collinearity of the variables in 
Experiment 2 making it difficult to distinguish the individual contributions of SR, AR, CEFT 
and Ravens. However,  the correlational analyses point to a clear association between SR and 
PPT in ALI.  To confirm that the association between SR and PPT was significantly different 
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in between the ALI and TD groups a Fisher’s Z calculation (2-tailed) showed that Z = 2.57, p 
<. 01. There were no other between group differences that were significant. These 
calculations go further to support the hypothesis that there is a significant association 
between SR (familiarity) and PPT (conceptual semantic knowledge) in ALI which does not 
seem to exist in ID or TD populations and to a lesser extent in ALN. 
 
 
4) ID group 
 
Another key aim of this research was to obtain data on memory and language measures for 
children with ID. A different profile of scores was predicted for the ID group compared to the 
ASD groups.  
 
Overall, the striking findings for the ID groups reflect a very low performance compared to 
other groups, on ALL measures in both Experiments 1 and 2; excluding the WASI on which 
they were matched and on the PPT where their scores were equated to both ASD groups. 
CEFT was shown to be associated with PPT performance unlike TD, ALI or ALN. 
 
5) Between test results 
Correlation tests of the experimental tests were run on the Experiment 2 dataset because it 
contains more participants than Experiment 1. The familiarity tests of FCC and SR correlated 
with r(91) = .54, p < .001 but, as would be expected, the recollection tests of FCNC and AR 
did not correlate as r(91) = .17, p = .10.  
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Summary 
 
One of the aims in Experiment 2 was to devise a test of recollection that avoided employing 
skills of familiarity (as well as visuo-spatial skills) as much as possible, unlike FCNC. The 
fact that FCNC and AR did not correlate might explain that this was achieved and that the 
AR test employed more recollective skills than the FCNC test.  
 
The overall memory scores for Experiment 2  for each of the diagnostic groups were more 
consistent with the predictions as well as the existing literature than Experiment 1. The 
results of Experiment 2 have successfully demonstrated that there is a relation between 
familiarity and semantic knowledge in ASD although the findings from the regression 
analysis complicate this relation. This will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
 
 
Overview of results 
 
The main aim of this research was to investigate the possible causes of structural language 
impairment in children with ALI looking specifically at the contributions of declarative 
memory impairment (familiarity and recollection) to semantic knowledge. The main 
prediction was that the ALI group would be impaired on familiarity and that this would relate 
to impairments in semantic knowledge. The main findings in ALI on familiarity were both 
mixed and unexpected with the ALI group unimpaired in Experiment 1 but performing worse 
than the TD and ALN groups in Experiment 2. On recollection they were relatively impaired 
to TD’s as expected and so were the ALN group. In both Experiments there was a clear 
correlation between familiarity and lexical semantic knowledge as measured by the Pyramids 
and Palm trees test in both ASD groups but not in the TD group. In Experiment 2, fluid 
intelligence also played a role in lexical semantic knowledge, overtaking the contribution 
from familiarity in the ALI group only.  
 
The secondary aim of the work was to obtain data on possible contributions to language 
impairment in children with ID and to compare their memory abilities and their relations with 
semantic knowledge with children with both ALI and ALN. The overall pattern of findings 
for the ID group was striking in that they were significantly impaired relative to the ASD 
groups on most measures. More specifically, their performance on familiarity and 
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recollection was significantly worse than all other groups in both experiments (apart from 
recollection in Experiment Two) as were their scores on fluid intelligence and visuo-
perceptual abilities. Familiarity was associated with lexical semantic knowledge in 
Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2; however visuo-perceptual ability rather than 
familiarity was the dominant predictor of lexical semantic knowledge in both experiments. 
 
The pattern of results obtained across the two experiments has a number of implications for 
the literature on both ASD and ID. The following sections will first outline the implications 
of the data for the literature in ASD, beginning with implications for declarative memory and 
structural language followed by a discussion of issues relating to ASD more generally. Next 
the implications for our understanding of ID will be discussed. The final three sections will 
acknowledge some limitations of the current research as well as future directions before 
concluding with some implications for applied settings. 
 
 
Implications for literature on ASD 
 
The findings from this research on declarative memory performance in ASD, comprising 
familiarity and recollection processes, will be discussed in the context of past and current 
literature. How these processes may underpin structural language in ASD will then be 
considered. 
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Familiarity 
ALI  
In Experiment 1 the ALI group performed numerically best out of all groups, contrary to 
predictions, but in Experiment 2 they were significantly impaired relative to the TD group but 
not the ALN group who scored only numerically higher. These mixed findings, though 
unexpected, are representative of some inconsistencies in the literature on familiarity in ALI. 
In one study, familiarity in ALI was impaired compared to both an age and ability matched 
ID and TD group when coloured shapes were used as the stimuli (Boucher et al., 2008), 
which were similar to the stimuli used in the current SR test of Experiment 2. By contrast, 
other studies have shown that familiarity is intact in ALI compared to NT controls (Boucher 
& Lewis, 1992; Hill & Russell, 2002; Hauck et al., 1998) and these studies all used stimuli 
that involved common objects, similar to the materials used in the current FCC test. It may be 
the case, therefore, that the difference in stimuli (abstract/novel shapes vs. common objects) 
contributes to the inconsistencies in the current performance where ALI were impaired on SR 
but not FCC relative to the TD group. Although such an explanation is appealing, it is 
important to note that an early study by Boucher and Warrington (1976) also used pictures of 
everyday objects, and Lind (2008) used named pictures of common objects and performance 
in the ALI groups was impaired relative to NT, ALN and ID groups in both studies. 
Therefore it is unlikely to be the content of the stimuli alone that accounts for differences in 
findings.  
 
The tests of familiarity that were employed in this research were specifically designed to 
minimise demands on verbal processes.  This may have favoured the ASD groups – in 
particular the ALI group – due to their superior visuo-spatial skills relative to their language 
skills. At first, this may not seem to explain why the ALI performance was relatively 
 186 
impaired to the TD group on SR but not on FCC. However, there are important differences in 
the nature of the foils used within the forced choice quartets. In the FCC test the foils were 
very slightly different to the target. For example, with a target item such as a paper clip, the 
foils would also be paper clips, but with only very small differences between them. However, 
in the SR test, the difference between the foils and the target (non-meaningful blue shapes), 
and between the foils themselves, was much greater than on the FCC test (see Migo et al., 
2013). A visual representation of this situation can be seen in Figure 8.1 below where 4 
Gaussian curves represent hypothetical feature distributions of the forced choice options 
comprising a test trial including one target (red) and three foils (blue) on the FCC test (left) 
and SR test (right and below). In the FCC test, there is much greater overlap between the 
signals representing the different options, making it more difficult to identify the target 
amongst the distracters than in the SR tests. 
 
Figure 8.1: Gaussian curves represent the relationship of the target (red) to the foils 
(blue) in similarity on the forced choice quartet in FCC (left) and SR (below right). 
 
 
 
        FCC 
 
 
SR 
 
 
It is possible that on the FCC test individuals with ALI find it easier to discriminate these 
differences at retrieval and may in fact be relying more on a process of eliminating the foils, 
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rather than the feeling of ‘knowing’ that they had seen the target previously. In the SR test 
however, foils were relatively different from the target and this may draw more attention to 
the target rather than the foils at retrieval and to establish whether or not it has been seen 
before. These two processes, although they constitute the skills involved in a task of 
familiarity, are different from one another. The former skill of identifying the differences in 
the foils to achieve success in identifying the target may not be the same as the feeling of 
‘knowing’ that you have seen something before. This is something future studies could 
address by systematically varying the extent to which foils are similar to targets and by 
varying the task (e.g., pick the one that is least similar to the one you have seen vs. pick the 
one you saw earlier). 
 
Another alternative could be more related to encoding.  Children with ALI may have 
performed better on FCC than SR because their relatively superior perceptual skills allow 
them to discriminate the foils more on FCC, essentially stretching the x-axis in Figure 9.1. In 
TD and ALN groups preserved language skills may interfere with the processing of 
perceptual details because all items are simply ‘paper-clips’ so their encoding is primarily 
verbally mediated whereas in children with ALI it is primarily mediated through visual 
processes. 
 
 The lack of impairment found on FCC in the ALI group, and the arguments above, would be 
consistent with the literature that suggests individuals with ASD have an enhanced ability for 
discrimination  (Plaisted, 2001; O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001) that confers an advantage on 
tasks where perceptual similarity plays a role (Bott et al., 2006).  The similarity between foils 
in the FCC test entails that success on this task depends on the ability to identify small 
differences amongst foils, rather than having to determine whether or not a novel, largely 
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dissimilar foil has been seen before, as in the SR test.  Retrieval of the correct response in the 
FCC test is therefore facilitated in the ALI group, whereas the novel foils used in the SR test 
constitute a distracting, rather than facilitating, factor.   
 
Bowler’s Task Support Hypothesis (Bowler et al., 2004) states that help at retrieval can often 
aid success on declarative memory tasks in ASD. If this is the case, not only may this explain 
the preserved performance on FCC, but also it brings into question how tests of familiarity 
can really probe familiarity processes ‘purely’ (i.e. involving as few other cognitive processes 
as possible) in ASD and has future methodological implications.  For instance, although the 
FCC test has been used successfully with amnesic patients and patients with hippocampal 
damage (Migo et al., 2009), it might be that this type of test is less suitable for testing ASD 
populations due to their tendency to be oriented towards visuo-spatial differences. However, 
what it may also show is that children with ALI may not necessarily have a quantitative 
impairment in familiarity processes but a qualitative one that will very often confer a 
disadvantage (i.e., in a world that dominated by language) but can confer advantages (i.e., 
when visual perceptual details are key to remembering what one has and hasn’t seen before). 
 
In summary, it appears that despite mirroring inconsistencies of familiarity performance in 
the ALI literature, the research presented in this thesis has unveiled some possible 
explanations for such diversity. Familiarity, as measured by SR, did demonstrate a significant 
impairment in ALI and this is important, particularly for reasons that implicate educational 
interventions and practice. It is still useful for educators to understand that familiarity is at 
least anomalous in ALI and will often be impaired if visuo-spatial skills cannot support 
retrieval. In classroom settings this may affect overall reading and comprehension and 
learning of new information. Educators could enhance learning if it is understood  ‘how’ 
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individuals with ALI may be compensating for this impairment in familiarity using their 
enhanced visual perceptual and discrimination skills. It would be interesting to devise tests of 
familiarity in the future that make use of auditory, gustatory, tactile and/or olfactory stimuli 
to examine ALI vs. ALN and TD performance on such tasks. It would also be useful to 
devise tests that examine success on a range of forced choice quartets with varying levels of 
similarity between target and foils to further examine the issues discussed above. 
 
ALN  
In the ALN group, performance on familiarity was also not entirely in line with predictions, 
ALN participants performing at a similar level to the TD group on FCC but significantly 
worse than the TD group on SR. The FCC result is consistent with the ASD literature where 
familiarity is largely preserved in ALN (Beversdorf et al., 2000; Hillier et al., 2007; Salmond 
et al., 2005; Boucher et al., 2005; Bowler et al., 2000; 2000b; Williams et al., 2006; Ambery 
et al., 2006; Buitelaar et al., 1999; Bigham et al., 2010; Boucher et al., 2008). However, it 
was surprising that the scores were relatively low for SR, with ALN participants being 
impaired relative to the TD group. This finding is particularly surprising considering that a 
similar test was used previously with similar aged children with ALN (Bigham, Boucher, 
Mayes & Anns, 2010) and no differences were observed between the TD and ALN groups. It 
would be possible to conclude that this result may have been obtained by chance but the 
group size was relatively large. It is possible also that the TD group performed better in the 
previous study but as there were a few minor changes to the stimuli it is not possible to 
directly compare results across both experiments.  
 
It is also worth questioning why the ALN group did not perform as well as the ALI group? If 
the arguments above regarding the similarity of foils holds, then perhaps if WCC is less 
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pronounced in ALN (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1) and enhanced discriminability is slightly 
reduced compared to ALI, then it is possible that in ALN, their preserved language may 
interfere with visual perceptual tasks (Williams et al., 2006; Williams & Jarrold, 2010).  This 
would be consistent with existing findings where verbal skills play a role when people try to 
remember pictures of objects (Williams & Jarrold, 2010). In ALI, visual perceptual skills are 
enhanced relative to their language ability whereas in ALN that is not the case. Therefore 
preserved language may hinder visual perceptual skills in the context of the SR familiarity 
task used here. 
 
Comment 
Whilst there may be instances where performance on tests of familiarity is facilitated by 
enhanced discrimination ability inpeople with ASD (as in performance on the FCC test), this 
may not translate to more ‘real life’ situations. This has been shown in an interesting study 
where small-scale search skills were extended to a larger-scale environment in a test 
comparing 20 school-age children with ASD and 20 age and ability-matched typically 
developing children (Pellicano, Smith, Cristino, Hood, Briscoe & Gilchrist, 2010). In this 
experiment, a ‘foraging room’ in a purpose built laboratory was created where numerous 
green and red search options were embedded into the floor. Children were instructed to 
search an array of 16 (green) locations in order to find the hidden (red) target as quickly as 
possible. The distribution of target locations was manipulated to appear on one side of the 
midline for 80% of the trials.  Baron-Cohen’s “systemising theory” should predict that 
children with ASD would have superior visual skills even in more true-to-life settings 
(Baron-Cohen, 2008; Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, Tavassoli & Charkrabarti, 2009). 
However this was not the case as their visual search behaviour was much less efficient, and 
their search patterns were significantly less systematic and optimal than those of the TD 
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children. The authors (Pellicano et al., 2010) propose that children with ASD have difficulties 
in inferring a probabilistic rule within a larger-scale environment because it requires constant 
updating of navigational skills involving egocentric and allocentric representations of space. 
Although these are not tasks of familiarity, their ecological validity may give a more accurate 
cognitive representation that is more true to real life.  If familiarity was tested in more 
naturalistic settings where enhanced discriminability can less easily be employed, then it is 
likely that ALI’s may struggle relatively more. The vast majority of familiarity data has been 
collected within same-day presentation and testing.  This would be when familiarity is likely 
to be at a temporary maximum. Recognition in natural settings produces familiarity responses 
after months and years (Mandler, 2008). In some natural settings children with ASD may not 
always be able to rely on their superior visuo-spatial skills therefore this may explain why 
findings are mixed. Given the possibility that individuals with ASD compensate for reduced 
abilities in declarative memory it would be useful to obtain data from more realistic settings 
rather than solely rely on tests that employ small-scale uncontextualised stimuli. 
 
 
Recollection 
Experiment 1 employed a recognition test (Forced-choice non-corresponding; FCNC) and 
Experiment 2 a cued recall test (Action Recall; AR) to probe processes of recollection. Cued 
recall tests would be considered a ‘truer’ test of recollection because familiarity processes 
contribute little if anything to tests of recall whereas they can play a role on tests of 
recognition (Bastin, Van der Linden, Schnakers, Montaldi & Mayes, 2010).  
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ALN and ALI 
 
Both groups were impaired relative to the TD group on the FCNC task, consistent with the 
predictions and with the literature (e.g. Bowler et al., 2008a; Bigham et al., 2010; Smith et al., 
2007; Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2003; Salmond et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2006a). The 
ALI group were also significantly impaired on the AR test, consistent with the predictions. 
 
However, on the AR test the ALN group were unimpaired relative to the TD group, which 
was not predicted, and which is also inconsistent with past results on this specific test 
(Bigham et al., 2010). The AR test is a source memory test that encourages intentional 
learning between previously seen cueing item (a shape) and its associated action. The groups 
in the current study were larger in size than in the Bigham et al, (2010) study, making it 
unlikely that the current study was underpowered to detect the previously reported group 
differences.  In addition some of the actions were changed in the AR test of the current 
compared to the previous study to make them more stimulus-directed. Although a minor 
change this may have contributed to the differences in findings by minimising demands on 
the imitation of self-directed actions, which has previously been shown to be a source of 
difficulty for ASD individuals (see Hobson & Lee, 1999). More generally it is also worth 
noting that the AR test involved cued-recall, which has shown mixed results in ALN (Bowler 
at al., 2000; 2004; Bigham et al., 2010; Ring et al., 2015). Individuals with ALN tend to do 
well on recall tests when contextual information (implicating recollection skills) is not part of 
the test (Ambery et al., 2006; Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner 2008a; Bowler et al., 2007; 
Minshew et al., 1992; Mottron et al., 2001; Renner et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2007; Williams 
et al., 2006a).  It may be the case that AR, although a source memory test, was also relying on 
a lower level of contextually rich detail due to the fact that the shapes and actions were non-
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meaningful. Otherwise cued recall has generally been shown to be intact in ALN and so this 
performance in the ALN group on AR is not surprising (Mottron et al., 2001; Bowler et al., 
1997; Gardiner et al., 2003; Ambery et al., 2006; Bowler et al., 2000). This is also consistent 
with the  Task Support Hypothesis which suggests that cued recall should be preserved over 
free recall in ASD. However, when cued recall probes specific contextual details the findings 
become more mixed and therefore further studies will be needed to establish under which 
circumstances cued recall is and isn’t impaired in ALN. 
 
 
Declarative memory and semantic knowledge  
 
There is little research in ASD that has investigated the possibility that declarative memory 
impairments contribute to semantic knowledge impairments in this disorder.  Ullman’s 
hypothesis (2004), that declarative memory underpins the mental lexicon component of 
structural language (as set out in Chapter Three), may help explain the impairments of 
semantic knowledge in ALI as compared to ALN. A clear link was found in Experiment 1 
between semantic knowledge and familiarity as predicted but this was less obvious in 
Experiment 2. This was due to the collinearity of the measure of familiarity with the 
measures of fluid intelligence and visuo-perceptual skills, which correlated very highly with 
one another in the ASD groups particularly. Therefore it is difficult to infer that the SR 
measure of familiarity measured a different construct to the measures of fluid intelligence and 
visuo-perceptual ability. However, the presence of collinearity does not necessarily affect the 
efficacy of extrapolating the fitted model to new data provided that the predictor variables 
follow the same pattern of collinearity in the new data (Gujarati, 2004).  This would be the 
case because individuals with ASD rely on their visuo-perceptual and non-verbal skills and 
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so the performance on CEFT and Ravens are always likely to correlate, therefore this model 
was accepted. However, the findings from Experiment 1 clearly demonstrate that the 
familiarity measures contribute to semantic knowledge over and above any contribution from 
fluid intelligence or WCC. 
 
 
Ullman (2001, 2004) states that any form of memory impairment is likely to result in 
impoverished language. In addition, if language provides a basis for thought, impoverished 
language may in turn create limited and/or anomalous memories. This cyclical process can be 
seen in the cognitive profile of ALI and is likely not uni-directional. Ullman’s hypothesis 
states that grammar and vocabulary employ distinct neural systems (Ullman 2001, 2004; 
Ullman et al. 1997). The fundamental distinction is set up between the mental lexicon, a store 
of information about phonological forms and their associated meanings, and the grammatical 
system, which computes the meanings of complex forms using the rules of grammar. 
According to the declarative/procedural (DP) model of language as described in Chapter 
Three, these two kinds of processing are most efficiently handled by different systems: the 
declarative system for the lexicon and the procedural system for grammar.  
 
However, there are several instances of these processes overlapping and also interacting. This 
can occur at a neurophysiological level where brain structures overlap in the systems that 
they support as well as on an anatomical level (see Chapter Three for a full account). In 
addition there is evidence that interactions between Procedural and Declarative systems 
operate in both a competitive and complementary way (Ullman, 2004). This is important 
because whilst the focus of this research is on declarative memory, these interactions may 
explain some of the anomalies in cognitive profiles. 
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Ullman’s hypothesis has motivated substantial research in relation to Specific Language 
Impairment (SLI) where deficits are more often seen in procedural memory and where 
declarative memory is relatively intact, almost the reverse of the memory profile in ASD 
(Boucher et al., 2012; Dewey & Wall, 1997; Lum & Conti-Ramsden, 2013; Ullman & 
Pierpoint, 2005). This, amongst evidence from other neurodevelopmental disorders, has led 
to the formulation of the ‘Procedural Deficit Hypothesis’ (PDH, Ullman & Pierpont, 2005). 
The current research on ASD has shown a range of declarative memory with overall 
quantitative impairments in recollection  and more qualitative anomalies in processes of 
familiarity where visuo-perceptual skills seem to play a disproportionate role. The PDH states 
that in disorders such as Dyslexia, SLI, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and ASD, 
declarative memory may be compensating for a deficit in procedural memory (Ullman & 
Pullman, 2015).  Although the work in this thesis focused exclusively on measures of 
declarative and not procedural memory processes, it seems unlikely that declarative memory 
would compensate for a procedural deficit in ASD. The current thesis demonstrated 
anomalies in declarative memory in ASD, which is in line with the extant literature, and 
studies of procedural memory generally reveal no or only minimal anomalies in ASD. 
However, the interaction of declarative and procedural memory has not often been considered 
carefully in ASD, at least not empirically. Ullman’s model provides some interesting 
arguments in this context and it is important to appreciate their significance in relation to the 
development of ASD in some more detail. 
 
In earlier work, Ullman refers to a see-saw effect between the two systems and how they may 
compensate for one another (Ullman, 2004, 2008). Therefore this may have implications for 
the current findings. In order to appreciate the broader significance of the current findings, it 
is important to broaden the scope of this discussion briefly and consider the role of 
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declarative memory in language and how procedural memory may also be implicated due to 
its interaction with declarative memory.  
 
It has been proposed that the declarative system initially acquires knowledge through rapid 
learning processes whilst the procedural system learns more gradually through repetition 
(Poldrack & Packard, 2003). In addition, in the early stages of learning new information, the 
declarative system will dominate and over time shift towards the procedural system. This 
time shift can be modulated pharmacologically (Packard, 1999) evidencing this possible 
interaction and therefore if individuals with ASD have declarative memory impairments this 
may lead to subsequent procedural memory impairments such as implicitly learning 
underlying principles relating to social situations (Klinger et al., 2007). 
 
Ullman and Pullman (2015) have recently proposed several ways that declarative memory 
could compensate for procedural deficits in ASD, at least as far as memory processes are 
concerned in the context of language function.  First formulaic speech (Dobbinson et al., 
2003; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1990) can be learnt in rote chunks to allow for linguistic deficits 
in social situations. In addition, individuals with ASD are able to memorise rules and 
schemas relating to social instances where they may not be able to use their social skills to 
decipher what type of speech or behaviour is appropriate. This type of explicit learning on 
which ASD individuals seem to rely is evident of a compensatory declarative role (Ullman & 
Pullman, 2015). This may be the case but if there are elements of declarative memory that are 
impaired in ASD such as memory for relational and contextual information, then this may 
produce a very narrow store of contextually-rich memories from which individuals can 
subsequently retrieve, whether it is for declarative or procedural purposes. For example, if 
social understanding and learning is attenuated from the start, it is unlikely to be consolidated 
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in procedural memory, which would then allow for implicit application in social situations. 
There is some neurological evidence from studies of ASD on such compensatory action 
where increased activation in the hippocampus (Dichter et al., 2012) and parahippocampal 
gyrus (Vaidya et al., 2011) on a reward anticipation task and a social stimuli processing task 
respectively. Both tasks would not normally employ hippocampally-related areas of the brain 
for such tasks, which is usually associated with declarative memory and the authors 
tentatively point towards a compensatory role of declarative memory in ASD here (Ullman & 
Pullman, 2015). 
 
Recently an interesting study addressing a similar relationship between declarative and 
procedural systems, but in SLI, found that although there were some clear declarative 
memory impairments in vocabulary learning in SLI, these impairments could be attributed to 
procedural deficits (Bishop & Hsu, 2015). Specifically, forming associations between visual 
and auditory stimuli as well as remembering them over time was intact in SLI. However, 
relative to an age-matched comparison group the SLI group had difficulties with learning on 
a vocabulary-learning task. Bishop and Hsu (2015) propose that although vocabulary-
learning may often be considered to employ declarative skills, this task utilized procedural 
skills of remembering novel phonological strings. Therefore this difficulty was attributed to a 
deficit in the procedural system rather than the declarative system. This is an excellent 
example of how these memory systems are capable of compensating for one another in 
specific ways but Ullman and Pullman’s PDH hypothesis may not easily be mapped onto 
ASD. It may be the case instead, that this flexibility of system compensation and 
competitiveness is present in ASD but more reliant on procedural memory to compensate for 
a declarative memory impairment.  It is well known that individuals with ASD have good 
rote memory skills, grammar is largely intact but as is evident from this current research and 
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existing literature their lexical semantic ability is relatively compromised. Given the 
flexibility of these two systems (declarative and procedural) it is difficult to identify where 
strengths and weaknesses originate from in ASD. 
 
Therefore, this flexibility between these two systems is interesting and relevant in the case of 
ASD. There is a substantial body of evidence pointing towards declarative memory 
anomalies in ASD rather than a procedural deficit (again, see Chapter Three) and this will 
have a direct effect on language. Individuals with ALI tend to be better at grammar 
(supported by procedural memory) than lexical semantic ability (supported by declarative 
memory). This latter association is supported in ALI by the findings in both experiments of 
the current thesis and has addressed a salient gap in the literature. Important questions 
remain, however, about how declarative and procedural memory processes interact in ASD 
and in this context, Ullman’s original DP model (2001, 2004) may provide a more fruitful 
frame of reference than the slightly later PDH model (Ullman & Pierpoint, 2005; Ullman & 
Pullman, 2015).  
 
 
Implications for Intellectual Disability 
 
The aim of this research in relation to intellectual disability was to obtain data on possible 
causes of language impairment in children with ID (without ASD). Performance by the ID 
group on declarative memory was predicted to fall between the ALI and ALN levels. 
However, on all tests excluding verbal IQ and semantic knowledge, the ID group performed 
significantly poorer. These include two familiarity and two recollection tests as well as tests 
of visuo-perceptual abilities (CEFT) and fluid intelligence (Ravens).  This is a striking 
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finding and is consistent with a government report on educational needs, which states that 
children with ID are more impaired than expected and that they struggle more globally 
(Dockrell et al., 2012a; 2012b). It may be that their relatively high VIQ enables them to cope 
in every day situations. A study by Carpentieri and Morgan (1996) showed that children with 
ID who are equated on IQ with children with ASD will show better adaptive behaviours than 
children with ASD. This is a key advantage; however in an educational setting it is important 
that these adaptive skills do not mask relatively severe cognitive impairments that could be 
overlooked or misunderstood. 
 
Despite the impairments in the ID group, they did show a different pattern to the ASD groups 
in terms of the predictors of semantic knowledge.  Low visuo-perceptual skills, as 
demonstrated by their low performance on CEFT, were significantly associated in the 
regression analysis to their semantic knowledge. Their performance on PPT was not 
predicted by either familiarity or fluid intelligence, which paints a very different picture to 
the ASD groups. This is not consistent with some existing literature. In children with 
language impairment (not strictly equivalent to an ID group as they included children with 
SLI), findings have shown that there is a domain specificity of memory impairment that 
affects verbal processing but not visual processing (Baird, Dworzynski, Slonims & Simonoff, 
2010).  The authors found that children with a language impairment had an impairment on all 
verbal memory measures compared to children who had never had language impairment but 
also that these impairments were still present in children whose learning impairment had 
resolved.   By contrast, visual memory and learning were not impaired relative to children 
without language impairment. The severity of verbal memory and language impairments 
correlated with one another. This may be further evidence for Ullman’s original model that 
memory impairment is implicated in language impairment, which may follow in individuals 
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with ID.  However, as mentioned, this link was not shown in this current research. More 
research is required in intellectual disability to establish factors that may contribute to 
semantic knowledge and more broadly, language impairment.   
 
 
Limitations  
 
It was unfortunate that it was not possible to fully pursue testing on the implicit mindreading 
test in this study as it is important to recognise that mindreading ability and language ability 
are strongly correlated (Bloom, 2000; Ahktar & Tomasello, 2000). However, the focus on 
declarative memory in children with ALI, ALN and ID is under researched and had to take 
priority. It was difficult to collect complete datasets in these populations as testing on a high 
number of tests across four different diagnostic groups took time and there were often 
absentees at schools resulting in some missing data. This happened across all groups so it has 
unlikely caused a sampling bias. Also, there were no participants that elected to no further 
testing. Similarly, it was also extremely difficult to obtain a separate measure to confirm ASD 
status. The SRS was administered for 26.3% of the sample and although these individuals 
performed accordingly in relation to their group status it is nevertheless disappointing. All 
children were diagnosed by educational or clinical psychologists and extra measures were 
taken by the experimenter as mentioned in Chapter 5 to attempt to reduce this weakness. 
 
The PPT test had ceiling effects from the TD group which made it problematic for drawing 
conclusions regarding the role of declarative memory in semantic knowledge in their group. 
A more sensitive test of semantic ability could have been used; however the priority of this 
current research was to use a non-verbal test with minimal memory load thus enabling 
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research to be conducted with language impaired individuals.  The Clinical Evaluation of 
Language Fundamentals – 4th Edition (CELF-4; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003) was initially 
trialled with children with very low verbal abilities (bordering on non-verbal) with ASD and 
ID but they were unable to do a significant amount of the tests. An alternative would have 
been to exclude children with lower verbal abilities and use a wider battery of language tests. 
However this would not have been in line with the main aim of the study which was to test a 
very under researched area of individuals with ASD and ID with low verbal abilities.  Future 
research, on the other hand, could benefit from a more comprehensive examination of 
language abilities and it might be worth compromising the group inclusion criteria to do this.  
Another factor particular to this current research was that some of the subtests of the CELF 
were considered to incorporate a memory load which needed to be avoided. This was because 
not only was this research testing declarative memory but it was also important to identify the 
language ability of participants without having to rely on other skills such as memory which 
may have made the task too challenging. In the Bigham et al., (2010) study the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) was used but there is evidence to show that this test can 
overestimate verbal abilities which would also be counter-productive here (Norbury, 2005). 
Therefore the PPT fulfilled these criteria and it was still sensitive enough to flag interesting 
associations in individual groups. 
 
The effect of visuo-spatial skills in the ASD group was anticipated to bias results to a certain 
extent but not as dramatically as they did.  Finding a suitable declarative memory test for 
language-impaired children is challenging for similar reason as mentioned above. To ensure 
that verbal skills were not being used that could either advantage children with better 
language and/or interfere with memory performance, the FCC and FCNC recognition tests 
were advantageous. However, the disadvantage that they may have relied on superior visuo-
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perceptual skills may also be seen as a point of learning. At a methodological level this type 
of test may not be suitable for testing in ASD populations, which is a valuable finding.  
 
It is also possible that instead of having separate ALI and ALN groups that are defined by 
VIQ cut offs that a single ASD group with a wide and continuous range of language 
impairments could have been used. There were children that scored a VIQ between 75-90 
because there needed to be a clear division between the ALN and ALI groups. It may be the 
case that this would be underrepresenting the range of ASD abilities. However, whilst a 
continuous range could be advantageous, it is not necessarily going to address differences at 
the opposite ends of the spectrum but rather only levels of impairments or abilities. There 
were also clear difficulties with group matching and direct comparisons cannot be made 
between the low (ALI and ID) and high functioning (ALN and TD)  groups. Again, the aim 
of working with children with low VIQ’s meant that their verbal age equivalent ability 
needed to be sufficient to understand test instructions. Therefore an older cohort of children 
were recruited in contrast to their higher VIQ counterparts. It is clear however from the 
findings, that regardless of age and VIQ, there were different relations and patterns of ability 
of declarative memory, visuo-perceptual ability, semantic knowledge and fluid intelligence in 
the different clinical groups. This is an important finding. 
 
It was beyond the scope of this research to measure procedural memory which was 
regrettable. However, the primary aim was to investigate language impairment in lower 
functioning children with ASD and although the hypothesis was led Ullman’s DP theory, its 
investigation was secondary.  Notwithstanding, it would be advantageous for future research 
to measure procedural and declarative memory simultaneously in conjunction with a 
comprehensive range of structural language measures in order to make direct comparisons. 
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Here however,  it was relied upon that there is sufficient evidence that points towards intact 
procedural memory skills in ASD (see Chapter 3) and the focus of this research was to 
explore any possible links between declarative memory and semantic knowledge.  
 
What has been learnt through analysing these shortcomings is that the main aim of this 
research (attention to lower abilities) significantly limited the use of measures and 
complicated the analysis. No doubt this may be one explanation as to why there is relatively 
little research with children with lower verbal abilities. Future work would need to prudently 
weigh up the cost and benefits of working with lower ability children. Larger groups are 
advantageous and perhaps a better strategy and use of resources would involve exploring 
heterogeniety within larger groups rather than against a control group. Addressing these 
limitations as discussed above would involve further substantial work; yet the novel findings 
from this research should support, justify and consolidate more research activity in this 
direction. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
What these current findings reveal is the importance of investigating performance of ALI and 
ALN separately.  There is now neurological evidence of differences between these groups 
(see Trontel et al., 2015) as well as behavioural evidence pointing towards different 
developmental trajectories in language skills (Tek et al., 2014). If these groups had been 
combined into a mixed group here the lack of familiarity impairment in the ALI group on 
FCC may not have shown up as a discrete feature in a large group score. These findings in 
familiarity require careful interpretation because they are still mixed and inconclusive. 
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However, given the heterogeneous cognitive profile and its varying manifestations in ASD 
this is not surprising. These anomalies in performance can reveal significant factors regarding 
methods used in the ASD population as well as inconsistencies in the autistic cognitive 
profile at both language-impaired and normal language levels. 
 
 
Whether or not the memory, language and/or visuo-perceptual anomalies in ASD reported in 
this thesis are conceptualised as skills or deficits has far reaching implications at an 
interventional level. It is important for educators to value and use the ‘skills’ present in ASD 
to help children to maximise their learning capacity by using pre-existing abilities. This can 
also contribute to a more positive interpretation of ASD, which is useful amongst peers in a 
social context. However, the danger of this is that pervasive deficits are potentially 
overlooked and not addressed, either at an individual level (in an interventional context) or at 
a conceptual level by researchers. There is little known about how children with ALI differ 
from children with ALN, and the work in this thesis demonstrates that careful comparisons 
can shed light on this. 
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Appendix 
 
  
Summary Table of Memory Studies 
 
 
 
 
  
Non-declarative Memory 
 
   Non-declarative memory in ALI       
Author 
 
Task Main findings 
 
 
Miller (1999) 
 
Implicit perceptual skills Unimpaired 
Pring (2008) 
 
Implicit perceptual skills Unimpaired 
Toal et al. (2005) 
 
Habit formation Unimpaired 
Carter et al. (1998) 
 
Daily living skills Unimpaired 
Kraijer (2000)   Daily living skills Unimpaired 
    
Non-declarative memory in ALN       
Barnes et al. (2008) 
 
Implicit sequence learning Unimpaired 
Nemeth et al. (2010) 
 
Alternating serial reaction time task Unimpaired 
Bowler et al. (1997) 
 
Perceptual/conceptual Priming Unimpaired 
Gardiner et al. (2003) 
 
Conceptual Priming Unimpaired 
Toichi (2008) 
 
Semantic priming  Unimpaired 
Molesworth et al. (2005) 
 
Implicit category formation  Unimpaired 
Bott et al. (2006) 
 
Implicit category formation  Unimpaired 
Soulieres et al. (2011) 
 
Implicit category formation  Unimpaired 
Sears et al. (1994) 
 
Classical conditioning Unimpaired 
Gaigg & Bowler (2007) 
 
Fear conditioning  Impaired 
Brown et al. (2010)   Contextual cueing, Motor sequence learning Unimpaired 
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Declarative Memory 
 
   Recognition in ALI       
Boucher et al. (2008) 
 
Pictures of coloured shapes Impaired 
Boucher & Warrington (1976) 
 
Pictures of common objects- Delayed Impaired  
Lind (2008) 
 
Pictures of common objects- Delayed Impaired  
Summers & Craik (1994) 
 
Spoken words- Delayed Impaired 
Boucher & Lewis (1992) 
 
Pictures of buildings- Immediate Unimpaired 
  
Unfamiliar faces- Immediate Impaired 
Hill & Russell (2002) 
 
Object pairs (unexpected test)- Immediate Unimpaired 
  
Spoken words- Delayed Impaired 
Hauck et al. (1998) 
 
Pictures of common objects- Delayed Unimpaired 
    Unfamiliar faces- Delayed (unexpected tests) Impaired  
    
Recognition in ALN       
Bowler et al. (2004) 
 
Written + spoken words (unrelated; various encoding conditions- Delayed Impaired 
Bowler et al. (2010a) 
 
Objects, locations, colours  Unimpaired 
  
Separately- Delayed Impaired 
Williams et al (2006a) 
 
Story Content- Delayed Unimpaired 
  
Complex scenes- Immediate (Wide range assessment of memory and learning) Impaired 
Toichi & Kamio (2002) 
 
Written words (various encoding conditions; unexpected test) Superior (phonological encoding) Unimpaired (semantic encoding) 
  
Immediate Impaired (self-referential encoding) 
Henderson et al. (2009) 
 
Written words (various encoding conditions; unexpected test)- Unimpaired (physical feature encoding) 
  
Immediate Impaired (self-ref. encoding) 
Lombardo et al. (2007) 
 
Written words (various encoding conditions; unexpected test) Unimpaired (physical feature encoding) 
  
Delayed Impaired (self-referential encoding) 
Bowler et al. (2008a) 
 
Written words (unrelated; in context of semantically related/unrelated words)-  Unimpaired (both conditions) 
  
Delayed 
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Toichi et al. (2002) 
 
Written words (various encoding conditions; unexpected test) Superior (phonological encoding) Unimpaired (semantic encoding) 
  
Immediate Impaired (self-referential encoding) 
Hillier et al. (2007) 
 
Geometric shapes- Immediate Superior  
  
Spoken words (semantically related- Immediate) Unimpaired  
Buitelaar et al. (1999) 
 
Meaningless patterns - Immediate (Benton Visual Recognition Test) Unimpaired 
Bigham et al. (2010) 
 
Meaningless shapes- Delayed Unimpaired 
Boucher et al. (2008) 
 
Pictures of coloured shapes- Delayed Unimpaired 
Beversdorf et al. (2000) 
 
Spoken words (semantically related)- Immediate Unimpaired  
Salmond et al. (2005) 
 
Spoken words (unrelated)  Unimpaired  
Lind (2008) 
 
Pictures (common objects)- Delayed Unimpaired 
Boucher et al. (2005) 
 
Written words (unrelated)- Delayed Unimpaired 
  
Pictures of common objects- Delayed Unimpaired 
Joseph et al. (2005) 
 
Pictures (common objects: same category; different categories) Unimpaired 
Ambery et al. (2006) 
 
Pictures of doors Unimpaired 
  
Proper names (doors and People test) Unimpaired 
Bowler et al. (2000)   Written words (related)- Immediate Unimpaired  
    
Free recall in ALI       
Boucher (1978) 
 
Others- Delayed Unimpaired 
  
Written- Spoken Words (unrelated)- Immediate Unimpaired 
Boucher (1981a) 
 
Spoken words (unrelated)- Immediate Unimpaired (reduced primacy; enhanced recency) 
Fyffe & Prior (1978) 
 
Spoken words (unrelated) Unimpaired (relative to both groups) 
  
Free recall - Immediate 
 Tager-Flusberg (1991) 
 
Spoken words (unrelated)- Immediate Unimpaired (relative to both findings) 
   
Impaired (relative to both groups; limited clustering) 
Frith (1970) 
 
Spoken word strings (structured, non-meaningful) Impaired (relative to both groups) 
   
(Enhanced recency) 
Boucher & Warrington (1976) 
 
Spoken words (unrelated)- Delayed Impaired (relative to both groups) 
Boucher & Lewis (1989) 
 
Instructions: spoken- immediate and delayed Impaired 
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 Demonstrated- immediate and delayed Impaired 
Boucher (1981b) 
 
Past activities: own- Delayed Impaired 
Millward et al. (2000) 
 
Past activities: Own- Delayed Impaired 
Hare et al. (2007) 
 
Past activities: own- Delayed Unimpaired (floor effects) 
    Others- Delayed   
    
Free Recall in ALN       
Ambery et al. (2006) 
 
Meaningless shape reproduction (doors and people) Unimpaired 
Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner (2008a) 
 
Written words (unrelated; in semantically related/unrelated word, texts)- Delayed Unimpaired (unrelated context) 
   
Impaired (related contexts) 
Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz & Paynton 
(1992) 
 
Unrelated words (California verbal learning test) Unimpaired 
Mottron et al. (2001) 
 
Written- spoken words (unrelated; various encoding conditions)- Delayed Unimpaired (all encoding conditions) 
Renner et al. (2000) 
 
Pictures of common objects- Delayed Unimpaired (reduced primacy) 
Smith et al. (2007) 
 
Written- Spoken words  Impaired 
Williams et al. (2006a) 
 
Number letter lists Unimpaired 
  
Unrelated words Unimpaired 
  
Sentence repetition Impaired 
  
Story Recall Impaired 
  
Figure reproduction Impaired 
  
Geometric shape reproduction 
 Minshew & Goldstein (2001) 
 
Unrelated words Impaired 
Bowler et al. (2009)  
 
Written words (unrelated) Unimpaired 
Buitelaar et al. (1999) 
 
Written words (unrelated) Unimpaired 
Salmond et al. (2005) 
 
Spoken words (unrelated) Unimpaired 
  
Spoken words - Immediate over trials Impaired 
Renner et al. (2000) 
 
Sentence repetition Impaired 
  
Pictures of common objects - delayed Unimpaired (reduced primacy) 
Bowler, Limoges et al. (2009) 
 
Written words (unrelated) Unimpaired 
Bowler, Gaigg et al. (2008a) 
 
Written words (unrelated) Unimpaired 
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Bowler et al. (2008b) 
 
Written words (unrelated) Unimpaired but Atypical 
Bowler et al. (2000) 
 
Spoken words - semantically relayed Impaired 
Bowler et al. (2009) 
 
Categorically organised word lists Unimpaired (reduced organisation) 
Gaigg et al. (2008) 
 
Categorically organised written words Impaired 
Botting & Conti-Ramsden (2003) 
 
Sentence repetition Impaired (relative to norm, not SLI) 
Williams et al. (2006a) 
 
Number letter lists Unimpaired 
  
Unrelated words Unimpaired 
  
Sentence repetition Impaired 
  
Story recall Impaired 
  
Figure reproduction Impaired 
  
Geometric shape reproduction Impaired 
Boucher et al. (2005) 
 
Story recall Unimpaired 
  
Figure reproduction Unimpaired 
Williams et al. (2005)   Story recall Unimpaired 
    
Cued recall in ALI       
Boucher & Warrington (1976) 
 
Spoken words Unimpaired 
  
Pictures of common objects Unimpaired 
Tager-Flusberg (1991) 
 
Spoken words  Unimpaired 
Farrant et al. (1999) 
 
Named Pictures of common objects Unimpaired 
Klin et al. (1999) 
 
Common objects on grid location Unimpaired 
Boucher & Lewis (1989)   Own past activities Unimpaired 
    
Cued recall in ALN       
Mottron et al. (2001) 
 
Written-spoken words Unimpaired 
Bowler et al. (1997) 
 
Written unrelated words Unimpaired 
Gardiner et al. (2003) 
 
Written unrelated words Unimpaired 
  
PAL - delayed Unimpaired 
Ambery et al. (2006) 
 
Proper names Unimpaired 
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PAL Unimpaired 
Minshew & Goldstein (2001) 
 
PAL Unimpaired 
Williams et al. (2005) 
 
PAL Unimpaired 
McCrory et al (2007) 
 
Naturalistic events Unimpaired 
Maras & Bowler (2010) 
 
Naturalistic events Unimpaired 
Bowler et al. (2004) 
 
Recognition of encoding condition Unimpaired 
  
Recall of encoding condition Impaired 
Bowler et al. (2000) 
 
Recall of episodic experience Impaired 
Bigham et al. (2010) 
 
Recall of unrelated action Impaired 
Salmond et al. (2005) 
 
Recall of temporal source Unimpaired 
Ring et al. (2015)   Object-location relations Impaired 
 
